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Abstract 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the question of British attitudes towards the 
United States of America has received significant attention as historians and 
commentators have debated whether Britain has belonged to an English-
speaking Anglosphere or a Europe defined by anti-Americanism. This research 
examines these contrasting ideas about British views of the US through a study 
of Britain’s political culture during the long 1950s. During this period events 
and trends from across the Atlantic were keenly monitored in Britain as the 
growth of the close Anglo-American diplomatic relationship added to the 
longstanding interest in US culture. This thesis provides an original 
contribution to debates about the ‘special relationship’ by analysing sources 
indicative of wider attitudes and ideologies which are often overlooked in 
existing accounts. It utilises a synthesis of sources including those pertaining to 
Britain’s political parties and their ancillary organisations, the media, and 
fictional representations of the US in order to analyse the reactions to America. 
Ultimately, it challenges the idea that anti-Americanism was widespread in 
post-war Britain and suggests that the threat posed by this viewpoint was 
usually exaggerated. Not only was the British political system particularly 
attentive to American trends and events but the majority of Britons were able to 
draw inspiration from groups or individuals in the US. Rather than being 
consistently positive or negative, views of the country intersected with other 
ideological beliefs and political exigencies, meaning that America was 
interpreted in diverse ways. Although there was often negativity about the 
country or opposition to its policies, these are best described as rational or 
reasonable criticism rather than excessive anti-Americanism. It was the US’s 
unprecedented international position rather than a surfeit of negativity which 
meant that it received sustained attention in Britain. 
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Introduction 
 
In a 1960 lecture about a recent visit to the United States of America, popular 
novelist Kingsley Amis complained about the ‘largely mistaken and dangerous’ 
state of British attitudes towards the country. He reported that: 
 
the pervasiveness of anti-American spirit is so thorough that it 
has become part of our national life, like discussing the weather 
or county cricket, something that binds together high and low, 
old and young, something so obvious that to mention it at all 
seems faintly absurd, humourless, pedantic […] 
 
Anti-Americanism, he claimed, was based on British ‘neuroses’ and the ‘envy 
of that nation which took world leadership away from Britain by means so 
much more humiliating than defeat in war.’ 0 F1 Amis’s ideas were provocative 
enough for the left-wing Fabian Society to reject the opportunity to publish the 
speech but his claims about post-war anti-Americanism were not as overlooked 
or unusual as he believed. 1F2 Despite having been seldom mentioned in the press 
or Parliament before 1945, by the early 1960s the term was well established 
within Britain’s political discourse as various politicians, journalists, officials 
and even celebrities discussed its extent and motivation. 2F3 This anxiety about 
anti-Americanism was merely one sign of the popular post-war belief that the 
1950s marked a period of strain or discord for the Anglo-American relationship. 
A vast literature was published which addressed the state of the alliance — or 
European-American interaction more broadly — and attempted to diagnose the 
reasons for the tension between the two countries. With titles which included 
Britain – Uneasy Ally, Less than Kin and Problems in Co-operation, these 
studies tended to re-enforce the idea that the relationship between Britain and 
                                                 
1 Kingsley Amis, ‘America, 1960’, Unpublished speech, Fabian Society/E/132/1, Fabian 
Society Papers, London School of Economics Special Collections (FSP). 
2 Fabian Society General Secretary Shirley Williams replied to Amis and noted that, though the 
lecture could be useful in countering the ‘anti-Americanism’ from the left-wing of the Labour 
Party, it stated its case too strongly. Letter from Shirley Williams to Kingsley Amis, 17 
November 1960, Fabian Society/E/132/1, FSP. 
3 In the Daily Mail in July 1953, it was reported that American singers Jerry Lee Lewis and 
Dean Martin had complained about the ‘anti-American biases’ of the British public. See 
‘Tanfield’s Diary’, Daily Mail, 27 July 1953, 4. 
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the US was troubled. 3F4 Such views were not confined to academia and the 
London Correspondent for American journal Newsweek, Fred Vanderschmidt, 
even claimed in 1947 that as many as one in three Britons could be described as 
anti-American. 4F5 
 Despite these anxieties about the growth of anti-Americanism and its effects 
on the Anglo-American relationship, the paradox was that these fears of a 
popular British antipathy towards the US grew at a time of increased intimacy 
between the two countries. Shared global interests led to unprecedented defence 
and intelligence co-operation sustained by a network of personal relationships 
between officials and politicians. The maintenance and extension of the alliance 
was, moreover, a central aim of post-war British foreign policy and concerns 
about the growth of anti-Americanism did not diminish the belief in a common 
Anglo-Saxon political heritage. Wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill was 
foremost in emphasising that the two countries comprised part of an Atlantic 
community based on their similar language, culture and political traditions. This 
thesis examines these divergent perspectives about post-war British attitudes 
towards the US. Investigating the long 1950s, it analyses sources pertaining to 
Britain’s political culture often ignored in studies of Anglo-American relations 
in order to characterise reactions to American politics, society, international 
policy and culture. It questions how far the panic about anti-Americanism was 
justified and the associated question of whether the putative ‘special 
relationship’ extended to British attitudes towards the US.  
 
                                                 
4 Leon Epstein, Britain – Uneasy Ally (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1954); Henry 
Pelling, America and the British Left: From Bright to Bevan (London: Adam and Charles 
Black, 1956); Franz M. Joseph (ed), As Others See Us: The United States through Foreign Eyes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Andre Visson, As Others See Us (New York: 
Doubleday, 1948); William Clark, Less than Kin (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1957); Fred 
Vanderschmidt, What the English think of us (New York: Robert M. McBride, 1948); Henry 
Roberts and Paul Wilson, Britain and the United States: Problems in Co-operation (London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953); James Burnham (ed), What Europe thinks of 
America (New York: John Day Company, 1953); William Buchanan and Hedley Cantril, How 
Nations See Each Other (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953); Henry Lee Munson (ed), 
European Beliefs Regarding the United States (New York: Common Council for American 
Unity, 1949); Bruce Russett, Community and Contention: Britain and America in the Twentieth 
Century (Westport: Greenwood, 1963); Milton Graham, ‘British Attitudes towards America’, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of London, 1951; Milton Graham, ‘Anti-Americanism: 
British Garden Variety’ Antioch Review, 12, 2 (1952), 217-228. 
5 Fred Vanderschmidt, What the English think of us, 2. 
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Literature Review 
 
Since 1945, the Anglo-American relationship has been the subject of extensive 
academic scrutiny as scholars have assessed the reasons for the diplomatic 
arrangements and questioned whether the alliance can accurately be described 
as unique or ‘special.’ An important tension in this literature has been the 
question of whether culture or realpolitik has been more important in 
determining its course. Broadly speaking, two approaches to the subject have 
been apparent: one which identifies the importance of shared values, culture, 
institutions and heritage in provoking co-operation and another which points to 
the role played by shared interests and goals in world affairs. Surveying the 
literature in 2013, Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh described this as a 
‘Manichean division’ but in practice the latter has been the more popular in 
studies of the ‘special relationship.’ 5F6 This emphasis on interests as the main 
factor informing the alliance and its vicissitudes — an approach described by 
Alex Danchev as ‘functionalism’ — has tended to focus on the state and 
intergovernmental co-operation. 6F7 Questions about the subject have 
consequently addressed the extent to which Anglo-American interests coincided 
during different periods and in various parts of the world. Influenced by realist 
conceptions of international relations, these scholars have focused on foreign 
policy makers and utilised Foreign Office and State Department papers, 
portraying the alliance as one of ‘competitive co-operation’ or an ‘ambiguous 
partnership.’7F8 Notions of specialness have tended to be regarded with suspicion 
with the adjective confined to inverted commas or charges that the alliance is 
either in terminal decline or has already ceased to exist. 8F9 
 Although the intergovernmental features of the relationship have been 
accorded extended scrutiny, its cultural, sentimental and ideological aspects 
have received less attention. David Watt articulated a common perspective 
                                                 
6 Alan Dobson and Steve March, Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives 
(London: Routledge, 2013), 2. 
7 Alex Danchev, ‘On Specialness’, International Affairs, 72, 4 (1996), 737-50. 
8 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-41: a study in 
competitive co-operation (London: Europa, 1981); Robert Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: 
Britain and America, 1944-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981). 
9 John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994). 
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when in 1986 he claimed that ‘the underlying basis of the Anglo-American 
relationship has always been interest and not, in the first place, emotion.’ 9F10 
When several studies of the Anglo-American relationship were published 
following the end of the Cold War, their treatment of culture or wider attitudes 
was cursory by comparison with the diplomatic features. 10F11 Steve Smith’s 
comment from 1990 still holds true of these realist, state-led studies: ‘much of 
the writing on the relationship overstresses the importance of personality’ and 
too often ‘actors’ own views are used as the starting point of analysis, whereas 
these themselves were structured by the situation.’ 11F12 Although the governments 
in Washington and London were central in determining the nature of bilateral 
co-operation and were pivotal during international crises, the alliance can be 
conceived as having operated on several levels: intergovernmental, elite/official 
and public/mass sentiment. 12F13 To focus on the first of these alone risks divorcing 
successive Prime Ministers and Presidents from their political contexts as well 
as the domestic organisations to which they owed their authority. Despite the 
executive’s primacy in making British foreign policy, every post-war Prime 
Minister had to contend with opposition over their stances towards the Anglo-
American relationship. Even the strongest leaders had to operate within certain 
ideological parameters and be sensitive to wider perspectives and attitudes. 
Furthermore, the heads of government were themselves the product of their 
political culture, arriving in office with assumptions or prejudices that pre-dated 
their election.   
 By investigating the long 1950s between the Korean War and Cuban Missile 
Crisis, this thesis aims to assess the ways in which the US was represented in 
                                                 
10 David Watt, ‘Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship’, in Wm. Roger Louis and 
Hedley Bull (eds), The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1986), 3. 
11 John Baylis, Anglo-American Relations since 1939 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1997); Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth 
Century (London: Routledge, 1995). John Dumbrell’s study gave culture the most extended 
attention and several others included some discussion of this aspect of the relationship. John 
Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001); C. J. Bartlett, ‘The Special Relationship’: A Political History 
of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (London: Longman, 1992).   
12 Steve Smith, ‘The Special Relationship’, Political Studies, 38, (1990), 136. 
13 Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
204. 
9 
 
Britain’s political culture in order to scrutinise this wider context within which 
decisions about the Anglo-American relationship were made. Although culture 
has at times been neglected in accounts of the ‘special relationship,’ since the 
end of the Cold War it has received more sustained attention. As well as being a 
sign of the ‘cultural turn’ in studies of history and international relations, the 
fact that the alliance survived the collapse of the Soviet Union led to questions 
as to whether its longevity was partly the result of sentimental factors unrelated 
to shared interests. According to Tim Dunne, the 2003 war in Iraq ‘reaffirmed 
the vice-like grip of Atlanticism on Britain’s identity.’ 13F14 Such studies 
emphasised the importance of myth, collective memory and identity in 
preserving the ‘special relationship,’ factors which influenced British policy-
makers in particular to continue to cultivate links with Washington. 14F15 For 
William Wallace, an Atlanticist narrative about Britain’s history and statehood 
retained a more powerful hold on the imaginations of policy-makers than its 
rival, which stressed that the United Kingdom was an essential part of Europe. 15F16  
 For conservatives, the ostensible shared culture and particularly the common 
political values and institutions represented an Anglosphere or Anglo-America. 
These scholars revived and extended the Churchillian ideas that were 
fashionable with the first generation of British Americanists in the 1950s and 
1960s. Their support for Atlanticism informed their Whiggish narratives about 
the nineteenth century ‘ripening of friendship’ and led them to minimise Anglo-
American conflict. H. C. Allen summarised this view by stressing the 
importance of ‘the fact that from their common heredity, environment, and will, 
there has developed an increasing similarity, and even sometimes identity of 
opinion and action.’ 16F17 The continued Anglo-American co-operation in the war 
                                                 
14 Tim Dunne, ‘‘When the Shooting Starts’: Atlanticism in British security strategy’, 
International Affairs, 80, 5, (2004), 908.  
15 Steve Marsh and John Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of 
International Relations’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17 (2006), 174. 
16 William Wallace, ‘Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom’, 
International Affairs, 67, 1 (1991), 65-80. 
17 H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relation, 
1783-1952 (London: Odhams, 1954), 33. See also H. C. Allen, The Anglo-American 
Relationship since 1783 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1959); Frank Thistlethwaite, The 
Great Experiment: An Introduction to the History of the American People (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1955); Herbert Nicholas, Britain and the United States (Baltimore: 
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on terror led to these themes being revived. However, the Anglosphere referred 
to a network of ‘special relationships’ between the US, Britain, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and English-speaking South Africa with its proponents 
suggesting that this group of countries was destined for international leadership. 
Walter Russell Mead described this culture area as ‘the group of countries 
where English is the native language of a substantial majority of the population 
and where social values and culture are largely shaped by Anglo-Saxon 
values.’17F18 Not only were there similarities in the political outlook within this 
culture area but its openness, strong civil society institutions and individualist 
ethos were said to have made it ‘the pathfinder for all humanity.’ 18 F19 The rise of 
information technology and the internet had led to a ‘cultural re-convergence’ 
and given these English-speaking countries the chance to extend their apparent 
global hegemony despite the rise of Asia. In Britain, Conservatives who 
opposed closer integration with the European Union promoted the Anglosphere 
— or the development of the links with the former Commonwealth with which 
the Anglosphere overlapped — as an alternative. 19F20 
 The notion of an Anglosphere poses several problems when attempting to 
understand Anglo-American interactions. On the left, the Anglosphere has even 
been labelled as a neoliberal, imperialist and covertly racist project. 20F21 However, 
more problematic has been the criticism that it homogenises both Britain and 
the US, ignoring the multiple political and cultural identities that existed in both 
countries. 21F22 On both sides of the Atlantic, there have been prominent groups 
and individuals who have frequently questioned the viability of the ‘special 
relationship.’ Although the cultivation of close Anglo-American links has been 
                                                                                                                                  
Johns Hopkins Press, 1963); D. W. Brogan, American Aspects (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1964). 
18 Walter Russell Mead, God and Gold: Britain, America and the Making of the Modern World 
(London: Atlantic, 2007), 114. 
19 James C. Bennett, The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead 
the Way in the Twenty-First Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 72. 
20 Daniel Hannan, How We Invented Freedom and Why it Matters (London: Head of Zeus, 
2013); David Willets, ‘England and Britain, Europe and the Anglosphere’, The Political 
Quarterly, 78, S1, 54-61.  
21 Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International 
Relations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
22 Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘The West as Anglo-America’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed), Anglo-
America and its Discontents (London: Routledge, 2012), 1-30. 
11 
 
a goal of both major UK political parties for most of the period since 1945, it 
has at times provoked considerable opposition. During the Cold War, there 
were doubts in Parliament and amongst the wider public about the wisdom of 
aligning British foreign policy too closely with that of Washington. There have 
also been recent calls for Britain to integrate more closely with the European 
Union and become a continental rather than Atlantic power. Despite the 
ostensible similarities in the political values and cultures of Britain and the US, 
there was often tension as both governments and populations harboured various 
stereotypes and prejudices about their ally. Nonetheless, the emphasis on the 
Anglosphere has tended to ignore or minimise those moments during which 
Britain and the US experienced conflict and tension. As Arthur Campbell 
Turner, an advocate of a Churchillian view of the relationship, argued in 1972, 
anti-American sentiments were: 
 
never voiced by responsible (seldom even irresponsible) 
politicians, never given any stamp of official approval, never 
“played up” in the press. All this tends to show that there was no 
great market for [anti-Americanism], that there was little 
advantage to be derived from being marked as a holder of anti-
America opinions, no political capital to be gained thereby. 22F23 
 
 Despite the belief amongst these scholars that anti-Americanism was a 
peripheral attitude in Britain, the end of the Cold War witnessed the growth in 
studies of the phenomenon. European-American disagreements about the 2003 
war in Iraq contributed to the proliferation of these studies as commentators and 
historians on both sides of the Atlantic identified it as widespread in British life. 
Rather than being a part of an Anglosphere, Britain was believed to be a part of 
Europe which was increasingly defined by its opposition to Washington. As 
Robert Kagan put it ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus.’23F24 After the term was popularised in the early 1950s amidst post-war 
Anglo-American tension, anti-Americanism tended to attract academic attention 
during the moments of conflict between Europe and the US which tended to 
                                                 
23 Arthur Campbell Turner, The Unique Partnership: Britain and the United States (New York: 
Pegasus, 1971), 32. 
24 Robert Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe n the New World Order (London: 
Atlantic, 2003).  
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coincide with Republican administrations. After the initial post-war interest, the 
1980s and 2000s witnessed subsequent extension of analysis of the concept 
with its meaning and scope undergoing various changes. Towards the end of the 
Cold War, anti-Americanism continued to be defined in similar terms to those 
used by Kingsley Amis in 1960. Its advocates were said to be were motivated 
by feelings of envy, resentment and bitterness at Britain’s post-war decline vis-
à-vis Washington. 24F25 By the 2000s, however, the vast attention accorded to the 
subject meant that its definition and scope were contested as it was variously 
described as an ideology, a counter-productive prejudice comparable with anti-
Semitism or an anti-democratic outlook. 25F26 For Moncho Tamames, it amounted 
to ‘the principal ideological current in the world’ and Ivan Krastev argued that 
anti-Americanism had ‘become a global reflex and a master framework with 
broad and flexible appeal.’ 26F27 Scholars stressed its polyvalent character, focusing 
on its plurality and ability to mutate according to time and space. Katzenstein 
and Keohane identified four types of anti-Americanism: liberal, social, social-
nationalist and radical. 27F28 Others have focused on the ways in which officials 
and authorities attempted to counter the growth of such attitudes. This has been 
one aspect of studies of the cultural Cold War, which have assessed the ways in 
which both superpowers attempted to manage their international reputations 
and project favourable impressions of their politics and society. 28F29 
 The interest in the historical and contemporary evidence of anti-American 
sentiment has resulted in some ambiguity about what constitutes the attitude. 
                                                 
25 Paul Hollander, Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965-1990 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992); Stephen Haseler, The Varieties of Anti-Americanism: Reflex 
and Response (Washington, D.C., Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1985). 
26 For a summary of the differing interpretations of ‘anti-Americanism’ see Brendon O’Connor, 
‘What is Anti-Americanism?’ in Brendon O’Connor (ed), Anti-Americanism: Volume 1 Causes 
and Sources (Oxford: Greenwood, 2007), 1-22. 
27 Quoted in Robert Stam and Ella Shohat, Flagging Patriotism: Cries of Narcissism and Anti-
Americanism (London: Routledge, 2007), xi. Ivan Krastev, ‘Introduction’ in Ivan Krastev and 
Alan McPherson (eds), The Anti-American Century (Budapest: Central European Press, 2007), 
2. 
28 Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
29 Hugh Wilford, The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune? (London: 
Frank Cass, 2003); Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of 
Arts and Letters (New York: New Press, 1999); David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The 
Struggle for Cultural Supremacy in the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-60 
(London: Routledge, 2004). 
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Most accounts point to the need to distinguish between pathological hatred and 
well-informed, reasonable or logical criticism of the US and Washington. For 
Andrei Markovits the crucial distinction is the difference between criticisms of 
what America is and what America does with only the former representing 
genuine anti-Americanism. 29F30 Despite these attempts to differentiate between 
criticism and prejudice, some definitions have been particularly inclusive and 
blur these categories. Sylvia Ellis, for example, described anti-Americanism as 
‘characterized by an opposition to U.S. values, culture and policies,’ as well as 
being ‘connected to a fear of the pervasive influence of American culture on 
British life, a culture viewed as morally bankrupt and overly commercialized.’ 30F31 
Such a broad definition indicates some of the problems with efforts to point to 
the depth of anti-American sentiment as these terms can result in almost any 
dissenter or critic of the US being dismissed as holding such views. Few of 
those accused of anti-Americanism were willing to identify as holding such 
attitudes and often sought to defend their reputations against this political insult. 
As Marcus Cunliffe has noted, the term ‘is a highly pejorative label,’ and the 
fact that it has been freely used to criticise opponents’ views is grounds for 
caution in invoking the term. 31F32 Indeed, the growing use of the concept has been 
criticised on these grounds by Max Paul Friedman, who has argued that ‘“Anti-
Americanism” […] came to explain almost any political position not in accord 
with the American policy of the day, regardless of the issues at stake.’ 32F33 
Federico Romero similarly argued that, ‘confounding different phenomena in a 
soup conveniently labelled as anti-Americanism is not a particularly useful tool 
for analysis.’ 33F34 Various accounts have rejected the idea that Britain, with its 
historic links with the US and post-war ‘special relationship’ deserved to be 
subsumed into a European culture area defined by opposition to American 
                                                 
30 Andrei Markovits, Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 11.  
31 Sylvia Ellis, A Historical Dictionary of Anglo-American Relations (Plymouth: Scarecrow, 
2009), 43.  
32 Marcus Cunliffe, ‘The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism’, in Rob Kroes and Maarten Van 
Rossem, Anti-Americanism in Europe (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1986), 25. 
33 Max Paul Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in 
American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 91. 
34 Federico Romero, ‘The Twilight of American Cultural Hegemony’, in David Farber (ed), 
International Perceptions of the United States since 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 157. 
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policies and values. According to Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, anti-
Americanism in Britain was ‘a matter of snobbishness and nasty journalistic 
remarks rather than political importance.’ 34F35  
 Ultimately, then, there is little agreement about whether Britain belonged to 
an English-speaking Anglosphere or an anti-American Europe which derived 
political identity from its opposition to Washington. This thesis scrutinises 
these contrasting ideas about Britain’s international position and identity with 
reference to the long 1950s. Despite the recent proliferation of studies which 
have scrutinised both the Anglosphere and anti-Americanism, gaps remain for 
further study. The contemporary preoccupation with the extent of anti-
Americanism has also been apparent in many subsequent studies. C. Vann 
Woodward reflected the common view when he argued that the 1950s ‘brought 
on a prolonged and quite unflattering barrage of criticism from left and right’ 
and ‘some of the bitterest anti-American criticism in the long history of the 
phenomenon.’35F36 Moreover, the more recent accounts of anti-Americanism and 
the Anglosphere have tended to assess Britain’s perceptions of the US 
alongside other European countries. 36F37 Given the fact that it had a ‘special 
relationship’ with Washington and historical, cultural, linguistic and political 
links with the country unlike those of its nearest neighbours, Britain ought to be 
considered in isolation. A handful of theses and articles have addressed aspects 
of the subject but have tended to assess particular institutions, organisations or 
groups in isolation. 37F38 This study differs by assessing sources which relate to 
Britain’s political culture, specifically the political parties and their ancillary 
bodies, the press, BBC and fictional representations of the subject. By analysing 
                                                 
35 Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Hating America: A History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 62. 
36 C. Vann Woodward, The Old World’s New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
xxiv. Emphasis in Original. See also Robert Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: 
Special Relations since World War II (Boston: Twayne, 1990), 56. 
37 Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans have loved, hated, and transformed America 
culture since World War II (London: Basic, 1997); David Ellwood, The Shock of America: 
Europe and the Challenge of the Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
38 Giora Goodman, ‘Who is anti-American? The British Left and the United States, 1945-56’, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University College London, 1996. One excellent study on which this 
thesis aims to build is John F. Lyons 2013 study, which examined the effect of gender, age, 
class and political affiliation on attitudes towards the US. John F. Lyons, America in the British 
Imagination: 1945 to the Present (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2013).  
15 
 
declassified and published sources, the thesis addresses several related 
questions. How far were the widespread post-war fears about anti-Americanism 
justified? Was the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ augmented by a 
political culture in Britain that was supportive of the alliance? How did attitudes 
towards the US intersect with other political values? 
 
The Long 1950s 
 
This thesis examines these questions by analysing the long 1950s. The ‘long 
1950s’ is a suitable time-frame for assessing the arguments about the 
Anglosphere and anti-Americanism. It was a time during which the alliance 
satisfied David Reynolds’s criteria for diplomatic uniqueness: it was both 
internationally important and unique in its bilateral qualities. 38F39 The years 
between the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and Cuban Missile Crisis in 
1962 marked the high-point of the Cold War relationship. Afterwards, the 
asymmetry of power within the alliance became increasingly apparent and 
scholars and commentators began to pronounce the ‘death’ of the ‘special 
relationship.’ Though there would be revivals in the diplomatic co-operation in 
the 1980s and 2000s, the relationship during the 1960s and 1970s was 
characterised by both countries’ existential crises, weak leadership and shifting 
international priorities. Despite the fact that the US and Anglo-American 
relationship were central to concepts such as ‘decline,’ ‘affluence,’ and 
‘consensus’ which have typically been used to characterised the 1950s, the 
question of American cultural, political, economic and social influences have 
been for the most part overlooked in accounts of the decade. 39F40   
 As well as being a period during which the two countries were close in 
diplomatic terms, the US was also significant in various debates about Britain’s 
politics, culture and foreign policy. A range of subjects led commentators, 
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politicians and activists to look across the Atlantic for warnings or inspiration 
about future trends, policies and developments. As well as being crucial in 
debates about the Cold War, America was a model of modernity and 
discussions about the actions of its government or its lifestyle were apparent on 
questions pertaining to socio-economic policy, culture and politics. Britain’s 
twentieth century has often been understood with reference to ‘decline’ or 
‘affluence’ and both of these concepts led to focus on the US and reflection on 
the Anglo-American relationship. For officials in Whitehall, the two decades 
after 1945 were a period of retrenchment which appeared sharply to contrast 
with Washington’s post-war prominence in international relations. As Britons 
debated their country’s seeming decline, it was often against the expansion of 
the US that this process was judged. Similarly, as the living standards of the 
British population improved throughout the decade, the challenges of 
consumerism and commercialisation were confronted with reference to 
‘America.’ Consequently, the subject played an important role in shaping the 
course of Britain’s political history during the long 1950s. Both the 
Conservative and Labour parties experienced divisions over the alliance with 
Washington and the issue affected elections and the formation of governments. 
The Attlee Government’s defeat in the 1951 general election occurred amidst 
Labour’s division over the ‘special relationship’ and Anthony Eden’s 
resignation as Prime Minister was in large part the result of the Anglo-
American tension caused by the 1956 Suez Crisis. Though it is often held to be 
axiomatic that foreign policy has had a minor role in determining general 
election outcomes, Harold Macmillan was reported as having told Conservative 
MPs in April 1955 that ‘Judging by experience in ’45, ’50 and ’51, Elections 
tend to turn on some issue of foreign affairs.’ 40F41 Furthermore, opinion polling 
surveys conducted at the time reported that international questions were often 
ranked by Britons as amongst the most significant issues. In January 1956, 
foreign policy was ranked at the top of a Gallup poll asking Britons to identify 
the most important problems facing the government. 41F42 Thus, this was an era 
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during which the US and Anglo-American relationship was central to British 
politics.  
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis explores these questions about British attitudes towards the US in 
the long 1950s by studying significant aspects and agencies of its political 
culture. Political culture has been defined in various ways since the term was 
popularised in the 1960s. For Walter Rosenbaum it amounted to ‘the underlying 
psychological forces that shape much of civic life’ and Dennis Kavanagh 
described the term as ‘the emotional and attitudinal environment within which 
the political system operates.’ 42F43 According to Raymond Williams, these were 
the ‘structures of feeling’ that governed human behaviour and political 
activity. 43F44 In this sense, political culture has some similarities with ideology as 
students of both have attempted to assess clusters of attitudes, how they fit 
together and motivate political action. For example, according to Michael 
Freeden ideologies do not simply refer to the major ‘isms’ but are more 
ubiquitous as they ‘map the political and social worlds for us’ and people 
‘cannot do without them because we cannot act without making sense of the 
worlds we inhabit.’ 44F45 Indeed, both Atlanticism and anti-Americanism have 
often been described as ideologies which informed British attitudes towards the 
US.  
 Utilising a synthesis of sources, it is possible to assess the ways in which the 
US was debated and represented in Britain. Chief amongst these are the two 
major political parties. In the 1950s, Westminster was an archetypal two-party 
system as Labour and Conservative dominated general elections and the 
formation of governments and opposition. The beginning of the period marked 
the high-point of membership figures for both parties; the Tories boasted 2.75 
million members whilst their left-wing rivals peaked at just over 1 million in 
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1952.45F46 Thus, political parties are a good indicator of wider attitudes because of 
their status as mediators and shapers of opinion as they perform the dual role of 
trying to reflect opinion in order to achieve electoral success whilst also trying 
to shape it and implement their political programmes. As well as both parties’ 
archives, this project incorporates their published journals, policy documents 
and the memoirs and diaries of these organisations’ senior figures. However, 
the parties cannot be assessed alone when gauging Britain’s political culture. In 
2010, Lawrence Black’s call for the broadening in the scope of the studies of 
political history described the necessity of encompassing information from 
outside of the formal arena of Westminster: 
 
Shifting from the world of elite politics to integrate popular 
politics and considering parties not in isolation, but in 
competition, is essential. But these can still operate within 
received parameters – tacitly assumed forms or customary 
sources of ‘the political’ – overlooking how parties and activists 
often have more in common with one each other than the rest of 
society. They insufficiently capture political culture – politics in 
its wider social setting, in which as a minority or occasional 
interest or identity, politics might bear a certain ‘otherness’, 
much as ethnicity or social class might. 46F47 
 
Nonetheless, Black claimed that to overlook the political parties entirely would 
be too extreme; ‘a discussion of political culture without party is like a party 
without fun – not uncommon but unfortunate.’47F48 Existing accounts of Labour 
and Conservative attitudes towards the Anglo-American alliance have often 
addressed them in isolation and question which party was the better custodian 
of the ‘special relationship.’ 48F49 Typically, this means that there is a focus on the 
leaderships whilst the wider party and the ancillary organisations — specifically 
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the trades unions and business groups — are accorded less scrutiny. Moreover, 
there were more similarities than differences between the parties; their senior 
politicians for the most part supported Atlanticism even though their 
memberships and supporters periodically objected to this strategy. 
 This thesis attempts to assess the attitudes within these organisations as part 
of Britain’s wider political culture, studying them alongside other sources 
which give some indication of views about the US. The print media also 
reached a mass public and the long 1950s was an era during which its 
circulation increased; of the national dailies both the Daily Express and Daily 
Mirror expanded to reach over 4 million readers by 1961. 49F50 The thesis does not 
solely utilise the quality newspapers such as The Times or Manchester 
Guardian which had an important role in influencing government decisions and 
foreign policy; the tabloid press, which had much higher readerships, has also 
been consulted. The post-war period also witnessed the growth of interest in the 
examination of American affairs and an army of press and BBC correspondents 
were located on the previously less glamorous US East Coast. Through their 
regular dispatches, Alistair Cooke, René MacColl, Don Iddon and Robert 
Waithman were amongst the individuals who helped Britons to interpret 
American culture, politics and society. As well as using the reports of these 
journalists, this study has also utilised the BBC’s archive of radio talks about 
the US in which the full transcripts of programmes and lectures broadcast 
throughout the 1950s are housed. 
Political culture and attitudes towards political questions can be identified 
using sources beyond those generated and controlled by elites but these tend to 
be less plentiful and pose several methodological challenges. Techniques for 
the study of public attitudes remained primitive and biased towards particular 
sections of the population. Although some accounts have attempted to probe 
attitudes towards the Anglo-American alliance by using opinion polls or 
quantitative methods, there is only enough information from such data to 
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supplement this study, rather than play a greater role within it. 50F51 Nonetheless, 
the contemporary findings of several social research organisations represent a 
rich and under-utilised source. The inter-war period witnessed the growth of 
academic attempts to measure attitudes and public opinion. The British Institute 
of Public Opinion (BIPO) and Mass Observation (M-O) were both founded 
with the aim of democratising policy-making by revealing the views and 
perspectives of the wider public. 51F52 Despite some initial scepticism, by the 1950s 
both BIPO and M-O commanded attention from the parties and its regular 
surveys — reported in the News Chronicle — helped to shape the political 
debate. Indeed, it was M-O co-founder Tom Harrisson who was amongst the 
first to warn of the growth of British anti-Americanism.52F53 Particularly vivid in 
revealing views about the US are M-O’s surviving Directives and News Quotas 
from 1950-1. In August 1950, shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea, the 
organisation asked its national panel of voluntary observers to provide their 
opinions about six nationalities with the result being that it produced several 
hundred often detailed descriptions about each country and its population. 53F54 
Although the responses only reveal a snapshot of attitudes at a particular time, 
they can nonetheless be used in conjunction with other sources to identify 
trends and patterns in views of the US. 54F55 
As well as being able to ascertain attitudes from these quantitative and 
qualitative resources, fictional portrayals of the Anglo-American relationship, 
the US or its population can be revealing of wider beliefs and assumptions. 
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Film directors or novelists did not transcend their political and social context 
but their works reflected debates and perceptions about the subject. As Alan 
Sinfield has noted, it ‘is through such stories that ideologies are reinforced – 
and contested.’55F56 In other words, these fictional portrayals help to frame 
political debates and the parameters within which these discussions occurred. 
Given its political salience, the Anglo-American relationship was often the 
subject of literary or cinematic representations. The financial arrangements of 
the post-war British film industry ensured that viewers were frequently 
presented with Hollywood actors occupying roles within majority British casts. 
The Anglo-American Film Agreement of 1948 specified that any profits over 
£17 million made by Hollywood studios in Britain had to be reinvested in the 
indigenous film industry. As a result, nominally British films could contain 
several US actors, directors or writers and thus provided frequent opportunities 
for the juxtaposition of actors from both countries. 56F57 Though audiences declined 
throughout the 1950s, weekly attendances still numbered 14.5 million in 1959, 
meaning that the medium was more popular than television and almost matched 
newspaper circulation. 57F58 As Sue Harper and Vincent Porter have noted, 
productions achieve popularity when ‘they set up a ‘parish of belief’ between 
the film-maker and the film-goer — a set of shared assumptions, a safe place in 
which dangers can be explored and neutralized, and confidence restored.’ 58F59 
Consequently, fictional accounts are not divorced from the political process but 
contribute to the setting of parameters for discussion and contribute to ongoing 
debates about a range of subjects. Various studies have previously examined 
British fiction and film during the Cold War or the representations of politics 
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more broadly and this study only assesses those productions or publications in 
which the subject of the US or the Anglo-American relationship is central. 59F60  
 Although this study intends to utilise a synthesis of sources often ignored in 
accounts of the Anglo-American relationship, there are limitations in the extent 
that such an approach can only shed light on the discrete political and economic 
developments of the relationship in quite general terms. This is particularly true 
given the fact that this thesis does not address American attitudes towards 
Britain or the Atlantic Alliance. After all, the officials in London and 
Washington have been central in the evolution of the alliance and also play a 
role in shaping political culture because of their ability to shape the political 
agenda and communicate ideas, propaganda and policies on the subject. Given 
that existing studies have tended to focus on the two governments and foreign 
policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic, this thesis utilises these sources 
sparingly. However, it would be mistaken to suggest that the government 
debate is ultimately unimportant in determining political culture. 
 
Outline  
 
Using this synthesis of sources, it is possible to explore the role of America in 
British political culture during the long 1950s. It is organised thematically with 
the five chapters each addressing a theme concerning British commentary about 
the US. Such a structure captures some of the awkwardness and untidiness of 
political culture as debates were fluid, not constrained by the institutional limits 
of particular organisations and various themes cut across several chapters. 
Chapter One examines British constructions of American politics in order to 
assess the degree to which commentary was based on the notion that the two 
countries shared significant political values. By assessing the reporting of US 
affairs and the divergent British interpretations of its ideological trajectory, it 
investigates the ways that America’s democracy and political life was reported 
and constructed by observers in the UK. Chapter Two explores the commentary 
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of American foreign policy in the context of the Cold War between the West 
and the Soviet Union. It investigates British responses to Washington’s 
international programme and the extent of the opposition to the nascent Anglo-
American relationship. Chapter Three examines the effects of the post-war 
changes in both countries’ international positions on British views of the US, 
addressing the ways in which Britain’s ‘decline’ was measured against 
Washington’s ascendency. Chapter Four focuses on the responses to the 
growing co-operation on questions of defence. With Britain increasingly 
dependent on American research and technology for its ‘independent’ nuclear 
deterrent as the decade progressed, this was an issue which at times epitomised 
doubts about the relationship with the US. As elites, policy-makers and the 
wider public grappled with questions about nuclear weapons, rearmament, 
NATO and the leasing of RAF bases to the US Air Force, the commentary 
frequently revealed underlying assumptions about Britain’s ally. Perceptions of 
American culture are the subject of Chapter Five, particularly the warnings and 
evolving debates about the Americanisation of British culture.   
Ultimately, the thesis argues that the popular fears about the growth in anti-
Americanism were exaggerated and in fact more common were attempts to 
discredit what was perceived as anti-Americanism. Although various issues 
concerning American politics, culture and foreign policy attracted regular 
criticism, this was evidence of the unusual amount of attention paid to the US in 
British political culture. Very few Britons were pathological in their criticisms 
with even the most hostile able to identify some elements of the country with 
which they sympathised or drew inspiration. Because of its role as the standard-
bearer for modernity but also due to the shared English language, no other 
country had the same significance in informing policy debates across the 
Atlantic. Commentary about the US intersected with a constellation of other 
values, beliefs and ideologies and a pro and anti-American schema is unhelpful 
given that perspectives evolved according to changing international and 
domestic circumstances and exigencies.  
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Chapter One 
Land of Liberty? 
 
Whether described as an Anglosphere, the English-speaking peoples or a 
‘special’ Anglo-American relationship, explanations of the ostensible intimacy 
between Britain and the United States have often pointed to the importance of 
shared political values. Speaking at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri in 
1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill outlined the major 
elements of this common heritage when urging western resistance to the threat 
from the Soviet Union: 
 
We must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great 
principles of freedom and the rights of man which are the joint 
inheritance of the English-speaking world and which through 
the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by 
jury, and the English Common law find their most famous 
expression in the American Declaration of Independence. 60F1 
 
Churchill’s perception that shared liberal values united a transatlantic 
community was not the only interpretation of the underlying principles of US 
politics as a diverse range of individuals and organisations sought to identify 
the traditions governing American domestic life. Nonetheless, it was a 
construction of the two countries’ links which had long been articulated on both 
sides of the Atlantic and had new relevance with the onset of the Cold War 
between the liberal democracies of the West and communist USSR. However, 
as well as there being substantial procedural and ideological differences 
between the two political systems, British commentary of certain aspects of US 
democracy was at times regarded as excessive, unfair and anti-American. 
McCarthyism, institutionalised racism, and the reports of crime and corruption 
in major cities were just some of the issues which provoked questions as to 
whether the country’s political culture had deviated from the traditions which 
linked it with Britain. This chapter examines British reporting of American 
politics and the contrasting ways in which its political and social trajectory was 
constructed in the long 1950s. It analyses the reasons for these different views 
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of American domestic affairs and assesses the extent to which Britons identified 
the existence of an Atlantic community based on shared traditions and beliefs. 
As will be shown in this chapter, the notion that there were underlying Anglo-
American political similarities was invoked by a range of individuals from a 
variety of ideological backgrounds. Although there were features of American 
democracy which provoked sustained criticism in Britain, these did not fatally 
undermine the idea that the two countries shared fundamental values.  
 
Reporting America 
 
In order to understand the nature of British attitudes towards American politics, 
it is important first to examine the scope and basis of the channels through 
which information about the country was transmitted to the wider population. 
This requires analysis of the ways in which the coverage of the US developed 
as well as the assumptions and backgrounds of the groups and individuals who 
were pivotal in its development. The Second World War and the growth of the 
Anglo-American relationship led to increased British focus on politics across 
the Atlantic. Interest in American politics was well established by Pearl 
Harbour and Washington’s entry into the conflict but the country’s growing 
significance in world affairs led it to receive even greater attention when the 
war was over. Writing in 1961, historian Arnold Toynbee argued that the whole 
world had a legitimate interest in American affairs because ‘the question of how 
America is going to acquit herself in her present ordeal is a question of life and 
death, not just for America herself, but for the whole human race.’ 61 F2 The allied 
co-operation between the two governments stimulated by the need to resist first 
Nazi and later Soviet expansionism led to growing demand for information 
about US domestic life amongst British audiences. In response, the BBC 
scheduled various radio programmes devoted to the affairs of its ally which 
included Let’s Get Acquainted, It’s Different in the USA and America Decides. 
Amongst the most popular was American Commentary, which had been a 
regular feature in schedules since the 1930s. Presented by American journalist 
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and broadcaster Raymond Gram Swing, the programme was reportedly heard at 
one point by a third of the British population with regular listeners including 
Winston Churchill and King George VI. 62F3 
 The wartime context within which the subject developed meant that the 
coverage of American affairs had to be sensitive. With the US entry into the 
conflict came the stationing of its military personnel in RAF bases in England 
after 1942 and broadcasts were designed to promote understanding and were 
careful not to cause the alliance to become strained.63F4 As a result, difficult 
subjects such as the nature of race relations and segregation were usually 
ignored or needed to be reported warily. Imperatives relating to the 
international situation also informed the increase in newspaper coverage of US 
politics and society. With the Roosevelt administration’s intentions in the 
Second World War uncertain at the time of the fall of France, the British 
Information Service (BIS) established a propaganda campaign after 1940 to 
disseminate information about the parlous European situation. Doubts existed in 
Britain about whether Washington would abandon its neutrality towards affairs 
in Europe and journalists were used by BIS in the efforts to counter the 
‘isolationist’ groups urging non-intervention. 64F5 A consequence of this 
propaganda offensive was the growth in newspaper attention on US politics and 
society. In 1940, few national newspapers had correspondents based in New 
York or Washington, while European positions were the more prestigious 
appointments. By the end of the 1950s however, a quarter of Britain’s foreign 
news derived from the US as numerous publications sought to expand their 
American coverage. 65 F6 The extent of this attention surpassed that reserved for any 
other foreign country. Throughout the 1950s, most journals and newspapers 
included sections devoted to US affairs but few were as extensive as the Daily 
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Express’s ‘American Column,’ which appeared on the third page of every 
edition and reported the minutiae of the country’s life. 66F7  
 The onset of the Cold War meant that the US remained relevant to Britain. 
Not only was American pre-eminence increasingly apparent but the renewal of 
diplomatic ties in the late 1940s informed the belief that political trends on 
Capitol Hill could have profound effects of British foreign policy. With many 
of the British journalists who began reporting in Washington or New York 
during wartime continuing to do so after 1945, there seemed to be continuity 
with the aims of wartime. William Clark, an Observer foreign correspondent 
who graduated from the University of Chicago in 1938 and later served as 
Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s Press Secretary, later reported that the task still 
involved ‘persuading the top-opinion makers that Britain was America’s loyal 
ally in peace as in war.’ 67F8 One newspaper which managed to assemble an 
impressive and respected American bureau was the Manchester Guardian. 
Before 1945, it had mainly relied on agencies and other newspapers for its 
American coverage and its staunchly Atlanticist editor A. P. Wadsworth had 
been responsible for most of the editorials on the subject despite having never 
visited the country. By the beginning of the 1950s, however, the newspaper 
spent more on the American service than the whole of the Guardian’s Foreign 
Service in 1930 and in 1950 cables from America amounted to nearly half of 
the total number of international reports received in 1938. 68F9 Its US 
correspondent Alistair Cooke and Washington correspondent Max Freedman 
provided regular despatches despite the technical difficulties associated with 
providing stories from the US. However, limitations were apparent in the UK’s 
American coverage. The Sunday Times only began to employ a foreign editor in 
1949 and the Daily Herald’s abolition in 1951 of such a position contributed to 
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the newspaper’s poor reputation for international affairs. 69 F10 Even though its own 
American service only developed in earnest after 1945, the Manchester 
Guardian’s journalists were somewhat dismissive of the rival Daily 
Telegraph’s use of the Associated Press for their American reports. 70F11  
The weight of coverage about the US in the press and media meant that the 
disagreements between the two countries were extensively reported and in turn 
could foster resentment towards Americans. A 31 year-old physicist illustrated 
this point when he reported that ‘when I read of the doings and sayings of 
Americans in the newspapers I get really mad and am inclined to blame the 
U.S.A. for all the world’s troubles today.’ 71F12 More generally, the fall-out from 
the reporting of diplomatic tension was often mistaken for signs of a prejudiced 
anti-Americanism. For American columnist Fred Vanderschmidt, the press had 
done more to create and increase and solidify anti-Americanism than any other 
medium.’72F13 However, this verdict is questionable given the backgrounds and 
attitudes towards the US of the individuals who shaped the coverage. Contrary 
to Vanderschmidt’s anxieties, many were enthusiastic about their adopted 
country even before embarking on their first assignments across the Atlantic, 
something which meant that criticism rarely extended to attacks on the country 
or its people. Many of those who reported in the formative years of the Cold 
War had already been based in the US for long enough to sympathise with the 
country and its population. BBC and Manchester Guardian journalist Alistair 
Cooke made the controversial decision during wartime to become an American 
citizen and his colleague Leonard Miall described him as ‘the real mid-Atlantic 
man.’73F14 Daily Express journalist René MacColl remembered his excitement 
when offered a role with the Baltimore Sun in 1926. It seemed, he later noted, 
‘as if every far-fetched dream in life might be coming true.’ 74 F15 Cooke had 
                                                 
10 Harold Hobson, Phillip Knightley and Leonard Russell, The Pearl of Days: An Intimate 
Memoir of the Sunday Times (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972), 259. Huw Richards, The 
Bloody Circus (London: Pluto, 1997), 164. 
11 See Letter from Alastair Hetherington to Max Freedman, 22 December 1953, Manchester 
Guardian Papers, John Rylands Library, Manchester (hereafter MGP). 
12 DR 769, reply to August 1950 Directive, Mass Observation Archive, University of Sussex 
(hereafter MOA).  
13 Fred Vanderschmidt, As Others See Us, 57. 
14 Leonard Miall, Inside the BBC (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994), 47.   
15 René MacColl, Dateline and Deadline (London: Oldbourne, 1952), 19. 
29 
 
witnessed US troops situated close to his home in Blackpool during the First 
World War and was fanatical about jazz music and the writing of H. L. 
Mencken. Not all were as enthusiastic and retained stereotypes about 
Americans despite their experiences of the country. News Chronicle journalist 
Vernon Bartlett, though noting his positive view of the ‘civilised American,’ 
complained about ‘the effects of chewing gum, ‘comics’, gangster films and 
motor cars so ostentatiously long that they cannot fit in any normal parking 
place.’75 F16 However, living and working in the US could alter the attitudes of the 
correspondents and C. V. R. Thompson modified some views of Americans 
whilst serving as the Daily Express New York reporter. Despite arriving with a 
perception that the typical American was brash and materialistic, Thompson 
concluded in 1939 that ‘I had changed. I was Americanized all right. I was no 
longer painfully shy, no longer ridiculously reserved, no longer dully placid.’ 76F17  
 Thompson’s suggestion that his US experience was transformative is one of 
the reasons for doubting the assertions that the British press was anti-American. 
With several having lived and worked in the US for several decades by the 
1950s, the American-based reporters were frequently reporting on what must 
have felt like an adopted home. Cooke, MacColl and Economist editor Geoffrey 
Crowther, who had worked for BIS and studied at Yale, were all married to 
American women. And it was not only American correspondents who had vast 
experience of the country. Daily Mail editor William Hardcastle had worked for 
Reuters in New York and Washington, conservative journalist Constantine 
Fitzgibbon was half-American and BBC’s political journalists Ludovic 
Kennedy and Robin Day had both worked on the East Coast before joining the 
Corporation. Rather than worrying about anti-Americanism, some British 
journalists were more perturbed by the emphasis on the US in the press. The 
Daily Express’s Anglo-Canadian editor Lord Beaverbrook believed that the 
problem was not that there was an excess of criticism about the US but that The 
Times under the ownership of Jack Astor was ‘simply a great propaganda organ 
directed […] to some vague idea of Anglo-Saxon union’ and ‘always ready to 
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sacrifice British interests to the States.’ 77F18 However, even the Beaverbrook press, 
though viewed by Vanderschmidt as amongst the most anti-American 
newspapers, praised aspects of the US political system. Despite its editor’s 
complaints about Washington’s foreign policy and Britain’s apparent post-war 
subservience to the US, the ‘American Column’ often pointed to the affluence 
of the country’s working class within its capitalist system. 78F19 Other robust critics 
of American foreign policies or of its political system retained a degree of 
admiration for its democratic processes. The regular columns of the Daily 
Mirror’s “Cassandra”, the pen-name of journalist William Connor, were 
outspoken in their opposition to McCarthyism and in 1954 he described the US 
as an ‘uneasy, power-soaked, wealth-drugged land.’79F20 Nonetheless, he was 
‘deeply interested’ in the country’s politics and ‘amazed’ by the Presidential 
conventions which he attended on several occasions. 80F21   
The geographical location and social circles of the British correspondents 
also had an effect on the coverage. The speed with which the channels for 
reporting US life grew after 1940 meant that there were certain geographical, 
political and social biases. At the beginning of the period, the foreign 
correspondents of the Sunday Times were largely British, male, university 
educated and their average age was 38. 81F22 As well as being quite a homogeneous 
group, many of the journalists based in the US were mostly familiar with the 
cities and elites on the East Coast.  Most socialised with their fellow reporters 
and Sunday Times reporter Henry Brandon remembered that on arriving in 
Washington he was told to ‘establish “connections” with the mighty, and the 
best way to do that was live near them in Georgetown.’ 82F23 At times this focus 
meant that events occurring outside of the East Coast were overlooked. As well 
as predominantly reporting from Washington and New York, questions were 
also raised as to whether the political prejudices of the Britons in the US 
affected the commentary. According to The Times’ reporter Peregrine 
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Worsthorne, the Democrats were significantly more popular than their 
Republican counterparts and this gave rise to ‘a consensus British view which 
nobody questioned.’ 83F24 The 1952 Presidential Election illustrated this attitude as 
the victory of Republican Dwight Eisenhower was unexpected by many who 
predicted the continuation of two decades of Democratic control of the White 
House. The Times’ senior American correspondent John Miller’s reports of the 
election led editor Sir William Haley to remove the journalist from Washington 
when his coverage of Democrat Adlai Stevenson was perceived as violating the 
newspaper’s goal of neutrality. 84F25 In reality, coverage of the election was more 
balanced as Dwight Eisenhower’s selection as Republican candidate led many 
to declare neutrality in the election, believing that the former General’s 
selection showed that American policy would unlikely change as a result of the 
contest. 85F26 Nonetheless, the urbane Stevenson received many tributes from 
Britons afterwards, with Cooke later describing him as ‘having mastered the art, 
far more difficult and rarer than that of a successful politician, musician, actor: 
success as a human being.’ 86F27  
 Amongst these American correspondents, there was usually concern about 
the state of the Anglo-American relationship. The published edition of Don 
Iddon’s Daily Mail columns stressed that he had ‘no great aim or theme […] 
except possibly a natural endeavour to aid Anglo-American relations by 
reporting everything with complete candour and frankness.’ 87F28 When the 
alliance seemed to have been damaged by the Suez Crisis in 1956, various 
British journalists stressed its significance for world politics. Geoffrey 
Crowther argued that the partnership was ‘not only a desirable thing in itself but 
also […] by far the strongest and perhaps the only guarantor of freedom from 
all-out war.’88 F29 For William Clark, the lessons of the diplomatic disagreement 
over the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt were not that Britain should pursue a 
neutral foreign policy but that the two countries would need to develop 
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together. Clark, who had resigned as Eden’s Press Secretary over the crisis, 
argued that ‘Britain will not gain national security and peace of mind by 
dissolving or loosening the partnership, but only by making it work, by seeking 
to be more and more closely mixed up with America.’89F30 Although the headlines 
in some sections of the press at the time seemed to indicate tension between the 
two countries, there were some articles which stressed the need for 
understanding. Serialised in The Times as the crisis erupted in late 1956, Sir 
William Haley’s report of a tour of the US concluded that ‘Of all nations, its 
history has a higher proportion of greatness than of baseness; of all peoples its 
motives are the least suspect.’ Despite the resentment about Suez which was 
apparent in some sections of the press, Haley stressed that ‘Amidst all the 
dangers that beset us we can be thankful that it is to this dynamic, humorous, 
impatient, impulsive, generous people there has passed the leadership of the 
world.’90F31  
 Augmenting the coverage of these British American correspondents was the 
writing of US journalists, whose columns could be easily reproduced in the UK. 
However, the backgrounds of these reporters only added to the geographical 
and political biases in the British coverage. The BBC employed liberal New 
Deal reporters such as Joseph and Stewart Alsop and Joseph Harsch for its 
American Commentary and the Corporation’s Chairman Lord Simon 
distinguished these individuals from the ‘irresponsible’ right-wing 
commentators such as Drew Pearson, Walter Winchell and Fulton Lewis Jnr. 91F32 
Other American journalists who were well-known in Britain were similarly 
supportive of its culture or political system. Frequent Spectator contributor 
Richard Rovere noted that his ideological background meant that he ‘would be 
some sort of Social Democrat if I lived in a country which had such a 
movement.’92F33 Many were born on the East Coast and were not unfavourable to 
British life when visiting or later remembered their network of contacts 
amongst the elite. Writing in 1958, the Alsop brothers recalled their friendships 
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with politicians from both sides of the House of Commons and, remarking on 
the deficiencies of Eisenhower’s America, claimed ‘Give us a Churchill, give 
us even half a Churchill or quarter of a Churchill, and America will pull the cart 
over the hill at last, to the grand goals all Americans wish to reach.’ 93 F34 Walter 
Lippmann was even known for having espoused the importance of an Atlantic 
Community in US foreign policy whilst the New York Times’ London 
correspondent Drew Middleton and frequent commentator Virginia Cowles 
were married to Britons, writing sympathetic accounts of their adopted country 
and its people. 94F35 Ultimately, then, the backgrounds, locations and political 
views of journalists who made a career out of translating American affairs to 
Britain meant there were likely to be limits on the extent of anti-Americanism 
in the press. Although the reporting of diplomatic tensions could foster Anglo-
American resentment, this was a sign of the relatively detailed scrutiny to 
which US affairs was accorded rather than anti-Americanism per se. American 
affairs were simply more often the subject of debate, controversy and attention 
that those of any other nation. This focus on US life and its politics was 
replicated in other areas of Britain’s political culture.  
 
Interpreting American Politics 
 
As well as the growing media interest in American affairs, Britain’s political 
parties keenly debated the putative direction and underlying values of US 
politics. Labour, Conservatives and their ancillary organisations sought to 
import political or programmatic lessons gleaned from their American 
counterparts whilst often arguing that the US system corresponded with their 
own ideas and values. Conservatives were the more natural exponents of this 
perspective. As politician and historian, Churchill was the figure most 
associated with this conception of transatlantic intimacy. Published between 
1948 and 1958, his multi-volume series The Second World War and The 
English-Speaking Peoples stressed the historical importance of the political 
values of a culture area encompassing Britain, the US, Australia, Canada, and 
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New Zealand.95F36 With maternal forebears who had fought for the American 
colonies in the Wars of Independence and shared ancestry with George 
Washington, Churchill referenced this heritage to encourage contemporary 
solidarity between the two countries. 96F37 His colleagues and Cabinet ministers 
Harold Macmillan and Quintin Hogg (Lord Hailsham) shared this Anglo-
American background as their mothers were part of a generation of the children 
of US millionaires who married upper-class Britons. All three figures embarked 
on high-profile pilgrimages to their ancestral homes during the 1950s and 
pointed to their transatlantic backgrounds as they stressed the need for Cold 
War co-operation. 97F38 A qualified barrister, Hailsham focused on the legalistic 
similarities of the two countries on several visits to Tennessee and in speeches 
to the American Bar Association. After invoking the supposedly common 
symbols of the King James Bible, the Magna Carta, William Shakespeare and 
John Milton, he noted that ‘America is the true born heir of Western Christian 
civilisation born in its British mode.’ 98F39 Fourteen years after Churchill’s speech 
at Fulton, Hailsham repeated the sentiments of his mentor when he noted at 
Westminster College that ‘Like America and Europe, Britain is part of 
Christendom or it is nothing.’ 99F40 
 Although such ideas were most frequently articulated in right-wing circles, 
the notion that Britain and the US were united by common faith in liberal 
democracy was espoused more widely. Released in 1946 just months after the 
Fulton speech, audiences at Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger’s A Matter 
of Life and Death would likely have noticed the similarities with Churchill’s 
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speech. It depicted a celestial trial in which British pilot Peter Carter (David 
Niven) attempts to convince an American jury that he deserves more time on 
Earth to spend with a Boston-born woman with whom he fell in love after 
making radio contact from his burning plane. The directors had explored the 
subject of Anglo-American affinity in their 1942 film A Canterbury Tale and A 
Matter of Life and Death affirmed the Anglo-American faith in the common 
law and freedoms. Although his prosecutor, a bigoted American killed by 
Britons at the Battle of Lexington, emphasised differences and tension between 
the two countries, his defence counsel convinced an all-American jury to grant 
Carter’s request. As well as the grand trial which stressed the mutual respect for 
justice and the rule of law, the trial ended with an invocation of the two 
peoples’ shared belief in the importance of the rights of the common man. 100F41 
Few 1950s films were as explicit in promoting messages of Anglo-American 
similarities but productions such as They Were Not Divided (1950), A House in 
the Square (1951) and A Yank in Ermine (1956) similarly explored the 
historical and contemporary similarities between the two peoples. 
With the Kremlin eager to exploit any tension within the West, portraying 
the ‘special relationship’ as based on more enduring factors than realpolitik was 
a way of stressing its resilience to critics. After meeting President Truman in 
December 1950 at a delicate stage in the Korean War, Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee spoke on BBC radio about the contrast between the ‘common cultural 
heritage and a common belief in freedom’ of the West and the totalitarianism of 
the USSR.101F42 Although Labour politicians utilised such rhetoric less frequently 
than their Conservative rivals, its senior figures supported Atlanticist 
organisations which often emphasised the sentimental basis of the relationship. 
Endorsed by the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell and various senior figures within 
the party, the Friends of the Atlantic Union stressed amongst other things the 
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importance of the common heritage when it argued for the creation of a 
parliamentary dimension to NATO. Barbara Ward’s 1954 pamphlet written on 
behalf of the group portrayed the two countries as having ‘developed, refined 
and consolidated the concept of freedom, and steadily extended the physical 
area over which free methods of government have been practised.’ 102F43 Several 
other groups utilised such arguments as they sought to promote Anglo-
American co-operation and communication throughout the 1950s and studies 
by academics such as George Catlin and the American founder of the Atlantic 
Union movement Clarence Streit stressed these features. 103F44 The fact that NATO 
forged agreements with Fascist Spain and the authoritarian regime of Syngman 
Rhee in South Korea did little to diminish the popularity of organisations such 
as the Society of Pilgrims, the English Speaking Union or the British American 
Association.  
 Alongside this belief in the underlying similarities of the Anglo-American 
democracies, there was fierce debate between the two major parties about the 
direction of post-war British politics. Within conservative opinion, free 
enterprise, entrepreneurialism and innovation were cited as the dominant 
American values. 104F45 Returning from a transatlantic trip in 1950, Conservative 
MP Richard Law was convinced that the American public’s high standard of 
living was the product of its capitalist economic system. Echoing claims often 
expressed in the right-wing press, Laws concluded from his US experience that 
‘free enterprise is more efficient as an instrument for producing wealth in 
abundance, and distributing it more widely, than the European system of 
reduction, defence and control.’ 105F46 On the left, the direction of the US was more 
fiercely contested, corresponding with the rival factions’ competing visions of 
Britain’s international position and future economic policy. Although left-wing 
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analysts were less likely to claim that Anglo-American relations were the 
product of shared liberalism, many on the left argued that the US was 
converging with their own version of democratic socialism. As well as 
celebrating the 1948 re-election of Democratic President Harry Truman as a 
victory for progressive forces around the world, there was frequent debate in 
left wing journals as to whether an American socialist party would emerge. 106 F47 
Such preoccupations caused historian D. W. Brogan to complain that the 
‘British public doesn’t want to learn about American politics’ and ‘prefers to 
ask silly questions like “When will the Americans get a Labour Party?” 107F48 
 Impressions of American politics and the content of its underlying values 
were mainly influenced by an individual’s own political position and domestic 
concerns. In Labour’s internal conflict over the post-war co-operation with 
Washington, divergent portrayals of the US were utilised in support of 
competing proposals for Britain’s foreign policy. Although the party leadership 
was largely Atlanticist and played an important role in the creation of the 
‘special relationship,’ the British left contained groups and individuals who 
were sceptical about the diplomatic links with Washington. These differences 
were particularly evident at the Labour party’s 1952 conference, which 
occurred at the highpoint of factionalism informed by attitudes towards Anglo-
American relations. Denis Healey, one of Labour’s prominent Atlanticists, 
asserted that: 
 
America is not run by Wall Street. Wall Street has lost every 
American election for the past 20 years and it will lose this one. 
It is not Wall Street that has run America’s foreign policy since 
the war. It has been backed by the 15 million organised workers 
in the American Labour Movement, and they are our blood 
brothers.108F49 
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His characterisation of Britain’s ally attempted to answer the criticisms of the 
party’s leadership from the Labour left that American life was dominated by 
conservative and regressive political forces. By contrast with Healey’s claims, 
other delegates in 1952 lamented the role of the ’60 monopolistic families’ in 
the US or the fact that ‘in the recent history of politics and trade union life in 
the United States the pace has been made by the right wing of American 
Toryism.’109F50 Such ideas about US politics were routinely invoked by individuals 
on the Labour left who believed that American capitalism was the natural 
successor of European fascism and for whom Wall Street, Du Pont and Ford 
were potent symbols of the apparent dominance of big business across the 
Atlantic.110F51 Thus, there was reluctance on the Labour left to accept that the 
governing classes in the US represented attitudes with which they could 
sympathise. Kingsley Martin, editor of Labour left journal New Statesman, 
argued that the prominent American unions were ‘conservative and not much 
concerned with preserving the Bill of Rights’ and Labour MP John Freeman 
described American politics as ‘politically primitive.’ 111F52 
 British onlookers could usually identify with certain American groups, ideas 
or individuals regardless of their party affiliation or ideology. Favourable 
constructions of the country’s politics were even invoked by the far left despite 
its programmatic and ideological hostility towards Washington. At the same 
time as claiming that the US Government was dominated by conservatism and 
business elites, there was faith that the general public held different attitudes. 
Harold Laski’s The American Democracy described the country as dominated 
by capitalism and property-ownership, conclusions which one recent 
commentator regards as demonstrating his naiveté and ‘willingness to believe 
the most outrageous slanders written about America if they fit his thesis.’ 112F53 By 
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interpreting US affairs through the prism of his own ideas, Laski, who was a 
Marxist writer and a member of Labour’s National Executive Committee, 
shared much with more mainstream figures and he was even optimistic about 
the country’s potential and the prospect of the emergence of another Abraham 
Lincoln or Franklin Roosevelt. He noted that ‘it is hardly possible […] not to 
feel that the impersonal forces of the world are shaping American destiny in a 
democratic direction which no party can deny and yet survive.’ 113F54 Even the far 
left celebrated the legacies of certain American figures – who were often 
establishment figures rather than radicals, communists or socialists. In a critical 
pamphlet about the state of US politics published in 1953, Daily Worker 
journalist Derek Kartun expressed faith in the influence of the ‘real Americans’ 
who included former Presidents Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams and 
Abraham Lincoln.’ 114 F55 In their admiration for these figures they had much in 
common with the more mainstream sections of British politics, which also 
invoked the legacies of these men. 115F56 Thus, ability to identify some political 
affinity between the US and Britain was widespread and defied the categories 
of pro and anti-American because it was practised by both supporters and 
opponents of the foreign policy relationship.  
 
Lessons from America 
 
As British politicians and officials tackled the socio-economic changes of the 
post-war era, the US was the country whose experiences were most frequently 
used as a guide to future developments. When Labour’s ‘revisionists’ lobbied 
for the reform of the party’s socio-economic policies after consecutive election 
defeats in 1951 and 1955, American lessons were regarded as particularly 
helpful. Anthony Crosland was amongst the most influential figures from this 
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faction of the party and used his interpretation of trends across the Atlantic to 
urge Labour to abandon its totemic commitment to the nationalisation of 
industry. Crosland’s seminal 1956 book The Future of Socialism argued that 
socialists should aim to achieve social equality as opposed to the reorganisation 
of labour and he frequently cited the US, rather than social democratic Sweden, 
as an example of the classless society which Britain should emulate. Recent 
economic growth and the resulting higher standards of living in the US were 
regarded as having eased class conflict and produced a less stratified education 
and social system than that of Britain. Emphasising like many on the left the 
importance of Roosevelt’s New Deal and the redistributive Tennessee Valley 
Authority, Crosland noted that these policies had ensured that ‘the natural bias 
of the electorate is, as in Britain, towards a little left of centre.’ 116 F57 The election in 
1952 of Republican President Dwight Eisenhower did little to diminish this 
faith and Labour colleague Hugh Dalton summarised Crosland’s viewpoint as 
‘if socialism = a classless society, isn’t the US more socialist than UK?’ 117F58 As 
the decade continued and Labour’s intra-party economic and foreign policy 
debates intensified as it remained in opposition, the arguments and analysis of 
American theorists such as J. K. Galbraith and Daniel Bell were used by left-
wing politicians to justify their prescriptions for the party’s future programme. 
For Stephen Brooke, such texts by US writers ‘became a weapon to be lobbed, 
like a grenade, not at the Conservative enemy but at one’s nominal comrades in 
the Labour movement.’ 118 F59 
 This supposed universal applicability of American lessons to a British 
context was mainly the result of the US’s international power, influence and 
symbolic position as the home of modernity. However, the implicit assumption 
of these efforts to learn from American politics was the idea that the two 
systems were sufficiently similar for ideas, techniques or methods to be 
transported across the Atlantic. The Anglo-American Council on Productivity 
(AACP), which funded trips for business and union representatives to study the 
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conditions of their counterparts across the Atlantic, showed that a similar desire 
to draw inspiration from the US existed outside of the political parties. 
Established as a part of Marshall Aid, the project led to the funding of sixty-six 
British teams to experience American industrial conditions. According to 
American official Paul Hoffman, ‘aid in dollars could be no more than a 
temporary palliative’ for Europe without increases in industrial output and an 
important task was ‘bringing labour along to see where their true interests 
lay.’119 F60 Such comments have led to the AACP sometimes being regarded as an 
example of American hegemony over Western Europe and Washington’s 
ability to alter attitudes by inculcating managerial and productivity techniques 
within industry and deradicalising the labour movement. 120F61 Indeed, the scheme 
attracted some contemporary criticism on these grounds from the far left or 
from others who questioned some British workers’ enthusiasm for American 
techniques. In a lecture to the Fabian Society in 1950, Richard Crossman 
challenged the idea that any lessons could be easily transported: 
 
It is very dangerous to assume that the economic incentives of a 
competitive society will necessarily increase the production of a 
society which has always believed far more in team work, in 
collaboration, and in the many other values beyond the 
acquisition of more wealth and a larger motor car than your 
neighbour.’121F62 
 
 Judging by the extensive reports of the AACP in trade union and business 
journals, few were in fact reluctant, coerced or pressured to imbibe examples 
from the US. The official reports of the trips sold hundreds of thousands of 
copies and were widely debated in British industry. Many of these accounts 
stressed the intangible ‘zip’ or ‘drive’ of Americans, impressions which added 
to the conviction on the soft left that the US experienced less industrial tension 
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than Britain.122F63 A report in the National and General Municipal Workers’ journal 
described the affinity between worker and employee, noting that ‘each 
addressed the other on the most familiar basis and this did not seem to lessen 
the discipline of the workers’ who ‘believed in putting in a full day’s work and 
fully appreciated that the prosperity of the firm ultimately determined their 
wages contract.’ 123F64 Such conclusions and recommendations that Britain adopt 
time-and-motion studies or specialisation were often advanced to make positive 
comparisons with the domestic situation by commentators who suspected that 
British industry was stifled by striking unions. After visiting US coal mines, a 
journalist for the Gaitskellite revisionist journal Socialist Commentary reported 
how refreshing was ‘the lack of bitterness in an industry that has seen harder 
times and more bloody battles than our own.’ 124F65 Industrial lessons from 
American companies were thought to be a panacea for various ills. Economist 
Graham Hutton — in a book which summarised the findings of the AACP — 
regarded American-style productivity as a panacea that could result in reduced 
working hours, a reduced economic burden of defence spending, lower taxes 
and increased personal savings. 125F66 As Hutton once noted, all of this could be 
achieved without the sacrifice of British traditions and customs. On BBC radio 
in 1951, he stressed that ‘Europeans can be richer and better-off in every way 
without having to chew gum, play American games, or drink and think like 
Americans.’126 F67 
 Not all sections of the trade union movement were as convinced about the 
necessity of the AACP or as positive about the calls for the automation of 
industry in 1955-6 which were made with reference to the US experience. 
Nonetheless, even opponents used American lessons to justify their 
prescriptions for Britain’s socio-economic policies. The far left was predictably 
the most critical, deriding the experiment as evidence of the ills of capitalism. 
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Metal Worker, the journal of the communist-led Engineering and Allied Shop 
Stewards trade union, suspected that the purpose of the AACP was ‘to place 
before the working class a line of bilge that will take our minds off the class 
struggle and attempt to kid us to maintain capitalism and the capitalist modes of 
production in the interests of the capitalist.’ 127F68 The enthusiasm of the trade union 
leaders and industrial managers for the American system as well as the glamour 
and high salaries of their US counterparts was not always shared by the manual 
workers, few of whom were involved in trips across the Atlantic. In a 1950 
BBC Home Service programme about the AACP, an industrial worker from 
Coventry was less favourable than his fellow speakers who had visited the US. 
Anticipating shortened work breaks and increased speed of production, he was 
reluctant to accept advice from a system which ‘reduces the worker’s status to 
something like an appendage to a machine.’ 128F69  
 Regardless of an individual’s attitudes towards the socio-economic changes 
of the 1950s, the US was regarded as portentous of Britain’s future. When the 
possible automation of industry received extensive discussion in the middle of 
the decade, Tribune correspondent John Lawrence was typical in pointing to the 
American example. A sceptic about automation, Lawrence reported that, 
despite some increases in industrial efficiency, in the US it had resulted in 
worsened labour conditions, unemployment, and the extension of the working 
week.129F70 With Labour and the TUC supportive of the controlled introduction of 
automation, others on the soft left conversely pointed to more positive examples 
from the US. The Daily Mirror’s series of articles about the ‘Robot Revolution’ 
in British industry stressed the favourable consequences of automation. 
Dismissing anxieties about the loss of jobs and emphasising the increased 
leisure time and education opportunities for workers, it outlined the testimony 
of a satisfied Ohioan manufacturer of vacuum cleaner wheels. 130F71 In trade union 
journals which favoured the introductions of these processes, the supportive 
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speeches of US union leaders were extensively reported and pictures of 
automated American plants were given prominence. 131F72 
 It was not only socio-economic lessons that could be gleaned by study of 
American politics as by the mid-1960s both political parties had also become 
eager to learn from US political practices. Initially, the Conservatives were 
more alert to the possibilities of importing the relevant techniques and methods. 
During the 1952 Presidential Election, the party collected ephemera from both 
the Democratic and Republican campaigns and its MP John Profumo travelled 
to the US to observe the electioneering techniques utilised by both 
organisations. 132F73 Reporting for the party’s Research Department on the methods 
of the American parties, Profumo claimed that there was ‘no apparent move to 
the Left’ in the US, whose life was ‘based on private enterprise.’ 133 F74 He reported 
the innovative and effective use of television by Adlai Stevenson and the 
popularity of the teleprompter, predicting that the medium would soon be 
employed in Britain. 134F75 Profumo’s analysis of American lessons was evidently 
deemed useful given that the party repeated the exercise in 1956, when Donald 
Kaberry provided a detailed report of a trip to the US. Conservative Vice-
Chairman, Kaberry doubted whether the party could ‘usefully copy’ much of 
what he witnessed and revealed his snobbery about the system when he stressed 
the limitations imposed by the ‘different scale of expenditure here and our more 
grown-up habits in relation to elections.’ What did impress Kaberry was the 
Republicans’ use of television briefing books for its candidates, the use of pin 
badges and coffee-party meetings and he recommended that these could be 
emulated by Conservative campaigners. 135F76 
 The aversion to commercialism and advertising on the left initially deterred 
greater study of America’s political methods. Writing in 1957, fervent critic of 
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consumerism and mass production Aldous Huxley referred to the US when he 
asserted that the ‘methods now being used to merchandise the political 
candidate as though he were a deodorant, positively guarantee the electorate 
against hearing the truth about anything.’ 136 F77 Even the sections of the Labour 
Party that were sympathetic towards the US and a close Anglo-American 
alliance were reluctant to utilise American lessons too overtly. In 1958, Patrick 
Gordon Walker, a broadly Atlanticist future Foreign Secretary, complained 
about the use by Conservatives of the advertising agency Colman, Prentis and 
Varley and his rivals’ focus on American politics. With Kaberry’s report having 
been referenced at that year’s Conservative Party conference, Gordon Walker 
believed that this was ‘bringing about the worst sort of Americanization of our 
public life.’137F78 Labour’s electoral misfortune during the 1950s encouraged 
greater engagement with ideas imported from across the Atlantic. As well as the 
growing perception that the party could learn ideological lessons from its 
American counterparts, the dynamism of John F. Kennedy, Democratic 
Presidential candidate in 1960, encouraged study of the reasons for his 
popularity. For Labour MP Betty Boothroyd, who worked for several 
Democratic Senate campaigns, it offered the opportunity ‘to be on the winning 
side for once and come back energised and better able to change the face of 
British politics.’ 138F79 That year’s campaign prompted wider calls for other US 
innovations to be adopted in British contests. Following the first televised 
Kennedy-Nixon debates in September, the Daily Mirror editorialised that this 
was ‘the Twentieth Century way to use TV for exciting, democratic 
electioneering,’ comparing it favourably with Britain’s ‘hidebound’ political 
productions. 139F80 The press diligently reported the encounters between the two 
candidates and several journalists concluded that the debates were the decisive 
factors in Kennedy’s ultimate victory, a judgement which encouraged questions 
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about whether a similar event would be held during the next British general 
election. 140F81  
 
Democratic Differences 
 
Despite the fact that political debate in both countries was conducted within a 
two-party system with regular elections, British attempts to portray their ideas 
as comparable with the US were at times belied by important constitutional, 
ideological and procedural differences between the two democracies. After 
achieving independence, the American system abandoned the rigid class 
hierarchy, state religion, monarchy and tradition which persisted in Britain. 
Instead, a political process was established which was particularly responsive to 
public opinion and had attracted the criticism of wealthy British conservatives 
who were frequent visitors during the nineteenth century. During the 1950s, the 
regularity of American elections and separation of the branches of federal 
government encouraged many Britons to describe Washington or the US 
population as temperamental, unstable or capricious. With the growth of a close 
intergovernmental relationship between the two countries, there were anxieties 
about Britain’s association with a potentially erratic system. Labour MP Tom 
Driberg noted in 1953 that ‘the trouble with America is that there is always an 
election pending.’ 141F82 At the climax of the 1952 Presidential Election, there were 
some complaints in Britain about the effect of the contest on American foreign 
policy. The Spectator complained about the ‘sense of vacuum created when 
America has for a brief interval to mark time in her diplomatic activity’ whilst 
the News Chronicle described the ‘paralysis’ in the country during the 
campaign which affected British foreign policy. 142F83 
 With Washington’s economic and military seniority within the Anglo-
American relationship increasingly apparent as the 1950s progressed, there was 
anxiety that developments in US politics could damage Britain. Because 
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Senators, Congressmen and military personnel had a more overtly political role 
in the US, these figures were at times thought to play too great a role in 
determining American policy. Author and politician Harold Nicolson expressed 
these concerns when he complained about the prospect that British ‘life and 
property may be placed in danger by one of those emotional gusts that eddy 
round the capitol at Washington.’ Particularly troubling was the possibility that 
‘our policies might be deflected by some twist in American politics or some 
Senator who is unknown to us and whom we are unable to remove.’143F84 
Exacerbating these concerns about the constitutional arrangements of the US 
political system was the fact that there were important ideological differences 
between both democracies. Although consensus broadly defined both countries’ 
experiences of the 1950s, Britain’s post-war settlement based on the pursuit of 
full employment and a mixed economy was markedly different to the US 
emphasis on economic competition within a free market. As a 63 year-old 
retired civil servant noted, ‘They err by being too much to the right in politics 
and their detestation of socialism does not make for a better understadning [sic] 
with other countries.’ 144 F85 In trade union and left-wing journals, there was frequent 
criticism of the American privatised medical system and a Tribune journalist 
reported in 1953 about the unnecessary procedures and operations conducted, 
concluding that ‘in a competitive society the hospitals have to supply a 
competitive service, and damn the risk to the patient just as long as the beds are 
full!’145F86 Added to this was the sense of superiority felt by British politicians 
towards their American counterparts. Assessing the legacy of President 
Roosevelt in 1955, Richard Crossman was not untypical in arguing that he was 
‘the intellectual inferior of all our twentieth century Prime Ministers, with the 
possible exception of Bonar Law’ and had ‘no respect for intellect or for 
ideas.’146F87 
 Besides the constitutional and ideological differences which caused concern 
in Britain, the apparent frequency of crime, corruption and gangsterism in the 
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US could damage the impression that the two countries shared democratic 
traditions. Despite the left-wing confidence that the two political systems were 
converging, American labor experienced a reversal of the gains achieved during 
the New Deal. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibited nationwide collective 
bargaining and trade unionists were required to sign statements saying they 
were not members of the Communist party. Moreover, the Kefauver and 
McClellan Committees received international attention when they investigated 
the extent of corruption and gangsterism in trade unions and urban areas. The 
latter led to the allegations of violence against the Teamsters union and its 
President Jimmy Hoffa becoming well-known in Britain. For Ben Roberts, a 
speaker on the subject for the BBC’s Third Programme in 1959, it seemed far 
removed from anything evident in Britain as he remarked it ‘is difficult to 
believe that a trade union leader could get away with this type of behaviour in 
Britain.’147F88 For communists, this was ample evidence that Britain should avoid 
American advice or emulate its democracy but such problems were at times 
wilfully ignored by their left-wing colleagues. 148F89 At a meeting of the TUC’s 
International Committee in May 1955, the National Union of Mineworkers 
moved that a protest be registered against ‘action being taken in America 
against trade unions under the Taft-Hartley Act.’ Rejecting this suggestion, the 
committee pointed to the far left background of the International Union of 
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers as a reason to doubt the veracity of these 
claims. 149F90 Journalists and officials often encouraged the conclusion that the 
crimes and offences of those being investigated did not represent the majority 
of American unionists. In 1957, American auto-worker boss Walter Reuther’s 
comments at the TUC at a time when the practices of American unions were the 
subject of scrutiny were similarly designed to ease concerns about corruption in 
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America’s largest union. His suggestion that the corruption was the work of a 
‘small minority’ and he promised that the AFL-CIO would ‘drive from our 
movement every crooked racketeer’ was widely endorsed by Labour’s allies in 
the press. 150F91 
 
McCarthyism 
 
McCarthyism — the strand of anti-communism based on unsubstantiated 
charges and personal defamation — was the subject of extensive coverage in 
Britain and had the capacity to erode confidence in the US’s liberal democracy. 
Of all the differences between the two systems, this was one of the more 
problematic. British eagerness to resist Soviet expansionism did not to the same 
degree extend to political attacks on academics, intellectuals and celebrities and 
various Americans sought refuge from the ‘witch-hunts’ in Britain. 151F92 Joseph 
McCarthy, the junior Senator from Wisconsin whose name was associated with 
anti-communism, was unpopular across the Atlantic. A Mass Observation (M-
O) poll conducted at the height of his notoriety in 1954 concluded that ‘[t]he 
general tone is against McCarthy’ as ‘few indeed showed themselves to be in 
sympathy with him.’ However, it stressed the nuances that existed in the 
coverage, noting that as few as one in six Britons could provide salient details 
about the Senator’s career and noting that the criticism ‘constituted a jibing 
form of scorn’ rather than ‘really bitter scolding.’ 152F93 Objections to this aspect of 
the US political climate were most frequently voiced in left-wing circles whose 
ideological counterparts were subjected to the most anti-communist scrutiny. 
McCarthyism only served to increase doubts about the nature of democracy 
within a capitalist system and New Statesman editor Kingsley Martin described 
the ‘witch-hunt’ as ‘rewarding mediocrity, cowardice, and sycophancy and 
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silencing independent and creative talent.’ 153F94 Past injustices against American 
radical and working class causes-célèbre such as Joe Hill, Sacco and Vanzetti 
and Tom Mooney were linked with McCarthyism and the Daily Mirror’s 
“Cassandra” even stated that it was ‘promoted by the same psychological 
background’ as Nazi anti-Semitism.’154F95 Liberals, socialists and communists alike 
challenged the accuracy of the conviction for perjury of former State 
Department official Alger Hiss, claiming that the extent of the post-war anti-
communism prevented a fair hearing of his case. 155F96 
 For supporters of the close Anglo-American foreign policy relationship, 
McCarthyism caused frustration more because he was closely associated with 
the ‘isolationist’ wing of the Republican Party. When McCarthy rose to 
international prominence in early 1950, his ascent was interpreted by many in 
Britain as potentially damaging to Washington’s involvement in Western 
Europe. The Manchester Guardian stressed that it ‘adds up to a very unhappy 
situation for America’s allies’ and there were anxieties that the bipartisanship of 
the early Cold War might have ended. 156F97 With the Republicans having been out 
of the White House for almost twenty years, McCarthy’s claims about the 
pervasiveness of communism in the State Department were just one element of 
the mounting attacks on President Truman and Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson. However, concerns in Britain were often offset by confidence that the 
‘witch-hunts’ would be transient with the press coverage of McCarthy 
describing the Senator as unrepresentative of majority values in the US. 
Discussing his 1946 election to the Senate, the Economist explained that it was 
‘what must be accepted as a moment of aberration.’ 157F98 This perception was 
encouraged by the American journalists reporting in Britain. In one of the first 
accounts of his anti-communist allegations, American Commentary presenter 
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Stewart Alsop reported that ‘The McCarthy’s in American political life are still 
a very small minority, but after this affair it may well [become] smaller simply 
because McCarthy has been made to look very silly’. 158F99 
 These widely articulated ideas all conflict with the view advanced by John 
Rossi which suggests that anti-Americanism ‘was given an enormous boost in 
Britain by McCarthy’s career.’ 159 F100 Although the Senator was unpopular with 
both elites and the public across the Atlantic, the ‘witch-hunt’ could nonetheless 
be reconciled with the idea that the US’s democracy was shaped by values and 
beliefs similar to those of Britain. There was faith that McCarthy would 
ultimately be defeated even when the Senator’s popularity and importance 
increased. Various politicians including Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, 
Dean Acheson, Adlai Stevenson and journalist Ed Murrow were regarded as 
individuals who could defeat McCarthy. These figures were portrayed as the 
responsible, mature or sane majority which would inevitably resist the goals of 
the rash, demagogic or lunatic fringe. As Britain’s Ambassador to Washington 
Oliver Franks noted in his initial reports of the phenomenon ‘[it] is difficult to 
believe that the American public can take Senator McCarthy’s charges 
seriously’ and ‘McCarthy’s antics are not overly important in themselves and 
they do not command the approval of responsible Republicans.’ 160F101 The fact that 
Eisenhower ranked amongst the likely bulwarks against McCarthy is 
demonstrative that Britons failed to appreciate the extent of the ‘witch-hunt.’ 
When the President was criticised for his stance of the subject, it was more 
often for his vacillation and inaction rather than complicity in the regnant anti-
communism.161F102 However, Eisenhower had been eager in practice to exploit the 
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Senator’s popularity in his presidential campaign and in office sought to outdo 
McCarthy in tackling subversive activities in the government. 162F103 British 
judgements often dismissed the idea that such anti-radical and anti-subversive 
attitudes were deep-seated in US ideology and presented its public as normally 
opposed to McCarthy. On the BBC radio panel programme Behind the News in 
1953, historian Alan Bullock rejected the criticism of McCarthyism from 
popular scientist Jacob Bronowski and outlined the reasons that the Senator 
would be defeated. He was confident that ‘the good sense of the American 
people and their courage and defence of civil rights will rescue them … I think 
that the Americans will come through and come up.’ 163F104 
 Even some of the people who acquired a reputation for anti-Americanism 
because of their criticism of American anti-communism were often reluctant to 
admit that the witch-hunts had fatally undermined or called into question US 
democracy. Director Charlie Chaplin had lived in America since the 1920s but 
was refused re-entry to the country in 1952 because of doubts about his political 
past and his treatment attracted criticism in Britain. In his 1957 film A King in 
New York which depicted the experience in the US of European monarch King 
Shahdov, Charlie Chaplin’s character mocked the ‘witch-hunts’ as well as the 
US education system and celebrity culture. In a juxtaposition often used by 
British satirists and commentators, Shahdov’s experience of American life 
contrasted with his expectation and excitement when first seeing the Statue of 
Liberty. Released in the year of McCarthy’s death, the film caused renewed 
debate about McCarthyism. However, Chaplin stopped short of suggesting that 
US anti-communism was representative of a permanent trend in American 
politics. Chaplin was reported as having stated in a press conference ‘I’m sure 
American democracy will function’ and in A King in New York American 
television specialist Ann Kay (Dawn Addams) advised Shahdov ‘Don’t judge 
by what’s going today. It’s a passing phase.’ 164F105 This was a mild critique, and as 
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Andrew Sarriss has noted the film ‘seemed remarkably gentle, wistful, and 
affectionate, in view of the treatment he had received.’ 165F106 
 Chaplin was one of many prominent victims of the ‘witch-hunts’ who 
gained attention in Britain but few incidents better demonstrated the caution in 
the British criticism of McCarthyism than the execution in June 1953 of Ethel 
and Julius Rosenberg. The radical Jewish couple from New York were 
convicted in 1951 of conspiracy to commit atomic espionage and despite 
initially attracting little attention in Britain by 1953 it was an important 
battleground in the cultural Cold War. The far left incorporated the case into its 
criticism of Washington and an international campaign for clemency was 
launched with street-protests apparent in London, Manchester and Birmingham 
with various trade unions and individual campaigners supporting the claims that 
the Rosenbergs were innocent and had been given an unfair trial. For anti-
communist Cold Warriors, this was an obvious example of anti-Americanism 
because the critics eschewed opportunities to make the same complaints about 
Soviet human rights abuses. 166F107 However, it was the relative availability of 
details about the Rosenbergs’ case rather than a surfeit of anti-Americanism 
that was responsible for the attention it generated. Moreover, responses to the 
incident did not easily fit within an anti and pro-American dichotomy. After all, 
the National Rosenberg Defence Committee (NRDC) which was established to 
direct the British campaign for clemency had strong links with their American 
counterparts and invoked US political icons in their protests. In Parliament 
Square, a sign placed next to the statue of Abraham Lincoln read ‘Lincoln 
would say that the Rosenbergs should not die’ and by the monument to 
Roosevelt in Grosvenor Square a wreath read ‘That Roosevelt’s ideals shall live 
– the Rosenbergs must not die.’ 167F108 Though critics dismissed these displays as a 
cynical effort to court public opinion, it was consistent with the far left’s belief 
that the American population could transform the direction of US democracy. 
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 It was the soft left for which the Rosenberg case caused the most difficulties 
as conservatives were mostly convinced of the couple’s guilt. For Labour and 
the Trades Union Congress, however, disapproval about McCarthyism had to 
be balanced with the desire to preserve the Anglo-American relationship and 
avoid offending Washington. Various politicians who had been critical of 
McCarthy’s ideas about American foreign policy were quick to dismiss the 
Rosenbergs’ case. Despite having caused a transatlantic dispute only a month 
earlier for criticising the Senator for having contributed to stalling Korean War 
peace negotiations, Labour leader Clement Attlee denounced suggestions by the 
far left that Britain should respond to the executions by evicting the US Air 
Force from RAF bases. 168F109  The wider left-wing criticism of the executions was 
more motivated by opposition to capital punishment — a live issue in Britain 
itself — than the desire to injure the US’s international reputation and it was 
this element of the case that attracted reproach from more mainstream circles. 
As Tribune, a journal on the Labour left which was hostile towards the Anglo-
American relationship, noted, the ‘real moral of the affair is that once again the 
barbaric nature of the death sentence is proved.’ 169F110 With several trade unions 
endorsing the calls for clemency, the TUC was forced to respond to queries 
about the subject by stressing that the couple had had a fair trial and were guilty 
of ‘treasonable activity.’ 170F111 Other unionists were outspoken in their calls for 
restraint in criticising US decision-making. One speaker at the far-left led Fire 
Brigades Union conference warned his fellow delegates of the dangers of 
passing a resolution which criticised the Rosenbergs’ execution. As well as 
characterising the NRDC campaign as ‘extremely left’ he advised that rebuking 
American action would ‘do nothing but harm our relations with the United 
States.’171F112 
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The “Negro Problem” 
 
The segregation and discrimination of African-Americans was another subject 
which was particularly difficult to reconcile with the perception that the US was 
a liberal democracy or country which shared values and traditions with Britain. 
White supremacy was the basis for social interaction in Southern American 
states and public facilities were legally segregated by race at the start of the 
1950s. Lynchings — the abductions and murders of black citizens by groups of 
white men — were less frequent than during the nineteenth century but the fact 
that they continued demonstrated the modest progress in furthering civil rights. 
This was often a source of British criticism and a 53 year old housewife 
complained to M-O that Americans ‘sing of freedom but lynch negroes.’ 172F113 
Although it had experienced racial controversies in the Commonwealth — most 
notably with the Seretse Khama case at the beginning of the decade — there 
were marked differences between the two countries’ racial compositions. 
Compared with the Deep South where over a third of some states’ populations 
were African-American, post-war Britain was relatively homogeneous and 
white. The black immigrants who arrived in large numbers during the 1950s 
were confined to a handful of port cities, meaning that few of the white British 
majority regularly interacted with the socially and geographically isolated 
minority communities. 173F114 
 Throughout the 1950s, British attitudes towards American race relations 
were entangled with the cultural Cold War. As both Washington and Moscow 
sought to prove the superiority of their political and social systems, the status of 
African-Americans was a contentious issue. Anxious that racial incidents could 
damage the reputation of its democracy overseas, the US Government sought to 
project positive aspects of the situation through the United States Information 
Agency (USIA). Published in the early 1950s, The Negro in American Life was 
typical in emphasising the progress made on racial questions. Including 
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photographs of racially integrated schools and urban areas, it described legal 
and educational reforms as the basis of recent advancements. 174F115 With both 
superpowers keen to appeal to the non-aligned world in Asia and Africa, the 
Kremlin and its satellite communist parties used any signs of tension to attack 
western democracy. In the early 1950s, the cases involving the Martinsville 
Seven and Willie McGee, who on the basis of questionable evidence were 
executed for the rape of white women, led to international campaigns by the far 
left. For commentators from this section of British politics already hostile 
towards American capitalism, this was another justification for their contempt. 
Harold Laski noted that the situation for African-Americans could not improve 
‘until its citizens have displaced the business man as the idol to be worshipped 
in its marketplaces.’ 175F116 
 Given that Communists sought to use this problem as a way of attacking the 
American political system, mainstream British opinion and coverage was often 
eager to support the US narrative of the subject which emphasised gradual 
amelioration. The fact African-Americans such as Paul Robeson, Bayard Rustin 
and Claudia Jones had contacts with the British far left ensured that racial 
injustices in America were predominantly publicised by communists. At the 
beginning of the 1950s, reflections on the subject tended to stress the ‘hope’ 
and ‘progress’ made in the US whilst trade unions pointed to the open-
mindedness of their American counterparts. 176F117 The Communist involvement 
deterred participation from the soft left and despite its doubts about the 
Martinsville case the Manchester Guardian editorialised that ‘[w]hen the 
“Daily Worker” and its friends take up a cause others become suspicious.’ 177F118 
Sensitivity about the communist propaganda on the subject ensured that the 
British press coverage was cursory. Racial riots in Cicero, Chicago in 1951 
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were barely reported in the British press and subsequent moments of tension did 
not discourage the perception that progress was being achieved. This narrative 
was epitomised after the US Supreme Court ruled in the Brown v. Board of 
Education case that racial segregation was unconstitutional. Although 
politicians from southern states condemned the ruling and vowed to block 
efforts to integrate black schoolchildren, the left-wing Daily Herald compared 
Brown with the Beveridge Plan and Tribune concluded that ‘the old society of 
the South which strove to maintain racial discrimination is finally doomed.’ 178F119 
As well as demonstrating the British uncertainties about the constitutional role 
of the Supreme Court — which had no power to enforce its decision and was 
soon ignored by Southern governments — it demonstrated that the British 
coverage often exaggerated progress. The optimism proved to be misplaced; in 
the states of the former Confederacy a decade after Brown only 2 percent of 
black students attended school with whites. 179F120 With the subtext being that the 
US could confront its past injustices and inadequacies unlike the USSR, there 
were similarities between this message and the propaganda of Washington, 
which was often re-published verbatim in trade union journals. 180F121 Indeed, some 
of the British reactions to the Supreme Court decision sufficiently 
complemented the official American position that the USIA utilised them in its 
subsequent pamphlets. In one entry published alongside The Negro in American 
Life, future Labour Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart asserted that Brown was 
evidence that the US was showing ‘as she demonstrated in the days of Lincoln, 
that the democratic principle can triumph over injustice.’ 181F122 
 This interpretation of American affairs was challenged in later years because 
Brown was followed by racial tension and the growth of the Civil Rights 
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Movement in response to Southern reluctance to integrate schools. By the mid-
1950s, the violence could no longer be ignored by the British press and various 
journalists became less optimistic after causes-celebres such as Emmett Till, 
Autherine Lucy and the Little Rock Nine generated headlines overseas. As the 
Civil Rights movement gathered momentum and racial tensions became more 
overt, press reports remained confident that this was a sign of progress. During 
September 1957, when the integration of nine African-American students at 
Little Rock Central High School was blocked by a white mob, the press reports 
in Britain tended to stress that the ensuing violence and strife demonstrated 
improvements. The white segregationists were regarded as holding attitudes 
that would soon be extinct and the News Chronicle journalist Bruce Rothwell 
was typical in describing the white protestors as ‘only a thousand strong, men 
crazed with hate and women wild-eyed and hysterical’ and ultimately the ‘mob 
was not Little Rock, just as surely as it was not America.’ 182 F123 The location of the 
British American correspondents amongst the US elite on the East Coast often 
discouraged more thorough analysis of the problem and the challenging of this 
complacency. In 1962, Guardian editor Alastair Hetherington was frustrated 
when his American correspondents failed to visit the Deep South to report on 
racial tensions at the University of Alabama. Referring to its main US 
correspondent, he expressed annoyance that ‘we were getting the “New York 
Times” beautifully re-written by Alistair Cooke’ which ‘wasn’t enough’. 183F124  
Even when journalists did venture outside of their natural territory and 
visited the Deep South, they were often able to reconcile experiences of 
segregation and racism with the notion that the US was a liberal democracy. 
When he travelled through the US in 1956, Cooke was optimistic about the 
recent progress. Of the high-profile case of Autherine Lucy, a school-girl 
expelled from Alabama University after her enrolment caused race riots, Cooke 
described it as ‘tragic freak’ and, with a characteristic reference to the Soviet 
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Union, described this as ‘the one lawless eruption so far’ and ‘all the more 
precious to the Communists for its rarity.’ 184F125 Underpinning this response was 
his discomfort about the emancipation of African-Americans. In an edition of 
Letter from America after his trip, he warned: 
 
Before we judge the South too hastily, we must put ourselves in 
their place. Suppose that half the population of Birmingham […] 
or Sheffield, or Brighton or London was coloured. And suppose 
it had been for two or three hundred years. With the coloured 
people going to their schools and you going to yours. Would 
you at once accede to a law going through Parliament that next 
autumn your children must go to school with coloured 
people? 185F126 
 
Though Guardian editor A. P. Wadsworth once praised Cooke’s ‘sensible 
views’ on the subject, his successor as editor Hetherington was less convinced, 
remarking later that Cooke ‘had a slight blind spot about civil rights in the 
South.’186F127  
Cooke was not the only journalist who could be accused of myopia on the 
subject even during the battles over de-segregation in the late 1950s. The 
BBC’s radio talks usually adopted a similar tone and historian John Lyons has 
claimed that although ‘there may have been some sympathy for the plight of 
African Americans, Britons still held rather negative views of them.’ 187F128 Various 
prominent visitors to the American South drew optimistic conclusions in spite 
of having witnessed violence or a lack of integration. The Times editor William 
Haley travelled to Georgia and New Orleans in 1956 and in his diary recorded 
his experiences of travelling by segregated buses and taxis, and noted that there 
‘must be progressions but we have not met them.’ 188F129 Nonetheless, Haley’s 
published account of the tour stressed to readers that the South was undergoing 
profound change and such practices were ‘bound to crumble in the end.’ 189F130 For 
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Guardian journalist James (later Jan) Morris, there was a similar conflict 
between her experiences and the reputation of American democracy when she 
toured the country. In Chicago, she reported hearing of attempts by white mobs 
to remove a black family from a previously all-white apartment block as well as 
noting racial economic disparities in New Jersey and the racial ghettoisation of 
Washington. 190F131 Nonetheless, travelling through the American capitol Morris, 
later a sympathetic biographer of Abraham Lincoln,  was captivated by the city 
and wrote that if one city in the world really does hold out a promise of ultimate 
decency, of fraternity among all peoples, it is still this dull old entity on the 
Potomac.’191F132 Ultimately, she urged readers to share her affection for political 
aspects of the country: 
 
And if, one summer night, you stroll alone through the city after 
a mellowing dinner, and see its famous monuments all about, 
the great floodlit dome of the Capitol, the gleaming obelisk of 
Washington’s memorial, the White House demure and domestic 
behind its railings, craggy old Lincoln dim-lit in his marble 
chair—if ever you wander through the capital in such a mood, 
Jefferson in your head and Chesapeake prawns in your belly, 
then I defy you to resist the magic of the American experiment, 
or evade its ever-noble pathos. 192F133 
 
 The fact that the racial situation in the US was a persistent cause of British 
interest prompted some allegations that it received disproportionate attention 
which reflected the British sense of superiority over its ally on the subject. In an 
unaired section of his 1957 Reith Lecture, American diplomat George Kennan 
noted the American bewilderment at the ‘smug superiority of the European who 
finds it easy to be tolerant towards the coloured minority he doesn’t have.’ 193F134 
Indeed, there was often a tendency to regard American examples as lessons 
which should not be imported to Britain. With immigration increasing from the 
Commonwealth throughout the 1950s, race relations in Britain were also 
strained by the end of the decade with riots occurring in Notting Hill and 
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Nottingham in 1958. The UK’s racial situation was far from harmonious and 
the white majority was intolerant towards the immigrant communities. 
According to Peter Fryer, Britons tended to regard the black population ‘as 
heathens who practised head-hunting cannibalism, infanticide, polygamy and 
‘black magic.’194F135  Nonetheless, outbreaks of tension or violence were reported 
with references to the American situation. Little Rock and Arkansas’s Governor 
Orval Faubus were cited as examples to be avoided in Britain. The front-page 
of the Daily Herald urged ‘Don’t Bring Little Rock to Britain’ and members of 
the public demonstrating after the riots displayed placards also alluding to 
events in Arkansas. 195F136 However, it was the growing racial tension in the UK 
that encouraged the left in particular to become more active in campaigning 
against racial injustice in the US. A month after the riots in Britain, African-
American labourer Jimmy Wilson was scheduled to be executed for theft 
amounting to $1.95, a decision which was eventually overturned after an 
international campaign and protests from Labour’s General Secretary Morgan 
Phillips.196F137 Silent about past US injustices, Labour’s concern about Wilson was 
partly motivated by its closer scrutiny of racism and prejudice in Britain 
following Notting Hill. Its National Executive Committee began work on a 
statement about racial discrimination in late 1958 and the party published a 
pamphlet on the subject in 1960 as it was now more sensitive to evidence of 
intolerance. 197F138 Though the far left continued to promote the issue, it was thus by 
the end of the period an issue that attracted wider debate and interest. 
Given the focus on the US from the British media, it is unsurprising that 
American race relations attracted the sustained attention of audiences across the 
Atlantic. Despite the differences between the two countries’ racial situation, this 
was another issue on which Britons looked to the US for policy inspiration and 
tended to regard the problems as analogous. Visiting African-American slum 
housing in 1947, Conservative MP Julian Amery observed that ‘In parts they 
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are as bad as the East End.’ 198F139After Notting Hill, opponents and proponents of 
the possible introduction of racial relations legislation cited the American case 
as instructive even though civil rights legislation was several years away. 
Labour MP Frank Tomney urged the government ‘to look at that American 
legislation, because in my opinion the American negro, except in the South, has 
reached the greatest stage of emancipation of those in any country.’199 F140 By 
contrast, opponents of legislation tended to note that progress was being 
achieved even before the Supreme Court intervened in the issue. 200F141 Thus, even 
with regard to an issue which elicited significant criticism of US practices there 
was a belief that American experiences and lessons could be applicable in 
Britain. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The belief that their political system shared important values, traditions or 
beliefs with the United States was widely expressed by British commentators 
with contrasting ideological backgrounds. Churchillian rhetoric about the 
English-speaking peoples was merely the most well-known example of the 
frequent efforts to look across the Atlantic for evidence to justify programmes 
and policies. Far from being based on anti-American hostility, implicit in the 
coverage was the notion that ideas and practices were to some degree 
transferable or that important lessons could be learned about the advantages of 
particular innovations. Attitudes were thus shaped by domestic positions and 
debates; the fact that American developments held relevant or portentous 
lessons for Britain’s future was the result of the US’s symbolic association with 
most forms of modernity. The post-war evolution of the journalistic analysis of 
the subject is demonstrative of this tendency to perceive Anglo-American 
similarities as observers often overlooked or minimised the country’s illiberal 
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or reactionary features. However, fundamental to this cautiousness about 
scrutinising the attacks on civil liberties was the international bipolarity of the 
Cold War. With the Kremlin arguing that these incidents undermined the US’s 
claims to represent democracy and liberalism, many British observers were 
unwilling to protest for fear of damaging Western propaganda or harming the 
Anglo-American relationship. Chapter Two examines in greater detail the 
effects of the global political situation on British attitudes and assesses the 
diverse responses to US foreign policy. Investigating views about American 
objectives, it questions the reasons for contrasting reactions to Washington’s 
international programme, the extent to which these views intersected with other 
views and beliefs and the degree to which the criticism of American Cold War 
strategy can be characterised as ‘anti-American.’ 
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Chapter Two 
Between Washington and Moscow 
 
Surveying the state of British attitudes towards the United States and the Soviet 
Union in 1947, Tom Harrisson argued that ‘the way that thinking people would 
describe our situation today, in psychological terms, is that we are in between 
USA and USSR, not just geographically, politically, or in power terms, but 
also, much more importantly, in social and sociological terms.’ 201F1 Linked with 
this position in world politics was what Harrisson, the co-founder of social 
research organisation Mass Observation (M-O), identified as an ‘alarming 
increase in anti-American sentiment’ with the ‘qualitative violence’ of the 
phenomenon now ‘widely overheard in private conversation.’ Despite the post-
war growth in East-West tension and the concomitant development of the 
Anglo-American relationship, Harrisson reported that M-O’s research ‘showed 
rather fewer people openly favourable to the USA than to Russia.’ 202F2 These 
conclusions were indicative of several assumptions which continued to be 
apparent in discussions of British attitudes towards the US throughout the long 
1950s. As well as being amongst the first accounts warning about the growth of 
anti-Americanism in the UK, Harrisson’s comments illustrated the extent to 
which the onset of the Cold War encouraged attempts to gauge British views of 
both superpowers. Within the bipolar international system — which led to the 
construction of opposing military alliances and outbreak of proxy wars — 
Britain was amongst America’s closest allies. Shared international aims led to 
the growth of close defence and intelligence links which were augmented by 
transatlantic networks of political and diplomatic contacts. Despite the 
centrality of this Atlanticism to British foreign policy, this did not prevent 
outspoken criticism, hostility and opposition towards American international 
policy or particular aspects of the ‘special relationship.’ Assessing the period 
between the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, this chapter examines 
British attitudes towards American Cold War foreign policy. It investigates the 
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growth in the usage of the term ‘anti-Americanism’ and questions if the 
widespread anxieties were justified about this aspect of the Anglo-American 
relationship. It analyses the reasons for the differing reactions towards the 
alliances and the ways in which they intersected with other political values and 
circumstances. Although there were periodic concerns about Washington’s 
international policy, this chapter suggests that the extent of anti-Americanism 
was exaggerated and simplified the reasons for the opposition to US foreign 
policy. Not only did the USSR attract greater suspicion and hostility than its 
Cold War rival but attitudes towards America’s world aims were complicated, 
the product of various beliefs which often pre-dated the close diplomatic 
relationship. Moreover, the intensity and frequency of the British objections to 
US objectives is best categorised as criticism rather than pathological anti-
Americanism. 
 
Who is anti-American?  
 
During the long 1950s, the Cold War was the defining feature of international 
politics. Optimism that the wartime allies would co-operate after 1945 soon 
diminished amidst mutual suspicions and tensions. Although relations between 
London and Washington were at times strained in the years after the Second 
World War, East-West animosity influenced the growth of the close Anglo-
American relationship during the late 1940s. Ostensible evidence of aggression 
by the Kremlin in Czechoslovakia and Berlin encouraged the conclusion that 
communist regimes were inherently expansionist. In response to this apparent 
threat, the Labour Government and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin cultivated 
close ties with Washington and as a result NATO was founded in 1949. 
According to Andrew Gamble, the bipartisanship about the subject meant that 
the alliance was ‘the real linchpin of the post-war consensus’ and a policy 
which ‘though occasionally questioned never looked remotely like being 
overthrown or seriously challenged.’ 203F3 However, not all sections of British 
opinion were supportive of such policies. Particularly in left-wing circles, this 
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Atlanticism was a frequent source of frustration for politicians and activists 
who objected to the alliance. In the late 1940s, the Labour left challenged 
Bevin’s foreign policy which centred on the Anglo-American alliance; a group 
of backbench MPs urging the government to pursue an international programme 
independent of both superpowers. This marked the beginning of dissent on the 
left which continued intermittently for the remainder of the period. Different 
views of the subject were important to Labour’s frequent factionalism; Aneurin 
Bevan and his supporters’ criticisms of the alliance often set them against the 
party’s Atlanticist leadership. 
It was within the context of Cold War alliances and the hardening East-West 
tensions that ‘anti-Americanism’ became a popular term for describing views 
about the US. As Philippe Roger has noted of twentieth century France, the 
concept’s ‘entry into the French lexicon seems to have been a direct 
consequence of the cold war.’204F4 The same was true of Britain; the rigid binaries 
of the era ultimately made it difficult to voice criticism of the US or prejudices 
about Americans without it being interpreted as anti-Americanism. Though the 
term was rarely used before 1945 in relation to Britain, it became embedded in 
the political discourse on both sides of the Atlantic during the 1950s. However, 
commentators were at first reluctant to employ the term and there was at first 
defensiveness in response to claims about the growth of anti-Americanism. 
When protests about the ‘special relationship’ were articulated by a group of 
Labour MPs in the late 1940s, the critics were more frequently attacked for 
their disloyalty or crypto-communism and Bevin described the ‘stab in the 
back’ he received from his colleagues who opposed his policies. Before 1950, 
allegations about the pervasiveness of the attitude tended to be met with 
suspicion. After Tom Harrisson reported the extent of the growth in anti-
Americanism and Newsweek journalist Fred Vanderschmidt argued in 1947 that 
one third of Britons were anti-American, their conclusions were challenged in 
the press. The Daily Mail — whose US correspondent Don Iddon was regarded 
by Vanderschmidt as amongst the worst offenders — claimed that only the 
‘dupes of Communist propaganda’ deserved the label and asked ‘What does it 
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matter if a few British are “anti-American” or a few American “anti-British” so 
long as both are sincerely “pro-Freedom?”205F5 Iddon regarded the accusations as 
‘hard to understand’ whilst a journalist for the Yorkshire Post questioned the 
utility of the term, suggesting that ‘[m]ost of us warmly admire the Americans’ 
but ‘we are, above everything, pro-British just as the Americans are, above 
everything, pro-American.’ 206F6  
As Cold War tensions ossified, objections to the alliance were more likely to 
be interpreted as examples of anti-Americanism. The initial scepticism about 
the relevance of the concept did not last long; by 1952 the Yorkshire Post 
reported of the growing factionalism on the left that those ‘who give way to 
anti-American prejudice are giving help and encouragement to the enemies of 
Britain.’207F7 Given that it offered the most outspoken critique of the Anglo-
American relationship, it was the left-wing of the Labour Party which was most 
often labelled ‘anti-American.’ As the politician who offered leadership to the 
critics of the relationship, Bevan and his supporters were often forced to defend 
themselves against such charges. In 1953, the Daily Mirror published an article 
by a New York newspaper which claimed that British anti-Americanism was 
widespread and that Bevan ‘needs hate for his politics [and] finds it more 
profitable and more in line with his Social Democratic ideas to turn it on the 
United States than the Soviet Union.’ 208F8 Although the Mirror’s correspondent 
“Cassandra” dismissed the allegations by stressing the British gratitude towards 
its wartime ally, 27 percent of respondents to a BIPO survey in 1955 described 
Bevan as ‘too anti-American.’209F9 As the term was popularised, it tended to be 
Atlanticists who defined the terms of the debate, utilising the concept as a way 
of discrediting their opponents’ ideas about foreign policy. Conservative MPs 
referred to Bevan’s colleague and ally on the Labour left when they called for 
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‘organised action in the House to counter anti-American efforts of the Barbara 
Castles, particularly at Question Time.’ 210F10 In Labour’s internecine conflicts over 
foreign policy, ‘anti-American’ was a term used alongside other insults which 
derided the left-wing of the party as ‘fellow travellers,’ ‘crypto-communists,’ or 
‘idealists.’ Prominent Atlanticist Denis Healey described his rivals as ‘political 
Peter Pans’ and remarked that ‘there is a real danger of anti-Americanism’ 
which he believed was ‘a disgrace to socialism and a menace to peace.’ 211 F11 
Attempting to discredit the critics of the ‘special relationship,’ Atlanticists 
portrayed ‘anti-Americanism’ as stemming from Britain’s declining world 
position vis-à-vis the US. Labour MP Anthony Crosland described it as an 
‘almost universal left-wing neurosis’ which Hugh Gaitskell believed was ‘fairly 
widespread and derived from envy at American wealth and power combined 
with the fear that Washington could embroil Britain in a world war. 212 F12  
Allegations about the growth of anti-Americanism were part of broader fears 
about the deterioration of the Anglo-American relationship amidst periodic 
intergovernmental disagreements. With titles such as ‘Are Britain and the 
United States Drifting Apart?’ and ‘Does the World Misjudge America?’ BBC 
radio programming on the topic reflected the common perception that the 
‘special relationship’ was imperilled. The warnings about anti-Americanism 
intersected with various other anxieties about the state of the relationship. 
American visitors often complained about their experiences of prejudice in the 
UK with an article in conservative journal John Bull capturing the mood of 
these publications by asking ‘Why are we American Visitors so Disliked?’ 213F13 
Anxious to minimise negativity towards America, the BBC’s coverage of 
American affairs often concentrated on attempts to reverse or remedy negative 
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attitudes about the US. 214F14 Speaking on the BBC in 1950, writer John Usborne 
told listeners how he had abandoned former prejudices about the US and 
advised his fellow countrymen ‘How to Like Americans.’ Although he claimed 
to have once regarded Americans as materialistic, bad mannered and 
uncultured, Usborne now concluded that he ‘had stopped somehow, thinking of 
Americans as Americans, as people who are different from us.’ 215F15 This anxiety 
and the ensuing attempts to diminish anti-American sentiment were noted by 
writer V. S. Pritchett on a US visit in 1954. Recalling a conference by the 
Committee for Scientific and Cultural Freedom on the subject, he complained 
that: 
 
By transferring unhappy things to the problem shelf, the 
conference, the symposium and — in personal life — to the 
psychiatrist’s couch, one has denied the buck, denied personal 
responsibility, and preserved oneself from the discomforts of 
facing awkward facts. The question “Why do Europeans dislike 
us?” for example, had become subtly transformed, when I was 
in New York, into something more soothing to self-esteem; the 
“problem” of anti-Americanism in Europe. 216F16 
 
Even though the term ‘anti-Americanism’ simplified the reasons for 
opposition towards US foreign policy or the Anglo-American relationship, 
critics of Atlanticism struggled to mount a convincing defence to these charges 
which were reified through frequent expression. Bevan’s 1952 book In Place of 
Fear began with the complaint that ‘it is almost impossible to express critical 
views about the policy of a nation to which you do not belong, without 
exposing yourself to the charge of being anti that nation.’ Despite not 
mentioning the US, his comments were a reaction against his reputation as anti-
American and he warned that such language ‘transfers to the nation concerned, 
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emotional connotations that belong to the world of personal relations.’ 217F17 It was 
not only Labour MPs who were forced to defend their criticism of American 
foreign policy or US politics and culture against charges of anti-Americanism. 
Novelist and playwright J. B. Priestley, defending his criticism of US foreign 
policy and commercialised culture, claimed that he had ‘more friends in 
America than […] in any country except for England.’ In 1954, he wrote in the 
New Statesman, a journal which was also forced to defend itself against charges 
of anti-Americanism, that his views about the US were more complicated and 
that his criticisms were the result of disappointment at America’s recent 
trajectory. He argued that the US was ‘a nation that came out of a noble dream’ 
and ‘[i]f it is anti-American to remember that dream, which so many people 
seem to forget, then I am indeed anti-American.’218 F18 
Priestley’s comments demonstrated the subjectivity of the term which was 
so widely employed in post-war Britain but his difficulty in providing a 
convincing defence of his views were indicative of the fact that it was easier for 
Atlanticists to level charges of anti-Americanism than to engage with the 
critics’ arguments. By the middle of the decade, it was rare that criticism of the 
US was voiced without accompanying discussion of the pervasiveness of the 
phenomenon. Even individuals who were renowned for their ‘anti-American’ 
views levelled the insult as their rivals. Philosopher Bertrand Russell’s criticism 
of American politics and foreign policy meant that he continues to be regarded 
as one of the chief exponents of the ‘most extreme, bizarre, and irrational type’ 
of anti-Americanism. 219F19 After Russell intervened during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis to call for a summit between the US and USSR, “Cassandra” was less 
tolerant than he had been of Bevan’s views almost a decade earlier as the Daily 
Mirror journalist describing Russell as ‘blatantly anti-American and servilely 
pro-Communist.’220F20 However, even Russell warned of the growth in the 
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phenomenon, claiming in the New York Times in 1957 that ‘a great many 
people in Britain have hostile emotion toward the [US] is an undeniable fact, 
and a very unfortunate one, since political cooperation is of the utmost 
importance.’ Anti-American sentiment, which for Russell was the result of 
British cultural contempt, envy and McCarthyism, was ‘unwise, illiberal and 
unjust.’221F21 Few elite figures used ‘anti-American’ or ‘pro-American’ to describe 
their views of international affairs but it was something recorded in interviews 
with the British public. Interviewed by M-O, a 73 year-old retired male was not 
alone in making this claim as he said that ‘my whole attitude can be summed up 
in one word – anti-American’ which he explained was because ‘America is the 
menace to world peace.’ 222F22 Even when individuals identified with the term, 
though, their descriptions demonstrated its complexity as respondents often 
distinguished between American politicians, the American population, and the 
individual American they had met. Another participant in M-O’s research, a 52 
year old female writer, noted ‘Individual Americans either very nice or else the 
kind who come over thinking they own everything who are bloody. American 
policy, hell for us, so I feel in general anti-American, tempered by thoughts of 
the nice Americans one knows.’ 223F23 
Though readily invoked, the term was often utilised without consideration of 
its definition or limits, something which allowed the blurring of the distinction 
between reasonable criticism of US policies and irrational or pathological 
prejudice. When a BBC radio programme examined the topic in 1962, the 
panellists’ agreed definition — that anti-Americanism was ‘criticism of an 
unjust kind […] based on ignorance, on prejudice, on resentment, on malice’ — 
did little to clarify the matter.224F24 Whether an objection was reasonable or 
justified was moot and it was usually Atlanticists who acted as the arbiters in 
such matters. Including Tony Crosland, conservative writers Constantine 
Fitzgibbon and Peregrine Worsthorne, novelist Kingsley Amis and academics 
D. W. Brogan, Geoffrey Gorer, and Marcus Cunliffe, the BBC’s panel attracted 
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complaints for being comprised of figures who were broadly supportive of the 
Anglo-American alliance and enthusiastic about US culture. 225F25 Fitzgibbon, who 
acted as the programme’s chair, instructed participants before the recording that 
the conclusion could be that ‘anti-Americanism is a manifestation of stupidity-
cum-envy, similar to anti-Semitism, and that most intelligent people in (Britain) 
are as immune to it as to the other, racial rubbish.’ 226F26 Although few would have 
regarded these individuals as anti-American, they too were prone to expressing 
unfavourable views about the US. In 1951, Brogan reported of American 
television after a trip across the Atlantic that ‘I was often nauseated by some 
horrid little children with ugly voices aping grown-ups.’227F27 Other panellists were 
similarly willing to criticise the US later in their careers. By the late 1960s, 
Amis also bemoaned the seeming Americanisation of British culture as he 
noted that it meant that any differences ‘get ironed out … as Kent becomes 
more and more like California.’ 228F28  
Some commentators and politicians were less convinced about the extent of 
anti-Americanism in Britain or questioned the usefulness of the term. Speaking 
in 1952, Prime Minister Winston Churchill explained that the attitude was 
confined to ‘one eighth at the outside’ of the House of Commons and 
Fitzgibbon challenged the use of a simple dichotomy for describing British 
views of the US: 
 
In the first place, the bulk of the population is neither pro- nor 
anti-American. […] A vague dislike of all foreigners may 
crystallize into a vague annoyance with the airmen from the 
nearby US base (or, more usually, with their English teen-age 
girlfriends). This is not a political emotion. […] For the vast 
majority, which is predominantly working-class, seldom think 
about America at all. 229F29 
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Compared with the journalists and politicians who were eager to portray their 
rivals as anti-American, the academic accounts of the subject which proliferated 
in the 1950s used the term sparingly. 230F30 Milton Graham, a researcher whose 
work was funded by UNESCO, was even dismissive about the usefulness of the 
term, questioning if its popularity had been exaggerated. Noting that there was 
no ‘hard core’ group which was anti-American at all times, Graham argued in 
1952 that ‘it probably matters very little whether a Briton given to expressing 
“critical views” about America can be labelled “anti-American.”’231F31 Given that it 
came to be used as a term of abuse and was so extensively debated, this 
distinction is more important than Graham believed but the conflation of 
criticism of the US and prejudiced hostility was increasingly common. The 
anxiety about anti-Americanism or damage to the ‘special relationship’ meant 
that even individuals offering valid criticisms or questions about US foreign 
policy were accused of being motivated by prejudice. In 1954, MPs on the left-
wing of the Labour Party were said to be driven by anti-Americanism when 
they called for a UN investigation into Washington’s possible role in a recent 
coup in Guatemala. Their Conservative opponents dismissed these complaints, 
with one backbench MP describing the questions as ‘vicious anti-American 
propaganda.’232F32 Given that the State Department was decades later revealed to 
have instigated the revolution, the left-wing concerns were prescient but the fact 
that they were denounced for this stance demonstrates the sensitivity about 
British criticism of US foreign policy. 233F33 Anti-Americanism was thus a label 
with which few politicians or commentators wanted to be associated and was 
more a term of abuse than a clearly defined concept.  
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Anti-Communism  
 
Besides the ambiguities which existed with the definition and usage of the term 
‘anti-Americanism,’ the growth in its usage occurred at a time during which it 
was generally accepted that the USSR was the major threat to Britain. The 
Soviet Union and its allies were regarded as inherently aggressive and, though 
the US eventually led the Western bloc in the Cold War and pursued the more 
robust anti-communist agenda, it was British elites who initially showed greater 
suspicion of Moscow’s world aims in 1945-6. According to John Lewis Gaddis, 
the Foreign Office assessment of the Soviet threat after 1945 ‘was more 
sweeping in character and apocalyptic in tone than anything in the record of 
private or public assessments by major American officials at the time.’234F34 Such 
views were not confined to Whitehall but were espoused more widely and 
identified as a major reason for the onset of the Cold War and concomitant 
growth of the ‘special relationship.’ The maintenance and development of the 
Anglo-American alliance was an objective pursued by the leaderships of both 
the Conservative and Labour parties. As the manifesto of the Conservative 
Party claimed in 1950 ‘[a]bove all we seek to work in fraternal association with 
the United States to help by all means all countries […] to resist the aggression 
of Communism by open attack or secret penetration.’ 235F35 
 On the left, anti-communism was the main justification for the Atlanticist 
policies pursued by the Clement Attlee Governments between 1945 and 1951. 
The creation of NATO — which was partly the legacy of Labour Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin — was portrayed as a purely defensive manoeuvre to 
deter the spread of communism. In 1951, Attlee referred to the USSR when he 
claimed that ‘we have been forced by their attitude to build up a great non-
aggressive treaty of defence, the Atlantic Treaty.’ For the then Prime Minister, 
Russian aggression was responsible for the global instability and NATO ‘was 
the result of the Cold War, it did not cause the Cold War.’ 236F36 Encouraged by 
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memories of the Second World War and Nazi aggression, this emphasis on 
USSR belligerence persisted amongst the party’s leadership for the remainder 
of the decade and, as Hugh Gaitskell put it in 1954 the ‘chief credit for the 
strength of the Anglo-American partnership goes to the Kremlin’. 237F37 Few 
objections to this argument were voiced in the left-wing journals which 
supported the Labour leadership. Labour Woman summarised the prevailing 
viewpoint when it noted in 1951 that the USSR was intent on imperialist 
expansion combined with sustained propaganda designed to divide the nations 
and to confuse public opinion in democratic countries.’238F38 With Britain beset by 
financial crises in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was unable to 
counter this perceived threat to Western Europe alone, something which led to 
calls for American intervention. In 1952, Labour discussion pamphlet Problems 
of Foreign Policy argued that many of the party’s ‘most important objectives in 
world affairs depend on America assuming, not fewer responsibilities than she 
already has, but more.’ 239F39 Atlanticists were wary of a possible American return 
to its pre-war ‘isolation,’ arguing that Britain needed to remain close to the US 
in order to influence international affairs. In 1952, Socialist Commentary 
similarly justified its Atlanticism with reference to the effect that Britain could 
have on American foreign policy. According to the journal’s editors, Britain 
occupied ‘the same boat in a stormy sea with a wayward and dominant partner’ 
which required Britons ‘not to engage in an embittered slanging-match, to 
impute motives or to threaten to jump overboard, but to use every ounce of our 
intelligence and influence to guide the boat safely to shore.’ 240F40 
 According to the burgeoning Atlanticists and foreign policy intellectuals 
within the Labour Party, this was a realistic or rational reading of international 
affairs. With sections of the left having long asserted that ideology should play 
a role in foreign policy-making, the Labour leadership sought to discourage 
such ideas with the claim that the deteriorating world situation called for a 
pragmatic approach. T. E. M McKitterick argued that ‘principles are not always 
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accurate guides to action’ and Christopher Mayhew argued that ‘logic and 
common sense’ needed to govern foreign policy. 241F41 Although they portrayed this 
anti-communism as inevitable given the state of international affairs, it was 
questionable whether the Soviet Union was as expansionist as was often 
suggested. Denis Healey, who served as Labour’s International Secretary before 
becoming an MP and close adviser to Hugh Gaitskell on foreign affairs, 
questioned the anti-communism which defined both parties’ foreign policies. In 
his memoirs published at the end of the Cold War, Healey claimed that   
 
Like most observers at the time, I believed that Stalin’s 
behaviour showed that he was bent on the military conquest of 
Western Europe. I now think that we were all mistaken. We took 
too seriously some of the Leninist rhetoric pouring out from 
Moscow, as the Russians took too seriously some of the anti-
communist rhetoric favoured by American politicians. 242F42 
 
Healey was right to note that such attitudes were widely endorsed but failed to 
acknowledge that he was amongst the most prolific in advancing this viewpoint. 
He often characterised the USSR as belligerent and described an international 
conspiracy in which national communist parties were portrayed as being totally 
subservient to Moscow. He argued in 1948 that for communists ‘the idea of a 
revolution carried on simultaneously in all countries had been replaced by the 
idea of a revolution growing with the territorial aggrandisement of the Soviet 
State.’243F43 Whilst supporters of the Atlantic Alliance portrayed their anti-
communism as a logical or commonsensical viewpoint, the warnings about the 
expansion of the ideology at times exaggerated the threat. Describing the 
radical government in British Guiana in 1954, Rita Hinden, an editor of 
Atlanticist journal Socialist Commentary and former head of Labour’s Colonial 
Bureau, argued that the ideology was a ‘cancer’ which ‘builds its success on the 
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good-natured tolerance of democrats, and particularly of socialists, whom it 
then turns round and destroys. 244F44  
Regardless of whether this anxiety about the Soviet Union was justified, 
though, it was widely invoked at times of international crisis and confrontation 
between the US and USSR. The British reactions to the outbreak of war in 
Korea in June 1950 demonstrated the wide support for this characterisation of 
Russian aims and the notion that it was responsible for the onset of the Cold 
War. For the British Government, the conflict in the Far East presented an 
opportunity to demonstrate its commitment to the Anglo-American relationship 
but the popularity of anti-communism in Britain ensured that its participation in 
the US-led United Nations intervention received broader endorsement. Events 
in the Far East only confirmed the orthodox interpretation that the West was 
merely defending itself against Soviet or communist aggression. For the then 
Leader of the Opposition, Winston Churchill, the response showed that the 
‘fraternal association of the English-speaking race all over the world […] may 
in the end be found to be effective by warding off from us the infinite horrors of 
a third world war.’ 245F45 Amongst the Labour leadership, the Soviet Union was 
blamed for the conflict as Attlee was reported as having told the party’s 
National Executive Committee that ‘the point had now been reached when 
Soviet Russia and its satellites had to be shown clearly that the Social 
Democratic nations would oppose the policy they had initiated in many parts of 
the world.’246F46 With both parties’ ancillary organisations endorsing the prevailing 
anti-communism, there were few signs of dissent amongst mainstream political 
groups. The trades unions retained the suspicion of the far left which derived 
from the domestic struggles with communist during the inter-war period. At the 
Federation of British Industries conference in 1951, its President, Robert 
Sinclair, commended the US action. He noted that calamity could only be 
averted if the countries of the West ‘make themselves collectively so strong in 
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the military sense that aggression by any who seek to undermine those 
principles is unattractive.’247F47 
 Criticism of US policy would become more prominent as the intervention 
continued but the press was initially supportive of the UN operation. The Daily 
Mail described the similarity of the motives of Britain and the US when it 
editorialised that ‘America is fighting to resist tyranny, as Britain has so often 
done and is doing again.’ 248F48 After troops were sent to the Far East in July, the 
News of the World was confident that ‘a united and resolute Britain, in co-
operation with her allies, can yet preserve the peace of the world.’ 249F49 The left-
wing and liberal press was also supportive though wary about the prospect that 
conflict could be extended throughout the region. The News Chronicle praised 
the American response as ‘prompt and bold’ whilst the Daily Herald warned 
that unless ‘action is taken to check this crime the Communists will be 
encouraged to use force again and again.’ 250F50 More remarkable was the support 
for the intervention by former critics of the Anglo-American relationship. As 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin sought to cultivate a close alliance with the US 
after 1945, the strongest criticism emanated from the Labour Government’s 
backbenches. Founded in opposition to Bevin’s Atlanticism, the Keep Left 
Group argued that Britain should remain independent from both superpowers 
and work to establish a ‘third force’ in Western Europe. By 1950, however, 
Marshall Aid and signs of Soviet aggression had convinced many former critics 
that Britain could not opt out of the Cold War. Prominent critic Michael Foot 
portrayed the UN’s response as consistent with values of collective security 
which had long been apparent on the British left. He argued that the Americans 
were fighting ‘to uphold a principle which the Labour Party ever since 1918 has 
held to be essential for the preservation of world peace.’ 251F51 Richard Crossman, 
another former critic of British Atlanticism, concluded in 1951 that ‘the best 
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hope of world peace lies in a constructive alliance between American welfare 
capitalism and British welfare socialism.’ 252F52  
 Not all sections of British opinion were willing to endorse this interpretation 
of international politics or American foreign policy but the main dissentients 
were politically marginal. Several Labour MPs warned that Britain’s alliance 
with Washington made Britain vulnerable to attack but sustained challenges to 
the orthodox version of events were confined to the far left. The Communist 
Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and the Daily Worker attributed the Cold War 
tension to the US and any signs of American aggression were denounced to 
deflect comparable allegations about the USSR. Whereas most Britons 
interpreted the conflict as evidence of Russian belligerence, communist-led 
organisations accused Washington of embarking on an illegal invasion, 
intervening in a civil war, and massacring Korean civilians. 253F53 The steady 
decline in the CPGB membership during the 1950s demonstrated its waning 
influence but the unpopularity of its narratives about American foreign policy 
were demonstrated in September 1950 when US Air Force pilots accidentally 
killed seventeen British soldiers in Korea. For the Daily Worker, the incident 
was symptomatic of the industrialised nature of American warfare and the 
Pentagon’s questionable tactics. The communist newspaper claimed that the US 
was ‘participating in a reactionary war which is being waged to make the 
Americans masters of Korea’ and condemned the ‘vicious saturation bombing’ 
and ‘traditions of slap-happy bombing.’ 254F54 Most of the press sympathised with 
Attlee’s claim that the fatalities were ‘an inevitable consequence of such 
operations we must face’ despite some reports that American photographers at 
the scene were targeted with abuse. 255F55 When similar events were depicted in 
Simon Kent’s 1953 novel A Hill in Korea which was adapted for film two years 
later, there were few signs of the sentiments voiced on the far left. Some readers 
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or viewers would undoubtedly have noticed parallels but the nationality of the 
pilots who drop napalm bombs on a group of British troops was omitted and the 
plot focused more on the comradeship and masculinity of the soldiers.  
 Establishment opinion-makers strove to prevent such views from 
undermining the Atlanticism of the major political parties and organisations. 
After receiving critical resolutions from its activists, Labour’s NEC distributed 
a response to some of the more common lines of criticism. Regarding the 
Anglo-American relationship, it sought to discourage public statements about 
the disagreements between the two countries. It noted that ‘British differences 
and agreements on foreign policy with the United States inevitably change from 
time to time’ and reminded activists that ‘the present [Democratic] American 
Administration is more sympathetic to British views than any alternative […] 
which might be imagined as its successor.’ 256F56 Though there was little open 
dissent in the mainstream press or Parliament at the outset of the Korean War, 
public opinion research revealed signs that some Britons questioned the 
orthodox interpretations of the Cold War and American foreign policy. 
Respondents to M-O’s News Quotas and Directives in late 1950 often voiced 
doubts about Washington’s aims or questioned the rationale for the Cold War. 
The US was variously described as ‘bombastic,’ ‘the war mongers of the 
world,’ and ‘imperialists’ whilst one interviewee noted that ‘I think everyone’s 
afraid of the Atom Bomb that America will drop there + Russia will retaliate.’ 257F57 
Another respondent expressed a view similar to the communist criticism when 
he reported that his colleagues ‘don’t see why America should go poking her 
nose in the dispute between the North + the South – that’s their own quarrel – a 
sort of Civil War – + we should keep out.’ 258 F58 There were various attempts to 
discourage such views but the media was reluctant to publicise details which 
could damage the US’s reputation. Reports of a massacre of suspected 
communists by South Korean police were suppressed by proprietor of the 
Picture Post Edward Hulton and the BBC rejected a story by journalist René 
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Cutforth about the American use of napalm in the Far East. 259F59 The TUC 
frequently sought to allay any doubts amongst its affiliated trade councils and 
trade unions and counter the influence of communist criticisms of British 
foreign policy. When it received queries from organisations which had received 
Jack Gaster’s Korea … I Saw the Truth — which accused the US of massacring 
civilians and using bacteriological weapons in the Far East — the TUC warned 
that Gaster was a ‘well-known member of the Communist Party’ and reported 
that his political background prohibited him from attending union meetings. 260F60  
 Although anxieties grew about the prevalence of anti-Americanism, opinion 
polls suggested that suspicion of the Soviet Union was more prevalent than 
similar attitudes towards the United States. A BIPO poll conducted in February 
1951 shortly after a highpoint in Cold War tension reported that 77 percent of 
the British public disapproved of the role played by Russia in world affairs 
whilst only 3 percent approved of its actions. By contrast, the actions of 
Washington were more popular if not entirely positive; in the same survey the 
US received disapproval from 35 percent yet approval from 40 percent of 
respondents. 261F61 Although the precise figures fluctuated to some degree for the 
remainder of the decade, this relative distrust of the USSR was a constant. For 
most Britons, the Kremlin was responsible for the onset of the Cold War, 
blamed for diplomatic misunderstandings and regarded as the more likely to 
instigate a third world war. When the 1959 Council of Foreign Ministers at 
Geneva failed to reach agreement about the future of Germany, the results were 
typical in that 53 percent blamed Moscow for the lack of progress whereas only 
17 percent made the same claim about Washington. 262F62 Even majorities of the 
Labour and Liberal voters — who were most likely to be suspicious or 
ambivalent about American aims — provided hostile views about the USSR. In 
1950, most respondents from supporters of all major parties were reported as 
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stating that the USSR was intent on world domination and 52 percent of Britons 
stated that the government’s policy towards Russia was ‘not firm enough.’ 263F63  
Despite Tom Harrisson’s warnings about anti-Americanism in 1947, by the 
1950s M-O similarly reported that the USSR was less popular than the US. 
After surveying its panel of voluntary observers in August 1950, analysts for 
the organisation concluded that ‘Russians are the least popular of all’ but 
stressed that ‘it must be remembered that attitudes towards them tend to take a 
largely political form, with the result that, whilst they have an unpopular 
Government favourable opinion of them as a nation must be handicapped.’ 264F64 In 
1954, it concluded that: 
 
Great goodwill for America, which current fears have done little 
to undermine, still exists in this country; and there is certainly 
more actual goodwill for America that there is actual goodwill 
for Russia. Equally, in terms of present actualities, Russia is 
more disliked than America. 265F65  
 
Not only was there relative distrust of the USSR compared with the US but 
polls also showed that a majority of the British public often reported their 
approval of America. Polling by the United States Information Agency reported 
that 57 percent of Britons in 1958 and 59 per cent in 1960 had a ‘favourable 
opinion of the United States.’ 266F66  This evidence that the Soviet Union more 
frequently attracted negativity than the US raises questions about the reasons 
for the growth in the warnings about anti-American views in Britain. These 
opinion polls were extensively reported in the press yet there were never the 
same concerns about anti-Sovietism or anti-Russianism. It was not only the 
superpowers that attracted unfavourable views; Germans continued to attract 
prejudices after having been Britain’s enemy in two world wars whilst 
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Australians were also regarded as naive and the French were labelled volatile or 
unstable.  
 
Atlanticist Consensus  
 
Anti-communism was not the only reason for the growth in the close Anglo-
American relationship and, though both parties were inclined to portray the 
alliance as a purely pragmatic consequence of international realities, others 
noted the importance of other motivations. As James Callaghan, then Labour 
MP and future Prime Minister, put it when he remembered the period at the end 
of the Cold War, the ‘facts were self-evident and they led to the apparent 
conclusion that, although it was vital to rebuild Europe, we would assist from 
outside in joint partnership with the United States.’ 267F67 The circumstances of the 
wartime development of the ‘special relationship’ were partly responsible for 
the continued attempts to cultivate the alliance after 1945. That senior figures 
from both parties had served in Churchill’s War Cabinet ensured that both 
frontbenches had a stake in the continuation of the policies established in 
wartime. With Attlee, Churchill, Bevin and Eden filling the major policy-
making roles for their parties after 1945, there was continuity in the personnel 
responsible for international affairs. Both organisations portrayed themselves as 
the best custodian of the ‘special relationship’ and denigrated their rivals’ 
handling of the alliance. According to Conservatives, Labour had in office 
overseen the deterioration in the links with Washington but the left accused 
their opponents of favouring a partnership within which Britain was subordinate 
to the US. Although sections of the left demanded a radical approach to foreign 
policy, for Labour it was important to demonstrate to the public that it was 
competent in managing international issues and a way of doing this was 
supporting the status quo. Opinion polls routinely showed that the party was 
viewed by the public as the less capable at managing international policy, 
findings of which its leaders were acutely aware given that Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Aneurin Bevan, in 1958, felt the need explicitly to dismiss what was 
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still the ‘prevalent myth.’ 268F68 Whilst there were ideological reasons for the party’s 
Atlanticism, this perception of the party’s weakness likely contributed to its 
unwillingness to challenge the consensus about the Anglo-American 
relationship.  
 As well as these political considerations which encouraged support for the 
alliance, the idea that the Anglo-American relationship was inevitable due to 
their similar outlook and values was also voiced by various political 
constituencies. At summits between successive Prime Ministers and Presidents, 
language was utilised which emphasised the importance of these features of the 
alliance. Notions of a unique Anglo-American political outlook had been 
invoked since the late nineteenth century after a period of diplomatic 
rapprochement following the Wars of Independence. Based on Social Darwinist 
ideas about the inevitability of competition within a dynamic hierarchy of races, 
Anglo-Saxondom stressed the unique set of values and interests advocated by 
Britain and the US. For Srdjan Vucetic, this idea was ‘hegemonic at all levels of 
discourse, including foreign policy’ and it also retained its appeal in the 
twentieth century. 269 F69 Despite being influenced by contrasting ideological 
traditions, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were both 
exponents of the superiority of the values of the English-Speaking people and 
Wilson frequently noted his admiration for the British Parliamentary system. 270F70 
Arriving in Britain in 1959, President Eisenhower told crowds that ‘I did not 
have to come here to assure you or the British people that the American people 
stand with them, strongly, firmly and determinedly in the defence of freedom, 
liberty and the dignity of man. You people know that we feel that way.’ 271F71 In a 
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‘fireside chat’ broadcast around the world, the President and Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan agreed about the importance of the shared faith in justice, 
freedom and liberty.   
 These arguments were less popular with the British public, which showed its 
eagerness to retain a degree of independence from the US. A BIPO poll 
conducted in 1952 reported that only 23 percent agreed that Britain and 
America ‘are natural allies and should always stick together’ whilst 53 percent 
endorsed the view that the two countries ‘should stick together on most things 
but Britain should remain independent.’ 272F72 When the prospect of a formalised 
Anglo-American association was put to the panel of an Anglo-American edition 
of the BBC’s Brains Trust in 1950, the panellists were sceptical and in 
agreement that co-operation should be on a broader basis between North 
America and Western Europe. Labour MP Christopher Mayhew suggested that 
‘we’ve got to have a general approach to unity on a three-fold basis – 
Commonwealth, Europe and the United States’ and the broadcaster Bill Corbett 
argued that ‘the salvation of the democracies is in Western Union and Europe 
combining with Britain with our great friend and ally, America, coming into 
closer contact with us.’ 273F73 Conservatives and upper class respondents were most 
likely to advance arguments and language emphasising Anglo-American 
similarities but there was nonetheless evidence of support for this idea in the 
responses to Directives of the disproportionately left-wing M-O. A 65 year-old 
female retired welfare worker described that towards ‘those [Americans] of 
Anglo-Saxon descent, I feel a kinship + a friendliness that I do not for any other 
national. As a Nation I trust them more than I do any other Nation. I have 
greater trust in their judgement + their word.’ 274F74 In the early stages of the Korean 
War, a male order clerk expected the transatlantic relationship to be important 
in world affairs and wrote ‘I hope the two nations will draw even closer in the 
future. The feeling of kinship is increasing.’ 275F75 
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 Whilst ideas about the sentimental reasons for Anglo-American co-operation 
were met with a degree of suspicion, both parties incorporated elements of 
these ideas into their statements on foreign policy. A Labour Party pamphlet on 
foreign policy claimed in 1952 that close co-operation was not only ‘an 
instrument for solving temporary problems but […] the expression of a 
common inheritance linking the peoples on both sides of the North Atlantic 
Ocean.’276F76 For Conservatives this idea was expressed more overtly in terms of 
the common Anglo-Saxon heritage of the two countries. Its manifesto in 1951 
stated the party’s intention to preserve the ‘unity of the English-speaking 
peoples’ who ‘have only to act in harmony to preserve their own freedom and 
the general peace.’ 277F77 Although these conceptions of the alliance were met with 
some scepticism, there were factors beside the anti-communism of the Cold 
War which encouraged support for the Anglo-American relationship. British 
politicians from a variety of backgrounds mixed with elites from the US or 
were influenced by their ideas. In his role in formulating Labour’s foreign 
policy, Healey moved in transatlantic foreign and defence policy-making circles 
and was influenced by American international relations theorists and diplomats 
Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan as well as pessimist philosopher 
Reinhold Niebuhr in the development of his Hobbesian view of foreign 
affairs.278 F78 This stressed the need for socialists to exercise power in order to 
achieve their global objectives and, for Healey, the nation state would 
inevitably remain the main unit of world politics and nationalism was 
impossible to eradicate. Although Labour politicians were traditionally more 
predisposed to forging links with their sister European socialist parties, the 
post-war period witnessed growing left-wing ties with their US counterparts.  
Because of the growing diplomatic ties between the two countries and 
Washington’s efforts to exercise its cultural capital to encourage sympathy for 
its foreign policy, many MPs were exposed to its soft power. Politicians from 
both parties embarked on tours of the US funded by the State Department or 
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participated in shadowy anti-communist organisations such as the Bilderberg 
Group.279F79 As well as liaising with their American counterparts with the common 
objective of preventing Soviet expansionism, many British politicians had an 
enthusiasm about American politics and culture which pre-dated the Cold War. 
The memoirs and diaries of British policy-makers were replete with references 
to relationships with politicians and officials across the Atlantic. Gaitskell 
reported in his diary in 1950 that ‘I think it must be an event in anybody’s life 
when he first crosses the Atlantic, noting that he ‘felt quite boyish’ and as 
Labour leader encouraged his colleagues to make similar trips. 280F80 George Brown 
— whose memoirs were named after the Frank Sinatra song My Way — was 
ridiculed after boasting on television of his intimacy with John F. Kennedy after 
the President’s assassination in 1963. Brown was not unusual in exaggerating 
his personal connections with American politicians; many Britons were struck 
by the power which resided in Washington and were eager to stress their 
contacts and friendships in the US. Conservative Colonial Secretary Oliver 
Lyttelton remembered several wartime meetings with Franklin Roosevelt, 
describing the President as having ‘treated me with almost paternal affection, 
and exhibited at times an indiscretion in talking to me which is one of the most 
flattering ways by which a man can show friendship and trust.’ 281F81 Both parties’ 
leaderships were keen to boast their credentials as Atlanticists and custodians of 
the ‘special relationship.’ Labour accused its right-wing rivals of pursuing an 
overly subservient relationship with Washington whilst Conservatives argued 
that the Attlee Government had led to the deterioration of the wartime Anglo-
American links.  
This familiarity with US officials, journalists and politicians was also true of 
the sections of the Labour Party which were sceptical about the Anglo-
American relationship. In her memoirs, Jennie Lee, who was Bevan’s wife and 
a Labour MP who was amongst the critics of the ‘special relationship,’ 
remembered the ‘constant stream of American friends [who] were received 
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happily, indeed, lovingly, into our home.’ Citing contacts such as Ed Murrow, 
Walter Lippmann and Bill Shirer, she noted that though they often disagreed 
with their guests, they ‘enjoyed exchanging views with our American friends, 
whether from the newspaper world, Hollywood, trade unions or the business 
community, as much as they enjoyed Nye’s far-ranging, stimulating comments 
on all the great problems of the day.’ 282F82 For all their complaints about American 
foreign policy, its ideological composition or cultural output, these figures 
operated within a political system in which it was common and frequent to have 
links with their counterparts across the Atlantic. David C. Williams — an 
American sent to Britain in 1946 by the Union for Democratic Action to ‘act as 
the unofficial ambassador of American progressives and as a competent and 
sure source of information — had great autonomy in shaping Tribune’s 
American coverage in the late 1940s. Despite leaving the journal in 1951, 
Williams and fellow American officials such as William C. Gausmann 
continued to mix in Labour left circles. 283F83 Crossman’s diary often showed 
meetings with American Embassy officials but given his willingness to criticise 
Washington, his relationship with these contacts was at times acrimonious. 
When his column in the Sunday Pictorial warned about General Douglas 
MacArthur’s role in US policy-making, he was rebuked by American official 
Julius Holmes. However, in response Crossman defended his article in a way 
that suggested he was fully aware that his writing could have an impact in 
America as he argued ‘I wanted to express in quotable form, for trans-Atlantic 
consumption, something of the temper of the House of Commons.’ 284F84 These ties 
did not prevent the ‘Bevanites’ from voicing critical views about the Anglo-
American relationship nor were they the sole factor for the alliance with the US. 
But the personal and cultural ties augmented the various political and economic 
motivations for the alliance. Such links simply did not exist in the case of the 
Soviet Union and were much fewer even in relation to many of Britain’s allies 
within NATO. 
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Against the Cold War 
 
Despite the agreement about the need to contain the Soviet Union and the 
consensus about the Anglo-American relationship there were also regular 
doubts, criticism and opposition to aspects of US foreign policy. The British left 
had the most difficulty reconciling the Cold War and Anglo-American 
relationship with its longstanding values and perceptions of foreign policy. 
Since its foundation, Labour had encompassed a variety of approaches to 
foreign policy and the question of whether a socialist government should 
advocate a break with the balance of power orthodoxies of the Foreign Office. 
Attlee implied in 1937 that it advanced a clear alternative when he identified a 
‘deep difference of opinion between the Labour Party and the Capitalist parties 
on foreign policy.’ 285 F85 Whilst Attlee lost his radical zeal when in office, there 
were regular calls for a ‘socialist’ international agenda from Labour’s rank-and-
file throughout the 1950s but what this meant in practice was vague. The left 
combined strands of internationalism, working-class solidarity and pacifism 
which caused doubts about elements of the alliance with Washington with anti-
capitalism, residual respect for the USSR and ambition for socio-economic 
progress in the developing world. As well as having to amalgamate these 
diverse views, the party’s leaders were required to meld the demands for 
radicalism with the need to build electoral coalitions and coherent programmes 
for office. 
 Many of the left’s beliefs about foreign policy long pre-dated the Cold War, 
the growth of Washington’s ascendancy in the West and the Anglo-American 
relationship. Its internationalism — broadly defined as support for international 
arbitration through multilateral organisations such as the League of Nations and 
the United Nations — had developed during the inter-war period at a time when 
the party recruited significant numbers of supporters from the declining Liberal 
Party. 286F86 Despite Labour’s frequent and public conflict on international policy, 
for Rhiannon Vickers it was by the 1950s ‘largely united on the basic principles 
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of a Labour foreign policy based on internationalism, commitment to the UN 
and the international rule of law.’ 287F87 Indeed, whilst Labour’s policy statements 
consistently tried to balance its Atlanticism with its support for the UN, the 
wider party was reluctant to accept that these goals were equally important. 288F88 
Pamphlets and leaflets published by prospective Labour MPs before the 1950 
General Election included a more diverse range of statements than those 
advanced by the party’s leadership. Being ideologically equidistant to both 
superpowers appeared more important that the ‘special relationship’ and one 
prospective MP noted that ‘Britain, in partnership with the Commonwealth, 
must be independent both of the United States and the Soviet Union, and must 
continue to play her part through the United Nations to keep the peace of the 
world.’289F89 Although the statements were diverse, candidates were far more likely 
to praise Britain’s links with the Commonwealth or Western Europe and called 
for a Labour Government to promote socio-economic programmes in the 
developing world. When Labour’s National Executive Committee canvassed 
opinions on foreign policy in 1952, it received diverse responses from activists, 
many of whom did not share the leadership’s Atlanticism. 290F90 On the subject of 
the Anglo-American relationship, Problems of Foreign Policy, a discussion 
pamphlet distributed to the rank-and-file, asked supporters whether Britain 
could survive without American help, how best Britain could influence 
Washington, and if the Atlantic Community ‘should be developed into a closely 
knit union.’291F91 The party leadership’s pursuit of a close relationship with the US 
was not a shared goal of local organisations. According to the party’s analysis 
of the responses, correspondence about the Anglo-American alliance revealed 
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that most respondents advocated ‘decreasing Britain’s political and economic 
dependence on the USA.’ 292F92 
 The support for American foreign policy in Korea at the outset of the 
conflict did not prevent periodic protests when Washington’s seemed to pursue 
its objectives without sufficient reference to the multilateral bodies. With US 
General Douglas MacArthur representing the American army, NATO and the 
United Nations in the Far East, there were questions as to whether Britain or the 
UN could exercise sufficient control over the operation. When UN soldiers 
crossed the 38th parallel and invaded North Korea in October 1950, there were 
complaints that the action had been undertaken without proper authorisation – 
allegations which increased in intensity after the decision led to the Chinese 
entry into the conflict. Similar doubts were again raised in 1952 following the 
US bombing of Chinese power stations on the Yalu River.  Labour MP Tom 
Driberg was reported as condemning this ‘crazy irresponsible and wicked 
action by the American forces’ whilst the Daily Mirror bemoaned a general 
lack of western direction and strategy in the Far East. 293F93  
 Despite the protests about this incident, though, the opposition from Labour 
was diluted by the Atlanticist majority within the party. When two meetings of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) discussed the Yalu raids, neither of the 
resolutions proposed for debate in the House of Commons offered a call for 
Britain to abandon the Atlantic Alliance, NATO or cease to co-operate in 
Korea. Attlee was reported to have altered the leadership’s statement after 
pressure from MPs but the ensuing resolution noted that it ‘regrets the failure of 
Her Majesty’s Government to secure effective consultation prior to recent 
developments’ and ‘considers that improved arrangements should now be made 
to enable such consultation to take place between the Governments principally 
concerned on issues of United Nations policy in the Far East.’294F94 The Daily 
Mirror reported Labour MPs’ annoyance at the ‘middle-of-the-road motion’ 
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which ‘offers no serious challenge to the Government’s policy’ but the 
alternative was still cautious.95 Moved by Aneurin Bevan and Fenner 
Brockway, an alternative statement called for the condemnation of ‘not merely 
the lack of consultation about the timing of the raids but also the launching of 
the raids at a critical time in the truce negotiations.’96 Whilst the US was not 
mentioned in this second resolution, it was aimed more at criticising 
Washington than the Labour leadership’s comments which focused on 
criticising the Conservative Government.  
Although the press emphasised these ostensible divisions within the Labour 
Party, the critics of the Anglo-American relationship who were led by Bevan 
were cautious and equivocal in their protests. Despite acquiring a reputation for 
anti-Americanism, Aneurin Bevan and his supporters on the left — who 
provided the most sustained critique of the Anglo-American relationship in the 
early 1950s — were reluctant to call for Britain to sever the links with 
Washington.  Before Attlee’s visit to Washington in December 1950, the Keep 
Left Group reported that ‘the Anglo-American Alliance is not everything’ and 
‘Britain has to take account of all of the free world.’97 Even when Bevan 
resigned from office with fellow ministers Harold Wilson and John Freeman in 
April 1951, there were questions amongst his allies on the left as to why he had 
not been more outspoken sooner about plans for rearmament.98 During the 
remainder of the period, the ‘Bevanites’ (as they were known in the press) had 
to reconcile their support for NATO with their criticisms of the Anglo-
American relationship. Bevan’s speeches and articles varied in the elements of 
US-UK co-operation that he criticised. In his resignation speech in the House of 
Commons, he was almost neutralist in tone when he claimed that Britain ‘has a 
great message for the world which is distinct from that of America or that of the 
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Soviet Union.’99 One Way Only, the pamphlet published by the resigning 
ministers but written with the help of Crossman and Foot, was more cautious. 
Its authors suggested that the danger of the USSR had been exaggerated and 
claimed that the expenditure on rearmament should be diverted to socio-
economic programmes in the developing world. However, the triumvirate 
argued that calls for a ‘Third Force’ had been ‘killed’ by the ‘actions of the 
Soviet Government, the force of economic circumstances [and] the fears of 
isolation.’100 Despite complaining about Washington’s anti-communist policies 
in Europe and the Far East, they argued that ‘We do not, of course, suggest that 
the alliance should be broken’ but that ‘British initiatives should be taken to 
rectify the lop-sided nature of the alliance.’101 
Bevan’s and his supporters’ attitudes towards NATO and the ties with the 
US oscillated until the politician’s death in 1960. Although he was critical of 
aspects of British foreign policy, Bevan was also ambitious and wanted to 
contribute to the shaping of Labour’s international programme, a fact which 
prevented too outspoken criticism. When he had front bench positions, his 
objections tended to be less pronounced than when speaking with freedom from 
the backbenches. The endorsement for the Atlantic Alliance evident in One 
Way Only was less central in his 1952 publication In Place of Fear. Criticising 
the Republican influence on US politics, he noted that ‘concerted and sustained 
collective action is rendered impossible in nations whose policies are 
determined by pressure groups representing limited and often anti-social 
interests.’102 Reviving the possibility of a political bloc equidistant of both 
superpowers, he claimed that it ‘would be fatal if European people were given 
the impression that they had to choose between two streams of intervention, 
Russian or American.’ Besides seeming to equate the aims and objectives of the 
US and USSR, he referred to NATO when he urged ‘increasing emphasis on 
the role of the United Nations and less on regional pacts, for these tend to wear 
                                                 
99 Aneurin Bevan House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 23 April 1951, Volume 487, Column 
38.  
100 Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman, One Way Only (London: Tribune, 1951), 
11. 
101 Ibid, 13. 
102 Aneurin Bevan, In Place of Fear (London: Heinemann, 1952), 122. 
94 
 
the appearance of instruments of dominant Powers.’103 In Tribune and New 
Statesman — the main forums for left-wing protests in the early 1950s — 
various commentators stressed that the alliance needed to be recalibrated rather 
than abandoned. British policy-makers, it was argued, were squandering 
opportunities to exert influence over their American ally. The New Statesman 
editorialised in 1951 that Britain needed to be vocal when criticising American 
policies because unequal partnership threatened the alliance. It stressed that 
American-European relations ‘have become less a frank exchange of opinions 
about the future policy of the Atlantic alliance than a continued attempt by the 
United States to conciliate or frighten its associates into a precarious unity.’ 
Britain, it argued, ‘alone has the power and prestige to make its voice heard 
across the Atlantic.’104 The subservience to the US that they perceived from 
both parties was believed to be unnecessary because Britain had skills and 
assets which gave it influence to change policies pursued by Washington. 
Freeman argued that: 
 
We are still more important to America than any other of her 
allies; we are the only country in Europe on whose resistance to 
genuine aggression she can really count. We provide her with 
her only secure base on this side of the Atlantic and the only 
fairly secure industrial potential. Moreover, we have the 
influence in much of the world – Africa and Asia, for instance – 
which, through the crassness of MacArthurism, has largely 
eluded her. America needs us as much as we need her.105 
 
The perception on the Labour left that Britain could influence American policy 
continued even as the US’s international economic and political position grew 
throughout the remainder of the decade. In 1957, Thomas Balogh, a Hungarian 
economist linked with the Bevanites, rejected the Atlanticist fears that 
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Washington would return to isolationism and argued that ‘British bargaining 
strength in relation to America is far greater than generally thought’.106  
The ‘Bevanites’ were a heterogeneous collection of figures who would later 
adopt diverse views about the Anglo-American relationship. When the group 
voted against the Conservative Government’s defence estimates in 1952, they 
were known as the ’57 varieties,’ a label which captured the heterogeneity of 
the protestors. Individuals who would go on to support the relationship and 
have diverse ideological trajectories and political careers, such as James 
Callaghan, Harold Wilson and Woodrow Wyatt, were at times involved in the 
protests. Freeman later served as UK Ambassador to Washington whilst 
Crossman was known as ‘Dick Double Crossman’ for his apparent 
oscillations.107 A future Prime Minister, Wilson was particularly notable for his 
changing positions on the subject as his political circumstances altered. After 
having resigned with Bevan in 1951, his specialism in economic policy gave 
him an important role amongst the critics of American policy. His 1953 
pamphlet In Place of Dollars critiqued the economic policies of Washington 
and Britain’s subservience within the relationship and voiced the concerns 
about US mass culture which were typical of the left.108 However, in Downing 
Street during the 1960s, Wilson attracted the criticism of his former allies on 
the left of the party by supporting the American war in Vietnam. In retirement, 
nonetheless, he remembered the post-war creation of the Anglo-American 
relationship with some scepticism. Washington’s cancellation of Lend-Lease 
was described in terms of ‘surrender,’ as he noted that ‘Britain was in pawn, at 
the very time Attlee was fighting to exert more influence over the post-war 
European settlement’.109 
 Despite their criticism of the US, the arguments of the so-called Bevanites 
were complicated enough for them to imagine a time when Washington shared 
their goals or aims in foreign affairs. As well as their endorsement of the 
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intervention in Korea in June 1950, there were suggestions from this group that 
they could have a positive influence on American opinion. Richard Acland told 
his colleagues on the Labour left that ‘both in Britain and on visits which we 
shall need to make to the States, we should so speak and act as to help the best 
Americans to “sell” the only workable world formula to the American people as 
a whole.’ Confident that the US public might sympathise with its criticisms, 
Acland noted that this could only be achieved if Americans ‘hear us, in our own 
country, presenting democratic socialism as the only possible means of 
organising a free community which has the guts to recognise that for a 
considerable time to come it is bound to remain poor.’110 There were several 
occasions during which the Labour left identified a symbiosis between their 
ideas and those of US administration. Although Washington often appeared 
hostile to aims of the United Nations, after it forced the Conservative 
Government of Anthony Eden to abandon its invasion of Egypt in 1956, there 
was brief optimism from Crossman that the US could now be the guarantor of 
the UN’s international aims. In the New Statesman, he described President 
Eisenhower as ‘an uncomplicated American,’ who ‘believes that world war can 
only be averted if he, as leader of America, makes the United Nations work – 
even when it works against America’s friends’.111 The fact that the chief critics 
shared assumptions and beliefs with the Labour leadership demonstrates some 
of the problems associated with drawing pro and anti-American dichotomies 
and the conclusion that the party experienced ‘a division between Atlanticists 
and those suspicious of the USA which continues to this day.’112   
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Different Opinions 
 
The internationalism of left-wing activists was not the only emotion which 
encouraged the left-wing protests about American foreign policy as the critics 
were also motivated by specific objections to Washington’s aims. Because 
Anglo-American tension was common in the mid-1950s and emphasised in 
press accounts of international affairs, there was extended debate as to whether 
this ostensible animosity was a sign of underlying and fundamental conflicts or 
merely the product of differences in opinion. Writing in 1954, Attlee claimed 
that it was ‘inevitable that even where long-term objectives are the same, 
differences of opinion in international affairs on particular questions are bound 
to arise from time to time.’113 Though the former Prime Minister’s comments 
were likely motivated by a desire to demonstrate the resilience of the ‘special 
relationship,’ it was a judgement which contained some truth. Various issues 
were longstanding causes of conflict with one of the most persistent issues 
being the two countries’ contrasting views about communism and the best way 
in which to resist its apparent expansionism. Differences could seem more acute 
given the extent of the British focus on American life. For anthropologist 
Geoffrey Gorer, the ostensible political, cultural, legal and religious similarities 
between the two countries meant that ‘each group expects the other to be a near 
replica of itself, and is continually being disillusioned and distressed when this 
view is proved to be unjustified.’114 
Though anti-communism was endorsed across the political spectrum, left-
wing complaints about the ‘special relationship’ were encouraged by residual 
enthusiasm about the Soviet Union.  Russia’s reputation as the world’s first 
socialist state earned it the respect of the British left but its popularity was 
enhanced by the wartime Anglo-Soviet alliance as well as the USSR’s apparent 
economic success and resilience in withstanding invasion by Nazi Germany. 
Despite the efforts of the British Government to discourage excessive support 
for the USSR during the Second World War, at times ‘some of the admiration 
                                                 
113 Clement Attlee, ‘Britain and America: Common Aims, Different Opinions’, Foreign Affairs, 
32, 2 (1954), 190. 
114 Geoffrey Gorer, The American People: A Study in National Character (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co. 1948), 11. 
98 
 
for Russian courage and fighting power rubbed off on the regime, its ideology 
and its leaders.’115 Though these sympathies waned as suspicions grew about 
the aims of Russian foreign policy, there was latent sympathy on the left-wing 
of the Labour Party into the 1960s which influenced the ideas of leader Harold 
Wilson and his economic advisers.116 Writers in left-wing Tribune expressed 
confidence in the eventual liberalisation of the Soviet economy and democracy 
in spite of evidence of political purges. Whereas American McCarthyism 
inhibited radicalism in the US, British politics contained various individuals 
who were inter-war communists or who had supported the popular front. One of 
Labour’s most prominent Atlanticists Denis Healey had called for a socialist 
revolution in Europe as late as 1945 whilst post-war Chancellor Stafford Cripps 
had been expelled from the party along with Aneurin Bevan because of their 
advocacy of a Popular Front with non-affiliated organisations. As Richard 
Crossman put it in a letter to Hugh Dalton in 1950, sections of the left retained 
a ‘Russia complex’ and argued that, though many had more mainstream views 
in the post-war period, ‘many of them have not re-thought the situation and 
asked why they were wrong in the 1930s.’ This resulted in an ‘uneasy 
conscience or in sheer mental confusion.’117 As the Cold War entered a phase of 
rapprochement in the mid-1950s, it was not only the left which was positive 
about the USSR. After the launch of Sputnik in 1957, Russia’s cultural capital 
and notoriety for its ability in technological matters increased to such an extent 
that in 1958 36 percent of Britons believed that the Soviet Union would be the 
world’s strongest country in a decade.118 
Compared with American policy-makers in Washington, Britons were more 
willing to propose negotiations and summitry with the Soviet Union or the 
People’s Republic of China: a position which led to allegations of appeasement 
from some of their US counterparts. This was another arena in which the desire 
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of some sections of American politics to defeat communism was problematic 
for the Britons who for the most part sought to contain the ideology. In the Far 
East, American support for the nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek in 
Formosa conflicted with the British Government’s policy of recognising the 
People’s Republic of China. The China Lobby — the group of American 
Senators and Congressmen who supported an interventionist foreign policy to 
defeat communism in the Far East — were a source of particular concern. Left-
wing concerns about the influence of McCarthyism were exacerbated by the 
presence of this group, which was described by journalist Norman Mackenzie 
as a ‘conspiracy’ against American democracy. Despite his criticism of the aims 
of the group, Mackenzie remained confident that ‘[w]e can fight back against 
the China Lobby, and against all other manifestations of American reaction 
knowing that at the same time we are helping to defend democracy in 
America.’119 He called for Britain to work for a reasonable policy in the Far 
East by continuing to recognise the People’s Republic of China and severing 
relations with Chiang and warned that ‘the activities and aims of the China 
Lobby are equally a threat to our security.’120 When Eisenhower’s State of the 
Union Address in 1953 announced the lifting of the American naval blockade 
between mainland China and Formosa, a move which seemed to encourage an 
invasion by the Chiang regime, the British left was critical. The Daily Mirror 
described it as a ‘perverse and senseless risk’ and argued that ‘[o]nly harm can 
come of President Eisenhower’s decision.’121 
 For the left, the differences with Washington were even more acute because 
these sections of British politics were more likely to believe that communism 
needed to be contained rather than defeated. The differing perceptions of the 
threat of communism were again raised during the 1954 Geneva Conference to 
negotiate an armistice in the war in Indo-China after insurgents had defeated 
French attempts to re-impose control of the country. The Daily Herald was 
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typical when it described the insurgents led by Ho Chi Minh as ‘part of the 
revolution which is transforming Asia, and the mainspring of that revolution is 
not Communism, but the desire for national independence.’122 Added to this 
were objections about the US’s willingness to conclude agreements and treaties 
with conservative or authoritarian regimes such as the Franco government in 
Fascist Spain or those of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa and Syngman Rhee in 
South Korea. Particularly as Cold War tensions eased after the death of Stalin 
and the end of the Korean War in 1953, the fear of the USSR and global 
bipolarity which marked the early 1950s was less pronounced. In Formosa, too, 
there were often differing perceptions of the communist threat and 
recommendations of how to oppose it. After President Eisenhower promised in 
1955 that the US would defend Formosa against attack from China, there was 
enough criticism in Britain for Foreign Office officials to compile a report on 
the nature of the dissent. The analysis of correspondence from the public 
revealed that ‘no more than 15 percent’ were supportive of Washington’s 
response, with one remarking that the Americans ‘have done well to poll 15% 
of 60 votes.’123 In fact, these results corresponded with polls which suggested 
that similar percentages of Britons were willing to support Washington’s action 
in Formosa but officials were inclined to dismiss the importance of such 
protests. One noted, for example, that ‘the large volume of protest can largely 
be accounted for by referring to the Communist press [because] “World News” 
and others incited protest.’124 
 It was true that it was the British left which was most vocal in its protests 
about US foreign policy and a related strand of the criticism which became 
more common in the early 1960s was the idea that the objectives of both 
superpowers were morally comparable. For American Conservatives in 
particular, this has been regarded as a recurring strand of anti-Americanism 
because this ‘moral equivalence’ was evidence of the inability or unwillingness 
of Europeans to realise that the USSR represented a greater threat than the 
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US.125 Events surrounding the failure of the Paris Summit in 1960 demonstrated 
the complexity of British views about both superpowers. The first meeting of 
the heads of both superpowers since the onset of the Cold War, the summit had 
been convened with the aim of resolving tensions over Berlin and to discuss 
proposals for a nuclear test ban treaty. After a US U-2 spy plane was shot down 
over the USSR two weeks before the summit, though, the discussions were 
beset by acrimony with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev leaving before any 
agreement could be concluded. Many commentators regarded this as another 
example of Russian intransigence but there were suggestions in the left-wing 
press that the US bore some responsibility for the diplomatic failure. Most of 
the attention was on the military personnel who were thought to have ordered 
the espionage mission before the summit. The Daily Mirror editorialised that 
this was just the latest occasion on which ‘arrogant American Brasshats and 
military meddlers have tried to show themselves the bosses of American policy’ 
whilst a Daily Herald reporter even wondered if American Service Chiefs had 
provoked the shooting down of the plane to sabotage the forthcoming 
summit.126 Even Labour’s Atlanticists were not entirely convinced that the US 
had not exacerbated the situation as Healey told the PLP that there was ‘general 
agreement that both the USA and USSR had made major blunders and 
miscalculations.’127 
 It was not only Republican administrations and US military personnel that 
were criticised for certain international policies or for pursuing a foreign policy 
without sufficient reference to the United Nations. After the election of 
Democratic President John Kennedy, the Guardian reflected the optimism that 
a change could occur in American policy and international affairs, noting that 
the ‘mood of America seems to have changed.’128 However, this faith was soon 
challenged with the US-backed attempted coup in Cuba in 1961, which caused 
questions as to whether American foreign policy was as benevolent as had been 
suggested at the outbreak of the Korean War. Because it was a furtive operation 
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which occurred without the UN having been consulted and breached 
international law, there were complaints on the left. Atlanticists attempted to 
make light of the incident but their colleagues were less tolerant.129 Resolutions 
submitted to Labour’s NEC expressed the concerns of some of its MPs and 
officials. A motion by Barbara Castle reported that the party was ‘deeply 
concerned’ by the recent events and that it ‘condemns the action as we 
condemned the Tory Government in Suez and the Soviet Government in 
Hungary.’130 The party’s draft statement on the subject was no less critical, 
explaining that it was ‘convinced that any such action would lower the prestige 
of the United States and its administration in whom we have placed great hope, 
would further endanger the Atlantic Alliance and might endanger progress 
towards agreement on other international questions.’131 Although the 
Atlanticists within the party were less outspoken, they had their own doubts 
about the intervention because the events threatened to undermine their 
argument that the character of US politics had undergone a significant change 
since the 1930s. Privately, Gaitskell described it as a ‘great blow’ because those 
in the party who supported a close Anglo-American relationship had ‘been 
basing a good deal of its argument on the claim that things have changed in 
America.’132 
Doubts about the US’s unilateralism resurfaced during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, when it was feared that the Kennedy administration was acting without 
proper consultation with international opinion. Although the President’s 
handling of the crisis was praised when it came to a peaceful conclusion, the 
left-wing press questioned why Washington was sensitive about Russian bases 
in Cuba given that American bases were located in Turkey. The Daily Herald 
summarised this sentiment when it editorialised that the ‘blockade is an act of 
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force by America against Cuba, an independent country with which America is 
at war.’ It cited US journalist Walter Lippmann as informing its view that ‘[i]f 
the American nuclear bases are defensive, then Cuba’s Fidel Castro can claim 
that so are his.’133 Some Conservatives disputed this idea that the aims of the 
two superpowers were equivalent; the Daily Mail was typical in stressing ‘how 
much we owe to those US bases and how fundamentally different they have 
been in conception from the offensive base in Cuba.’134 Ultimately, then, there 
were various reasons for the British criticism of the foreign policy of their 
closest ally. The broad agreement between the two governments about the need 
to withstand Soviet aggression was complicated by their contrasting 
interpretations of specific aspects of international affairs and this informed the 
occasional doubts about US foreign policy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
During the long 1950s, the Cold War between Washington and Moscow had a 
major bearing on British perceptions of the United States and Americans. The 
nascent Anglo-American relationship was central to foreign policy and the 
programmes of major political organisations. Despite the growing warnings 
about anti-Americanism in Britain during the long 1950s, the use of the concept 
was vague and ill-defined and tended to simplify British attitudes towards the 
US. The increased usage of the term was more a reflection of the global 
bipolarity than a sign of greater hostility towards America. In the tension of the 
Cold War, disagreements were more important given Moscow’s efforts to 
undermine the Anglo-American alliance. Rather than there being consistent pro 
and anti-American groupings in Britain, attitudes towards Washington’s 
policies in the Cold War were more complicated. Attitudes towards both 
superpowers evolved with changing circumstances but it was the Soviet Union 
than attracted the greater hostility, suspicion and negativity in post-war Britain. 
Not only was the Atlanticism of the political system based on anti-communism 
but such attitudes were espoused more widely. This does not mean to say that 
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the alliance with Washington was always endorsed as various features of 
American policy were perennial sources of concern in Britain. In spite of the 
warnings about anti-Americanism, the objections about the nature of US anti-
communism ought to be classified as logical criticism based on differences of 
opinion rather than pathological hostility. Only the far left — which was a 
marginal force in post-war British politics — articulated a consistent critique of 
American foreign policy; the dissent from the ‘Bevanites’ on the mainstream 
left was heterogeneous and complicated by the protestors’ political ambitions 
and even shared many of the assumptions of Atlanticists. Though it was the 
British left who had the greatest difficulty in accepting the need for a close 
Anglo-American relationship and objected to certain aspects of US foreign 
policy, conservatives also voiced periodic criticisms of the alliance or American 
international aims. These concerns focused on the related question of 
Washington’s policies towards Britain’s imperial territories and continuing 
colonial responsibilities. Chapter Three explores issues which provoked critical 
commentary amongst some conservatives: the UK’s changing international role 
and Washington’s policies towards the British Empire and Commonwealth.  
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Chapter Three 
End of Empire 
 
Speaking at West Point military academy in November 1962, former American 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson caused controversy in the UK when he 
claimed that Britain ‘has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role.’ The 
Daily Mail editorialised that Acheson ‘should have known better’ and noted 
that ‘like most foreigners,’ he ‘does not understand the Commonwealth.’1 For 
the Daily Express, the comments amounted to a ‘stab in the back’ and even 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was reported as having stated that Acheson 
had made the same mistake as Philip of Spain, Louis XIV, Napoleon, the Kaiser 
and Adolf Hitler in underestimating the UK’s imperial links.2 Although his 
comments were provocative, Acheson’s speech was merely one of the most 
prominent expressions of a belief that was widely held by the early 1960s. 
Britain, it was claimed by a wide and politically diverse range of commentators 
and officials, had experienced a period of ‘decline’ or cultural and political 
malaise as it encountered economic crises, diplomatic uncertainty and 
retrenchment in its international position. The apparent alteration in Britain’s 
world role was most evident vis-à-vis the United States. As the leader of the 
West in the Cold War against the USSR, the largest contributor to NATO, and 
at the centre of the post-war financial system, Washington wielded 
unprecedented political, military and economic power. By contrast, in the two 
decades after 1945, Britain experienced the decolonisation of imperial 
territories in Asia and Africa and by the early 1960s the prospect of playing a 
regional role as a member of the European Economic Community. 
 This chapter analyses the various ways in which the changing roles and 
responsibilities of both countries affected British attitudes towards the US in the 
long 1950s. It investigates the responses to American foreign and economic 
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policies which affected Britain’s imperial links and spheres of influence. 
Though the nascent Anglo-American relationship was crucial to British foreign 
policy, Atlanticism existed alongside longstanding links with the Empire and 
Commonwealth and this chapter examines the tension between these two goals 
and how far they were reconcilable. Given the recent challenges to ‘declinist’ 
interpretations of British history, such a focus requires some caution, even 
though decline seems evident in Britain’s relative standing in the international 
arena. Ideas about Britain’s ‘decline’ could be as much cultural inventions or 
weapons in political debates as a reflection of economic realities.3 Indeed, this 
chapter demonstrates the complexities beneath this ostensibly simple process as 
the US’s changing international role elicited a range of responses. Although 
there was outspoken hostility about US anti-colonialism amongst some right-
wing groups and individuals, others were more relaxed about the possible 
effects of both countries’ changing roles. Even as the debate about the UK’s 
existential crisis gathered pace after the Suez Crisis in 1956, there was 
reluctance to concede that Britain was no longer a ‘Great Power’ and few 
questioned the belief that it retained its capacity to influence American 
politicians and officials. 
 
Conservatives, Empire and Anti-Colonialism 
 
As the Cold War Anglo-American relationship became increasingly important 
to British foreign policy after 1945, it had to exist alongside longstanding 
imperial commitments. At the beginning of the 1950s, links with the 
Commonwealth and Empire were central to Britain’s foreign and economic 
policy. Although India, Burma and Ceylon had been granted independence by 
the Attlee Government in 1947, Britain retained overseas territories and the 
associated cultural influence and economic interests in Asia and Africa. 
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Moreover, the Commonwealth — which was then based on the English-
speaking UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa — ensured the 
continuation of amicable relations with Britain’s former colonies. Despite 
differences on questions of how quickly these territories should move towards 
self-government, the leaders of both parties stressed their devotion to these 
imperial links. Until the mid-1960s, trade with the Empire and Commonwealth 
surpassed exports and imports to the US or Western Europe. Though it steadily 
declined after 1945, British exports to the Commonwealth in 1960 totalled 35.7 
percent of total exports whilst Western Europe only amounted to 26.6 percent.4 
It was not only economics that motivated the preservation of Empire ties as the 
network of relationships was thought to be a considerable source of British 
prestige. According to John Darwin, this was evidence that there was ‘no sign 
that British leaders or their advisers gave up their overriding belief that, by 
hook or by crook, Britain should remain a great world power.’5 Whilst sections 
of the Labour Party were anti-colonialist and called for immediate 
decolonisation, its leaders were cautious and sympathetic to the 
Commonwealth. Tory MP Julian Amery even remarked in 1959 that every 
‘Conservative politician in Britain knows that when he can get a hearing on 
nothing else from a working-class audience, he can command respect and even 
enthusiasm if he speaks on the Empire.’6 Labour’s paternalism towards the 
imperial territories continued until the end of the period and survived when the 
movement for independence in sub-Saharan Africa gathered pace in the late 
1950s. There was reluctance fully to support the ambitions of nationalists due to 
anxieties that independence without democratic reforms could lead to racial 
tension or the deterioration of socio-economic standards. As a result, there were 
calls for Britain to retain its imperial territories and Attlee wrote in Socialist 
Commentary that there ‘must be a period during which the British Government 
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must retain control’ and this would be a ‘time for the rather tender seeds of 
democratic government to grow.’7  
Although Britain’s relationships with the Empire and Commonwealth were 
central to the foreign policies of a range of commentators and politicians, 
Conservatives tended to have greater difficulty reconciling these goals with the 
nascent Anglo-American alliance. The party’s leadership sought to portray its 
Atlanticism as compatible with its links with the Empire and Commonwealth 
but activists were sceptical that these relationships were equally important. A 
delegate at the party’s 1950 conference reflected the romantic view that 
prevailed amongst activists by stressing that the Empire was ‘the greatest 
contribution that the British people have ever given to the history of mankind.’8 
That the Anglo-American alliance alone was not regarded by its rank-and-file 
as sufficient was evident during an exchange at the party’s 1952 conference. A 
motion which claimed that ‘preservation of freedom in the world depends 
principally on Anglo-American friendship, co-operation and solidarity’ was 
after protests swiftly broadened to include reference to ‘the British 
Commonwealth of Nations and our association with Western Europe.’9 
Washington’s foreign policy after 1945 and its stance towards the British 
Empire exacerbated the tension between these two relationships. Anti-
colonialism had been apparent in American politics since its independence from 
Britain in the eighteenth century but was significant in wartime debates about 
post-war reconstruction. Secretary of State Cordell Hull was amongst the 
foremost proponents of the multilateral economic system constructed in 
peacetime which was based on the International Monetary Fund and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Though the US calls for a ‘free trade’ 
economic system were endorsed by Whitehall and the liberal sections of the 
British elite, it was interpreted by some Conservatives as evidence of US efforts 
to dismantle the Empire.10 As the State Department’s policies increasingly 
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affected Asia, Africa and the Pacific with the onset of the Cold War, there were 
anxieties that it sought to encroach on British spheres of influence. Complaints 
about the US’s growing international role had already intensified during the 
Second World War when British and Americans were allied against Nazi 
Germany. Even within Churchill’s War Cabinet, there was some reluctance to 
accept the Prime Minister’s romantic conception of the special relationship. 
Secretary of State for India Leo Amery often denounced ‘American 
Lebensraum’ and worried that after 1945 ‘the US will come in with as crude 
and impossible ideas of world economic organisation as it did about world 
political organization after the last war.’ He described Hull as an ‘ideologue’ 
with ‘nineteenth century’ views about free trade.11 
The tensions in right-wing circles between these contrasting views of British 
foreign policy and the relationship with Washington continued after 1945. 
Compared with Labour and the left, though, Conservatives did not experience 
the same degree of factional conflict about the Anglo-American relationship 
and open dissent was confined to marginal groups such as the far right League 
of Empire Loyalists.12  The Suez Group was the main forum within the 
Conservative Party for critics of the Anglo-American relationship. Led by 
Julian Amery and Captain Charles Waterhouse, the organisation numbered 
between 28 and 40 MPs and its members voiced disapproval at the apparent 
loss of British influence in relation to Washington. According to a member of 
the group Paul Williams, the State Department intended ‘to break the British 
Commonwealth and establish Britain and Europe as satellites of the US defence 
network.’13 If Anglo-American co-operation were to occur in the Middle East, 
it was claimed that it should be on an equal basis. Throughout the 1950s, British 
withdrawals from Palestine, Abadan, Sudan and Suez were all attributed by 
critics to American pressure. In 1957, the Daily Express linked these events 
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with instability in post-independence India and Africa, concluding that ‘Anti-
Colonialism has been the curse of our age. Immense has been the destruction 
wrought by it.’14 Under the proprietorship of Canadian Lord Beaverbrook, the 
Daily Express provided the most consistent conservative opposition to the 
‘special relationship.’ Typical were his complaints in 1951 about the growing 
American cultural and economic presence in the British colony of Jamaica. He 
described that the ‘Americans are on the way to complete control of the island’ 
which was a ‘sad situation’ because its population ‘do not show any desire to 
relinquish the Empire associations.’15 
Such disapproval at the US’s growing international role undoubtedly ran 
much deeper within the Conservative party and right-wing circles but the 
organised protests were small and public divisions were for the most part 
avoided. This was the case when backbench MP Enoch Powell criticised the 
‘special relationship’ in the House of Commons during November 1953. At 
times associated with the Suez Group, Powell claimed that his view ‘of 
American policy over the past decade has been that it has been steadily and 
relentlessly directed towards the weakening and destruction of the links which 
bind the British Empire together.’16 Although Powell’s comments were met 
with objections from his Conservative colleagues in Parliament, he received 
supportive correspondence which praised his bravery for publicly voicing 
doubts on the subject. A bank manager who wrote to Powell noted that ‘If only 
more MPs had the courage to tell the truth about American aims against Britain 
and the British Empire, it would be far better for all concerned’ whilst an army 
Major implored him to ‘continue your efforts to persuade the party leaders, that 
– although close friendship with America is desirable – it must only be on a 
basis of complete equality.’17 The explanation for the differing intensity of 
Labour and Conservative criticism was more the result of their contrasting 
mores, conventions and organisations than evidence that the left was more 
                                                 
14 ‘In the name of freedom’, Daily Express, 15 April 1957, 6. 
15 Letter from Lord Beaverbrook to Brendan Bracken, 15 January 1953, Richard Cockett (ed), 
My Dear Max: The Letters of Brendan Bracken to Lord Beaverbrook, 1925-1958 (London: The 
Historians’ Press, 1990), 139-40. 
16 Enoch Powell, HC Deb, Hansard 5 November 1953, Volume 520, Column 348. 
17 Letter to Enoch Powell from ALD Lang, 8 December 1953; Letter to Enoch Powell from 
Major D. Phillips, 6 November 1953, Enoch Powell Papers, POLL 3/1/12, CCC.  
111 
 
‘anti-American’ than its political rivals. According to Leon Epstein, this 
restraint was the consequence of the party’s upper-class background and the 
resulting ‘self-imposed discipline flowing from membership in a respectable 
club.’18  
 Whether Epstein’s caricature of right-wing politicians is applicable to its 
activists is questionable and it is likely that the hierarchical nature of the 
Conservative Party was more responsible for the relative acquiescence of its 
MPs. Unlike Labour — which in the form of the party conference and the NEC 
had various outlets for debate and protest — the Conservative leadership was 
better able to control political discussions and use the institutions of the party to 
stifle dissent. Moreover, Churchill and Eden retained a degree of prestige as a 
result of their prescient warnings about Nazi Germany and wartime leadership 
which strengthened their positions within the party. This was one example of 
the ways in which domestic institutions and political contexts affected the 
intensity and frequency of expressions of negativity or criticism of the US or its 
foreign policy.  Complaints about Washington’s foreign policy and its stance on 
the British Empire ran much deeper within the party but few were prepared to 
adopt a position of outspoken opposition. Indeed, it was not only Washington’s 
anti-colonialism that provoked criticism on Conservative backbenches. During 
1955 when the continued American defence of Formosa provoked criticism in 
Britain, the party’s leaders repeatedly advised its MPs not to endanger the 
‘special relationship’ with outspoken protests on the subject. At the 
Conservatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee in February 1955 after President 
Eisenhower had alarmed Britain by threatening to defend the nationalist 
Chinese regime of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden warned his colleagues about the importance of avoiding Anglo-American 
tension. He warned that the subject ‘must not be allowed to imperil the Anglo-
American front’ and ‘it was better not to say in public what we had said in 
private; that the sooner America could get rid of the embarrassment of the off-
shore islands, and widen the area between Formosa and the mainland the 
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better.’19 His successor Harold Macmillan made a similar appeal later that year 
when he told MPs that ‘the Americans did not like being hustled into decisions’ 
and that Britain ‘should not push them on the question of trade with China, or 
Chinese representation in the United Nations, in view of the overriding need for 
solidarity.’20  
 Both Eden and Macmillan at times shared their colleagues’ frustration with 
the US’s policies but usually expressed these privately. Despite claiming in his 
memoirs that the Anglo-American relationship was ‘a guiding principle 
throughout my life,’ in his diary Eden was often critical of policy-makers in 
Washington and the objectives of American foreign policy.21 He regarded the 
post-war loan from the US as having ‘marked finally our dependence on US’ 
and noted during the Geneva Conference in 1954 that ‘All the Americans want 
to do is to replace the French and run Indo-China themselves. They want to 
replace us in Egypt too. They want to run the world.’22 Added to this were 
various concerns about the abilities of American policy-makers. Macmillan 
shared these doubts about his American counterparts and the nature of 
Washington which existed alongside an otherwise Atlanticist outlook. He noted 
in 1953 that President Eisenhower was ‘very naive and inexperienced; Dulles is 
ignorant and stupid; some of the old Republicans are hopelessly reactionary – 
but we have got to get along with them.’23 For the senior Conservatives who 
were less certain about the Anglo-American relationship, it was difficult to 
challenge Churchill and the party leadership. The Prime Minister’s 
achievements during the Second World War ensured that his position was 
secure even as his health deteriorated. Even Eden — the Foreign Secretary 
whose view of the Anglo-American relationship was based more on realpolitik 
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than Churchill’s romantic conception of the alliance — could offer little serious 
opposition. As well as having acquiesced during the wartime coalition, Eden 
continued to suppress any doubts as the ‘special relationship’ was established in 
the late 1940s. Secretary of State for India and Burma during the Second World 
War, Leo Amery revealed the frustrations which were common amongst 
Conservative politicians constrained by collective responsibility. He privately 
wrote ‘I only wish sometimes I were in a free position to say what I think about 
the Atlantic Charter and all the other tripe which is being talked now, exactly 
like the tripe talked to please President Wilson.’24 Freed from the conventions 
of holding office, many conservatives were subsequently more outspoken about 
their objections to US policy. In his memoirs written in 1962, Colonial 
Secretary Oliver Lyttelton remembered that Washington was motivated by ‘a 
pathological hatred of colonialism, reinforced by a profound ignorance of what 
Great Britain was trying to do, or the very nature of the difficulties.’25  
 
Greeks and Romans 
 
Although American anti-colonialism was problematic for Conservatives in 
Britain, London’s changing role in world affairs elicited various reactions from 
observers across the political spectrum. As Britons attempted to explain the 
changing situations of both countries, some were indeed influenced by feelings 
of jealousy, envy, resentment and bitterness at this transfer of power but these 
reactions were complicated. Visiting a Seattle fairground in 1952, Labour MP 
Woodrow Wyatt noted that:  
 
I was shocked by the low regard for Britain. Or is patriotism an 
extension of one’s own vanity? I am me and very special; I am 
British so Britain must be the best and most important country, 
influencing all the others. On a large fairground in Seattle, 
Washington, I looked one night at the stars and wept: this vast 
country thought my darling England was not worth bothering 
about, equating her to a poor old aunt of the mainstream.26 
 
                                                 
24 Wm. Roger Louis, In the Name of God, Go! 146.  
25 Oliver Lyttelton, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, 355.  
26 Woodrow Wyatt, Confessions of an Optimist, 187. 
114 
 
Such sentiments were not uncommon. Ian Fleming, a novelist and manager of 
the Sunday Times’s foreign coverage, noted on a trip to the American West 
Coast in 1959 that it ‘was a source of constant depression to observe how little 
of our own influence was left in that great half of the world where we did so 
much of the pioneering.’ Perturbed by Washington’s growing presence in Japan 
and Australia, he observed that ‘the Americans and American culture, 
communications and trade have almost a monopoly of the Pacific.’27 Fleming’s 
James Bond novels reflected his attempts to come to terms with this apparent 
loss of status vis-à-vis Washington. Bond’s relationship with CIA operative 
Felix Leiter was allegorical of the Cold War ‘special relationship’ and, 
according to Jeremy Black, was ‘a far smoother working of the Anglo-
American alliance than was in fact the case.’28 Bond was contemptuous about 
the inauthentic nature of American culture; he even regarded its gangsters as 
‘just teenage pillow-fantasies’ compared with the ‘dedicated, chess-playing 
Russians; brilliant, neurotic Germans; silent, deadly, anonymous men from 
Central Europe.’29 Despite the protagonist’s occasional scepticism about the US 
and its culture, Bond and his American counterpart were close enough to co-
operate against various foes as the financial might of Washington was utilised 
to fund the British efforts. 
Implicit in such constructions of the relationship was the assumption that 
Britons had superior experience and diplomatic skills than their American 
counterparts yet they needed the US’s economic backing for support. This was 
a common interpretation which was applied in a wide range of debates about 
the relationship and intersected with the common British belief in the stereotype 
that Americans were naive or innocent in foreign policy. Even more 
provocative than the Bond novels was Graham Greene’s The Quiet American, a 
critique of American foreign policy in Indo-China which was accused of being 
anti-American by reviewers in the US. A Newsweek headline described ‘This 
Man’s Caricature of the American Abroad’ and complained about the novelists 
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‘dreary stereotyping of his American characters.’30 Set during the first war in 
Indo-China, central to Greene’s novel were English journalist Thomas Fowler’s 
encounters with Americans reporting on the region or providing aid for the 
area. The US characters were based on longstanding British stereotypes of their 
ally; the journalist Grainger is arrogant and brash whilst Fowler regards the 
eponymous ‘quiet American’ Alden Pyle as idealistic and naive in his 
appraisals of foreign affairs. Although the novel’s title attracted attention and 
allegations of anti-Americanism, the British character Fowler was hardly heroic 
or a positive portrayal of the English abroad given his cynicism, duplicity and 
jealousy of Pyle. As Greene’s biographer noted, this was ‘tame’ compared with 
the French criticisms of the US role in Indo-China but given his other views 
about America the novelist was by no means fond of the country and was 
particularly critical of its government.31 In 1967, he wrote that ‘If I had to 
choose between life in the Soviet Union and life in the United States I would 
certainly choose the Soviet Union.’32 
 Despite the growing power asymmetry within the alliance and Washington’s 
enhanced international position it was rare that Britons concluded that they no 
longer exercised an important world role. It was believed that diplomatic and 
other skills acquired over time would compensate for material shortcomings 
and relative loss of hard power. Future Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s 
wartime claim that British officials could be the ‘Greeks in this American 
empire’ continued to be espoused in the 1950s in various forms.33 Attlee 
claimed in 1954 that ‘Americans think in black and white where we see shades 
of grey.’34 After all, there was some justification for this belief and despite any 
ostensible decline Britain remained a significant actor on the world stage. It was 
the only country besides the US and USSR to have exploded atomic and 
hydrogen weapons and had been a major contributor to anti-communist 
interventions in the Far East and Middle East.  
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Notions of Anglo-America or the similar heritage, language and political 
values between the US and Britain also affected appraisals of the UK’s post-
war world role and position vis-à-vis Washington. One aspect of the belief in 
Anglo-America or a liberal Anglosphere was the idea that both countries’ 
common values meant that US foreign policy continued Britain’s aims and 
objectives. This was widely invoked by the burgeoning ranks of Americanists 
in British academia as the post-war period witnessed the growth of this 
discipline encouraged by the State Department and Whitehall.35 Particularly in 
universities, the topic was accorded more attention with the onset of the Cold 
War and close Anglo-American alliance with departments focusing on the 
subject founded at several universities. Writer Stephen Potter pointed out in 
1956 that ‘[k]nowledge of the history of the United States, most rewarding of 
subjects, is the intelligent Englishman’s biggest gap.’36 This was less true 
amongst the academic community by the end of the period and the British 
Association for American Studies (BAAS) was created in 1953 to provide a 
forum for these scholars. Nonetheless, gaps remained in the provision for 
American history, geography and literature in the British education system. A 
study conducted in 1955 revealed that only 14 percent of secondary schools 
offered any substantive study of the US and as few as 5 percent of O Level 
history students sat exam papers in the subject.37 However, proponents of 
American studies were often met with reluctance, indifference or suspicion as 
they sought to broaden the curriculum. When a survey in the early 1960s asked 
if it taught US subjects, a Welsh school replied ‘Why should we? This is a 
British school.’38 According to writer and academic Martin Green, this meant 
that the academic interest in American affairs was ‘neither intelligent nor 
wholehearted’ because it ‘either remains academic or concentrates on the 
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exotic’ and ‘does not take America seriously as our successor, our collaborator, 
in reinterpreting, recreating, creating the Western mind.’39  
In fact, his judgement about the links between the two countries was widely 
invoked by the growing ranks of British Americanists who tended to echo 
Churchillian arguments about the alliance. According to Richard Pells, this 
group ‘tended to think of themselves as rebels, outsiders, people from the 
proverbial provinces, having only the most tenuous connections to the British 
economic and professorial establishment.’40 This might have been the case but, 
with few radicals or socialists amongst their ranks, they rarely challenged the 
wisdom of the Anglo-American relationship and often communicated these 
ideas to the wider public through regular press assignments. Indeed, numerous 
historical accounts portrayed the nineteenth century development of the 
relationship as a ‘ripening of friendship’ as the countries overcame the tension 
which culminated in American Independence. The scarcity of dollars and 
logistical problems in crossing the Atlantic meant that there were limited 
opportunities for specialists in US affairs to make trips to US archives and as a 
result their writing tended to have a transatlantic focus. For BAAS Chairman 
Frank Thistlethwaite, the US ‘developed, not in truth in isolation, but as an 
integral part of the Atlantic basin.’ Furthermore, he outlined that ‘American 
culture grew to maturity within an Atlantic world with nerve-centres in Chelsea 
and Manchester, as well as in Boston and Philadelphia.’41 Observing the views 
of this group in the 1980s, British American historian Michael Heale argued 
that this was a ‘liberal moment’ for his predecessors, who looked across the 
Atlantic with enthusiasm and confidence that the US had positive lessons to 
offer Europe.42 The contemporary challenges in world affairs were regarded as 
having similarities with examples from American history. H. G. Nicholas’s 
study The American Union concluded that: 
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There was nothing that Lincoln had to say of the struggle in 
1862 which was not even more truly applicable to the struggle 
of 1946, save that now it was not the American Union merely, it 
was world civilization which was at stake. Looking back on 
their history, all could see the answer they had given then; 
looking forward, they could resolve not to shirk the answer 
now.43 
  
According to this view, Britain’s post-war decline was eased due to the 
special relationship,’ because its policy-makers shared a world view and values 
with their American counterparts. On the BBC Third Programme in 1957, Keith 
Kyle, who began an academic career in the 1960s after a period working for the 
Corporation’s North American Department, labelled the US as the ‘Guardian of 
British Tradition.’ He told listeners that its political system bore similarities 
with those of eighteenth century Britain, claiming that ‘the more bewildering 
and irritating features of American politics […] would be far less mysterious to 
most Englishmen if they knew rather more about their own political history.’44 
Even the right-wing critics of the Anglo-American relationship utilised such 
rhetoric despite their opposition to US foreign policy. The Daily Express often 
editorialised to such effect, noting during Queen Elizabeth II’s Coronation that 
the American tourists’ attitudes towards the new monarch was ‘more like that 
of loyal and devoted subjects than of inquisitive tourists out to see a show.’ 
This was a sign, it asserted, of the ‘common heritage, in the soil and traditions 
of Britain, which will withstand any malicious efforts which may be made to 
split Britons and Americans asunder.’45 Leo Amery, a prominent critic of the 
effects of the ‘special relationship’ on British links with the Empire, offered a 
more extended disquisition on the subject in a 1949 speech to the English-
Speaking Union. Entitled ‘The English-Thinking World,’ Amery outlined the 
common outlook of the two countries and cited Abraham Lincoln alongside 
John Milton and Edmund Burke in his discussion of this outlook which was 
‘essentially moral, in the sense at least that it tends habitually to form moral 
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judgements.’ The American Revolution was regarded as a ‘continuation of the 
English Civil War’ and US resentment of the Commonwealth was the product 
of the fact that its elite and public ‘continued to think of the British Empire in 
terms of the British Government of the eighteenth century.’ Ultimately, Amery 
encouraged greater understanding as a way of resolving any tension as he urged 
Britons to:  
 
learn to understand the nature of the American constitutional 
system and be interested in its working, and that Americans 
should understand and be interested in the development and 
working of the Commonwealth, both for its own sake as the 
newest experiment in the building up of human ordered 
freedom, and also as an essential partner in helping to preserve 
freedom in the world against the dangers which threaten it.46 
 
Remembering Co-operation 
 
The tensions between Britain’s imperial and Atlantic loyalties were apparent in 
the memories of the Second World War. In 1953 William Buchanan and 
Hadley Cantril argued that the Second World War served as a ‘frame of 
reference’ for governing views of other nationalities in the post-war period as 
both allied and axis countries tended to sympathise more with their former 
allies whilst remaining hostile towards their wartime enemies.47 However, the 
fact that they had co-operated to defeat Nazi Germany did not prevent the belief 
in Britain that the US had acquired its post-war international position as a result 
of the conflict. The differing recollections of wartime were evident in M-O’s 
surveys of the British public in the early stages of the Korean War as many 
respondents to News Quotas or Directives pointed to the most recent conflict in 
order to explain the evolving international crisis in the Far East. A 49 year-old 
housewife articulated an interpretation of the wartime co-operation informed by 
the belief that the two countries’ interests and aims overlapped: 
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During the war, I felt that in spite of Lease-Lend etc, the 
Americans owed us a debt of gratitude for the stand we made for 
freedom. Now they are taking the lead against aggression, which 
with their vast resources + less depleted reserves than ours, they 
are well able to do.48 
 
Not all respondents were as positive about the wartime experience or 
believed in the shared goals of the two countries. Fatigue for air raids and 
conscription was often reported by Londoners and, though there was a desire 
that Britain exercise the role of a Great Power, there was ambivalence which 
likely continued with anti-communist interventions in Malaya and Kenya 
during the 1950s. A 53 year-old housewife reported her mixed feelings about 
the effects of US policy and the wartime relationship: 
 
They are supplying us with considerable financial aid and yet I 
find that I have no feelings of gratitude. Much of their wealth 
and our poverty is due to their non-participation in the early 
years of the war.49 
 
A 19 year-old female shorthand typist described that she was ‘definitely anti-
American’ because the Americans ‘get rich on wars.’50 Such views were also 
apparent amongst the critics of Britain’s Atlanticist foreign policy. Harold 
Wilson, a left-wing Labour MP who was amongst the chief sceptics about the 
Anglo-American relationship, argued, ‘basic economic fact about the war is that 
whereas Britain and many other countries came out of it a great deal poorer, 
some nations, and in particular, the United States, came out of it much richer.’51 
For the Conservative critics of the ‘special relationship,’ their experiences 
fighting alongside American soldiers in conflict informed the criticism of the 
alliance. Having served as a Brigadier in North Africa, Enoch Powell, a 
backbench MP who was linked with the Suez Group, described his American 
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allies as ‘gauche and amateurish’ and the experience informed his view that 
Washington was intent on supplanting the British Empire in the Middle East.52 
Particularly revealing of the different interpretations of the Anglo-American 
relationship were the war films that dominated cinema listings throughout the 
period. According to one study, 85 films were produced on the subject in the 
fifteen years after the war with most well-known directors, producers and actors 
involved at some point in a combat film.53 Though ostensibly divorced from the 
political process, the productions are significant for ascertaining attitudes 
towards the US because of their popularity. The Dam Busters, The Bridge over 
the River Kwai and The Red Beret were amongst the most successful films of 
the era and the 1948 Anglo-American Film Agreement led to a surfeit of 
Hollywood actors appearing alongside Britons. Because cinema often reached 
more people weekly than even the press, it is a useful indicator of underlying 
assumptions of the film makers and the ideological context in which they 
worked. Furthermore, the growth in the number of Second World War films 
was often attributed to the context that was Britain’s changing international 
role. New Statesman film critic William Whitebait linked the genre’s appeal 
with British ‘decline’ as he noted that ‘H-bomb looms ahead, and we daren’t 
look at it; so we creep back to the lacerating comfort of ‘last time’.54 According 
to Richard Todd, who starred in the popular 1955 film The Dam Busters, the 
war film genre was motivated by the same nostalgia as that which inspired 
Hollywood westerns.55 The Anglo-American relationship was often central and 
the Americanism of the central characters emphasised as they had names such 
as “Texas” Norton or “Yank” Flanagan. As such, these were revealing about 
memories of the wartime relationship and the respective roles the two countries 
were believed to play in the post-war world. 
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Few of these war films offered an assessment of the Anglo-American 
relationship which critiqued the Atlanticism that dominated British politics. 
Indeed, they often presented co-operation between the two countries as central 
to the military triumphs with any clichéd differences in language and culture or, 
more importantly, strategy, eventually being overcome. Released in cinemas 
months before the onset of war in Korea as Cold War tension escalated, They 
Were Not Divided (1950) portrayed the importance of Anglo-American co-
operation to the allied victories. It focused on the comradeship within the Welsh 
Guards — with particular emphasis on the friendship of Englishman Philip 
Hamilton and American David Morgan — before the invasion of Europe in 
1944. References to the importance of British and American solidarity were 
evident throughout if somewhat contrived; Morgan married an English woman 
and told her that the two countries ‘think the same things.’ When they die 
together on the battlefield at the film’s conclusion, their graves were 
indistinguishable and marked with a British and American flag that tilted 
towards one another. They Were Not Divided was unsuccessful at the Box 
Office and caused some sensitivity amongst reviewers who perceived that the 
American role was exaggerated. Shortly before its release, which came at a time 
when US actors were beginning to feature more frequently in nominally British 
films, Daily Express film critic Leonard Mosley reported receiving negative 
correspondence from viewers who believed the American role was inflated. 
Though he stressed the importance of the US contribution, Mosley confessed 
that ‘my blood begins to steam and my heart is full of hate when I see Errol 
Flynn, or some other Hollywood actor, leading a charge of the Sunset 
Boulevard Fusiliers and winning the war in Burma all on his own.’56 Such 
complaints were a constant refrain throughout the period. Whitebait described 
The Cockleshell Heroes (1955) as ‘one of those mysterious Anglo-American 
war films in which everything is supposed to look authentic while a Major of 
Marines has an American accent’ and US actor Alan Ladd’s role as a 
                                                 
56 Leonard Mosley, ‘So don’t go all indignant over this …’ Daily Express, 3 March 1950, 6. 
Mosley’s subsequent review of the film was largely favourable Leonard Mosley, ‘War … with 
an amiable gleam in the eye.’ Daily Express, 31 March 1950, 6. 
123 
 
paratrooper in The Red Beret (1953) prompted protests from branches of the 
Parachute Regimental Association.57 
Despite these questions about whether the American role was inflated, there 
was little reflection on the fact that the Soviet role and the war in Europe were 
omitted from productions. On-screen criticisms of the US were tame and even 
the persistent complaints that Washington had entered the war late could be 
offset by the inclusion of American soldiers who had joined the British Army 
before Pearl Harbour. One such instance of this was Gift Horse (1952), which 
focused on the St. Nazaire Raid of 1942. “Yank” Flanagan was seamlessly 
incorporated into the majority British operation, even marrying an English 
woman from the local port. As well as showing co-operation between the two 
nationalities, it depicted an incident which was contentious in discussion of the 
Anglo-American relationship. The fictional HMS Ballantrae had been 
transferred to the British Navy from the US in exchange for the leasing of 
various colonial territories under the 1940 Destroyers for Bases Deal, an 
agreement that attracted some criticism from conservatives. Eden reflected 
right-wing doubts about the arrangement when he wrote in his diary: 
 
Incidentally, do we want to see US bases established, say, at 
Auckland and in Fiji, at Takoradi and Trincomalee? Some of 
these areas are a far cry for US, others are not, and I would not 
happily contemplate a whole-sale extension of US bases 
throughout the British Commonwealth.58 
 
As the title of the film suggested, Gift Horse portrayed the agreement more as 
an opportunity that could not be missed than a sign of American efforts to 
dismantle the British Empire, something which prompted at least one complaint 
in the right-wing press.59  
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 When overt disagreements between British and American soldiers were 
portrayed, these were usually resolved during the course of the film. In Count 
Five and Die (1957) and The Guns of Navarone (1961), the Anglo-American 
co-operation succeeded in spite of the initial tension caused when more junior 
US characters took charge of their British superiors. In The Red Beret (1953) 
and Seagulls over Sorrento (1954), the initial tension between the allies is 
overcome as they experience wartime co-operation. These themes were evident 
in successful productions and Box Office flops alike. Saturday Island (1951) 
received poor reviews but the adaptation of a Hugh Brooke novel from 1935 
reflected the widespread debates about the two countries’ changing roles. The 
film portrayed the relationship between Michael Dougan, a young and 
inexperienced US marine and Lieutenant Elizabeth Smythe, a higher ranking, 
more mature and middle-class Canadian nurse, after they became stranded on a 
desert island during wartime. Smythe is initially unimpressed by the American 
who was sought-after amongst the women crew on the ship destined for 
Canada. When Dougan finds some money on the island, she tells him he can 
‘buy himself a yo-yo’ and, when he claims the island in the name of the United 
States, Smythe replies that it ‘undoubtedly belongs to England.’ Overcoming 
their initial differences and awkwardness of their situation, they develop a close 
relationship but Dougan’s declaration of love is interrupted by the crash-landing 
of English pilot William Peck. Despite the American’s jealousy of the older 
Peck’s more instant rapport with Smythe, when the trio are rescued Dougan 
confesses that he was ‘born too late and has got a lot to learn’ and concedes 
both the island and the Canadian woman to his English rival.  
Despite the frequency with which Anglo-American co-operation was in 
portrayed British war films, there was sensitivity in both countries about the 
depictions of the relative roles of both countries during wartime. Being 
productions that usually celebrated British heroism and comradeship, there was 
some annoyance that the US’s role seemed to have been inflated. In the Dam 
Busters (1955), the inclusion of the ‘Coney Island beach-guard’ Joe McCarthy 
was a token reference to the broader national basis of the operation and defeat 
of Nazi Germany. As one recent commentator has noted, this was ‘to be ‘part of 
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our Empire’s story’ rather than a celebration of the diversity of the United 
Kingdom or of the Atlantic Alliance.’60 Macmillan’s aphorism about ‘Greeks 
and Romans’ was often apparent in the representation of the wartime Anglo-
American relationship. This was especially true in prisoner of war films, a 
popular sub-genre in the 1950s portrayals of wartime co-operation. In these 
portrayals, a single American character was usually presented as an outsider 
compared with the other inmates who were mostly British. As the inmates 
devised escape plans, national differences were important in shaping their 
contrasting approaches. In Albert R. N. (1953), Lieutenant “Texas” Norton’s 
(William Sylvester) impatience with the long-winded schemes of the British 
officers result in him devising a unilateral plan to bribe the guards with an 
expensive watch which result in him being shot dead whilst trying to escape. 
This American impulsiveness became a trope in these films; US characters 
attempted solo bids for freedom with varying results in The Bridge over the 
River Kwai (1957), The Camp on Blood Island (1957) and No Time to Die! 
(1958). Such constructions of the contrasting Anglo-American approaches to 
wartime were epitomised by the Anglo-American produced The Great Escape 
(1963) about which as one recent observer has noted ‘Anglo-American tensions 
[…] provided the unspoken context to the development of the genre and 
intruded into the action.’61 Although the American role in the escape from 
Stalag Luft III was exaggerated to appeal to US audiences, their presence was 
central to the plot as Fourth of July celebrations and baseball reminded 
audiences of the co-operation between the two countries. The US Captain Virgil 
Hilts (Steve McQueen) was notorious for having made eighteen previous 
escape attempts and proceeded to devise unilateral schemes which differed 
from the elaborate British plans. Thus, British Second World War films 
ultimately offered a variety of portrayals about the Anglo-American 
relationship (sometimes simultaneously) which applied as much to the post-war 
collaboration as memories of the recent conflict. Despite the latent resentment 
about the US’s late entry into the conflict and sensitivity that British 
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achievements not be overlooked or minimised, there was little overt hostility 
towards the US. This was partly the result of the financial arrangements of 
British cinema in the 1950s but it complemented the Atlanticism that was 
popular in the formal political debate.  
 
International Economy 
 
The United States’ growing international economic role was also the cause of 
some tension with Britons. Washington’s efforts to exploit overseas markets 
and promote multilateralism brought it into occasional conflict with Britain 
when the two countries’ interests diverged. Not only did the Commonwealth 
continue to be the main area for British exports and imports, it was widely held 
that any recent reduction in imperial trade was temporary and that trade with 
these countries could be vital in the UK’s economic recovery. In 1950, the 
Conservative manifesto pledged to tackle the economic problems ‘not only by 
reviving [Britain’s] native strength but by fortifying every link with the nations 
of our Empire and Commonwealth.’62 Little had changed by 1955 after the 
party’s first term in office and that year’s manifesto similarly argued that the 
imperial partnerships had ‘enabled us to stave off the economic perils that faced 
the whole Sterling area at the time the Conservative Government took over.’63 
It was not only right-wing spokesmen who held this view as politicians in the 
Attlee Cabinet had routinely spoken to this effect whilst in office and such ideas 
persisted on the left until the 1960s.64 A pre-election statement by Labour 
leader Harold Wilson in 1964 was typical as it rejected the idea ‘that decline in 
the relative importance of Commonwealth trade is inevitable’ but regarded this 
as ‘due to Government policy and a failure on the part of our exporters to grasp 
their opportunities in Commonwealth markets.’65 These economic ties were 
also regarded as a source of British strength and independence which seemed to 
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be undermined by aspects of the Anglo-American relationship. Although aid 
from the US was welcomed in the late 1940s, the termination of Marshall Aid 
in 1950 was celebrated as marking an increase in British autonomy. A front-
page headline in the Daily Mirror announced that ‘Britain is on her own feet 
again’ and the Daily Express proclaimed that the country was once again ‘an 
erect and independent nation.’66 Being independent economically was linked 
with Britain’s capacity to play a vital role in world affairs. At the Conservative 
Party’s 1952 conference, Eden stressed that the country ‘must not expect the 
status of partner unless we can stand on our own feet and that Britain ‘must be 
economically independent in order to ensure that our voice may carry its weight 
in the world.’67 
 This economic attachment to the Empire was often a source of tension with 
Washington. The support for the complicated system of preferences on which 
imperial trading was based contrasted with American officials’ calls for free 
trade and exacerbated the scepticism about the Anglo-American Loan deal of 
1946 which one senior figure described as marking the abandonment of 
‘Victorian prudence.’ 68  At Conservative Party conferences in 1952 and 1953, 
anti-GATT and pro-Commonwealth resolutions were moved, with ministers 
responding that the organisation needed amendment. In 1954, the party’s 
leadership’s position was challenged as Leo Amery, a prominent supporter of 
Imperial Preference, called for Britain’s withdrawal and backbench MP Victor 
Raikes warned that currency convertibility could mean that ‘the markets of 
much of our Empire would be swept and flooded by foreign goods.’69 
Answering these concerns, Chairman of the Board of Trade Peter Thorneycroft 
received the support of delegates when he stressed the importance of imperial 
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trade but stressed that Britain needed to remain in GATT and work for its 
amendment. Thereafter, as one recent account has noted, GATT was ‘a dead 
issue in practical policy terms.’70 Nonetheless, the subject remained a cause of 
the grievances with figures aligned with the Suez Group and, though it might 
have ceased to have an effect on policy debates, there were signs of resentment 
towards the US. In a 1957 book revealingly entitled The Uncertain Ally, John 
Biggs-Davison developed this case when he argued that:  
 
Much well-meant, naïve or unconstructive criticism was levelled 
from America at the Colonial Powers. This assisted the entry of 
American interests into new fields of exploitation, furthered and 
incited the open and clandestine competition of Moscow for the 
allegiance of the new nationalities of Asia and increased the 
dependence of the British and European Empires upon 
American patronage.71 
 
 The inconsistency of Washington’s calls for multilateralism added to the 
Conservative complaints about the US’s international economic policies. 
Despite its calls for ‘free trade,’ the American administration often introduced 
legislation to prevent imports and the 1933 Buy American Act ensured that the 
federal government preferred to offer contracts to domestic businesses. Even 
Chancellor R. A. Butler remembered imploring US officials ‘to live up to the 
slogan which they had been dinning into me ever since I arrived at the 
Treasury, namely non-discrimination.’72 This alleged hypocrisy of American 
policy-makers was a frequent theme of Daily Express editorials but its criticism 
was aimed as much at the Conservative Government as the elites across the 
Atlantic. After the US protected its bicycle industry against British exports in 
1952, it editorialised ‘No blame then to the Americans if they decide to use this 
weapon. But blame, blame in plenty for the British Government which fails to 
use the same weapon, and the weapon of preference, to protect its own and the 
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Empire’s vast markets.’73 This was connected with the belief that the 
Commonwealth could be developed in order to overcome the need for 
dependence on American markets. In 1953, Julian Amery argued that Britons 
should not complain about US policies but ‘should embark on the intensive 
development of our resources, and accept that this will call for short-term 
sacrifice of present living standards.’ Rather than making policy with reference 
to Washington, he argued that ‘we should make up our minds what it is we 
want to do, offer the Americans a chance to come in with us if they so wish, but 
if necessary be prepared to go it alone.’74 
Business organisations linked with the Conservative Party responded to 
American trade and economic policies in a variety of ways. Although many 
echoed these criticisms of Washington’s positions, there were also concerted 
efforts by entrepreneurs and manufacturers to penetrate American markets 
which continued in spite of US policies.75 Much to the chagrin of those who 
remained confident in the Empire’s economic potential, Chancellor Butler 
coined the slogan ‘Trade, not Aid’ and encouraged businesses to remedy 
Britain’s Dollar deficit by trading in the US.76 When British tender for US 
electrical contracts was rejected in December 1952, the Daily Mail told readers 
that ‘Empire development is our last reserve—and it can put us right on top 
again.’77 Nonetheless, there were concerted efforts to promote British goods in 
the US as British trade centres were established in American cities and the 
Dollar Exports Board was formed in 1949 to provide information and advice for 
exporters. Its Chairman Sir Cecil Weir remembered that its main priority was 
‘the restoration of our financial and economic independence’ and the British 
businesses who traded in America were often positive about their experiences.78 
In the same way that their counterparts in the labour movement tended to report 
favourably on US industrial relations, business groups relayed often 
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enthusiastic advice and guidance for companies seeking to export their 
products. Car manufacturer Sir William Rootes remembered that it was 
tantamount to a ‘finishing school’ and ‘the incredible North American 
friendship and North American goodwill.’ Ultimately, Rootes believed that the 
‘experience taught me a great deal. It gave me a respect for what I call the 
American “snap” while at the same time it made me aware of my own faults.’79  
Another element of the economic relationship with the US that caused 
anxiety was the extent of American investment in Britain. In spite of the 
eagerness of certain businesses to exploit the opportunity to penetrate US 
markets, there was some reticence about the prospect of American multilateral 
organisations operating in Britain. This was particularly true on the sections of 
the left which, motivated by anti-capitalist impulses, feared the domination of 
the British economy by foreign businesses. According to Francis Williams, who 
had served as Clement Attlee’s Press Secretary in Downing Street from 1945-7, 
the post-war growth of American big business in Britain was partly responsible 
for its Americanisation, a fear which is addressed more closely in Chapter Five. 
Noting that 800 companies were controlled by US firms and that one twentieth 
of production came from American-owned plants, he argued that these 
investors were ‘seeking to export to Britain […] not just money but American 
civilizations and an American way of life.’80 Though Williams’ thesis was 
crude, overlooking any reciprocal British influence over the US, similar 
warnings were often espoused on the left. For opponents of the close Anglo-
American relationship, this apparent influx of US business was another sign of 
Britain’s servile role in relation to Washington as it could prevent a Labour 
Government from nationalising Britain’s industry.81 Opposition to this process 
culminated during the bid in November 1960 by the Ford Motor Company to 
gain 100 per cent control of its British subsidiary. Led by Shadow Chancellor 
Harold Wilson, Labour MPs in the House of Commons criticised the 
Conservative Government’s support of the decision. This was prompted by 
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concerns that American Ford could divert business away from its subsidiary as 
well as fears that a recession across the Atlantic could harm the British 
economy, or that decisions about production would be made from Detroit. John 
Parker, the Labour MP whose constituency included the Ford plant at 
Dagenham, warned that:  
 
If the American Ford Company misuses the position which it 
will acquire as a result of this take-over bid to the detriment of 
Dagenham in regard to employment, there will a Boston Tea 
Party in Dagenham and we shall throw the American interests 
into the Thames. We shall free Dagenham from colonial rule.82 
 
Labour’s opposition to the takeover prompted renewed charges amongst 
Conservatives that the left was motivated by ‘anti-American venom,’ or, as the 
Spectator put it, ‘auto-anti-Americanism.’83 The Economist linked the left-wing 
opposition with the growing evidence that Britain was ‘a second class power,’ a 
change in Britain’s status that encouraged ‘suspicion, envy and prejudice that 
drive a less than great power into recurrent, if half-hearted, xenophobia’84 The 
Ford incident proved to be another demonstration that Labour was usually 
forced to defend its credentials about the Anglo-American relationship and 
counter charges about its anti-Americanism. Wilson was right to stress that it 
was the extent of American involvement rather than indiscriminate opposition 
that motivated the protests and pointed out that the Labour Government made 
similar deals for foreign investment – a distinction lost in the heat of debate.85 
Conservatives had their own doubts about the decision – even if they were less 
forcefully expressed. The Daily Express reported deep concern amongst some 
Tory MPs and right-wing objections focused on the sale price of the remaining 
shares purchased by American Ford and the possibility that British managerial 
talent could be overlooked as US staff was brought to the UK.86 As much as the 
right-wing press attempted to smear the left with charges of anti-Americanism, 
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the US takeover of British assets in Persia in 1951 and Trinidad in 1956 was 
also criticised by Conservatives. When the Eden Government agreed to sell 
British oil assets in Trinidad to Texas-based Anglo-American Oil Company, the 
decision provoked criticism from an unlikely alliance of the communist Daily 
Worker, Labour supporting Daily Herald and the Beaverbrook Daily Express. 
The latter editorialised that it ‘is wrong for a foreign Power to entrench itself 
either in Britain or in the Empire. And that applies even to Britain’s ally.’87 
Nonetheless, this was another occasion during which the Conservative Party 
ensured the acquiescence of its MPs as the dissent reported in the 1922 
Committee failed to materialise when it came to a Parliamentary vote on the 
subject. 
Left-wing complaints about Washington’s economic policy focused on its 
hoarding of raw materials or the restrictions it placed on British trade with 
countries behind the Iron Curtain. Passed by the American Congress, the Battle 
Act threatened to deny aid to any country which traded behind the Iron Curtain. 
For some trade unionists, this appeared to be evidence that Washington was 
harming the British economy. At the 1953 TUC conference, a delegate from the 
Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers bemoaned the impact of this legislation 
as he claimed that unemployment in Merseyside was ‘a direct result of 
American interference with our established elementary rights to trade with any 
other country.’88 For Aneurin Bevan, Washington’s restriction of trade with 
China ‘scarcely touches the buoyant American economy’ but ‘hinders in a 
thousand ways the totally different economic needs of Great Britain.’ 
Moreover, Bevan argued the US trade embargoes prevented the industrial 
expansion which would undermine revolutionary extremism.89 This section of 
British politics believed that the American preference for global free markets 
and currency convertibility hindered Labour’s aspirations for a socialist 
programme based on import restrictions and bilateral trade. Furthermore, 
American restrictions on trade with communist states led some to conclude that 
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US policies were hindering Britain’s economic recovery.90 John Strachey 
asserted for example ‘Convertibility, and the restoration of one united capitalist 
economy in the Western world today, would in practice mean that we could 
become the helpless, hopeless, voteless and voiceless satellite of America’.91 
The policy document Challenge to Britain, accepted by the 1953 conference, 
criticised high American tariffs and its hoarding of raw materials, advocating 
currency controls and discrimination against luxury dollar goods.  
 
Suez and After 
 
Conservative complaints about Washington’s attitudes towards the British 
Empire culminated during the Suez Crisis in November 1956. The diplomatic 
events leading to the period of tension for the Anglo-American relationship are 
well-known; Britain and France colluded with the Israeli Government to invade 
Egypt in order to reclaim the Suez Canal Company which had been nationalised 
by President Gamal Nasser earlier that year.92 When pressure on sterling from 
Washington forced the abandonment of the operation soon after its launch, the 
right-wing criticism of the US’s policies in the Middle East was momentarily 
articulated much more widely. Members of the Suez Group were naturally 
vocal in their criticism of the Eisenhower administration. Angus Maude 
claimed that ‘the ultimate destruction of Western interests in the Middle East — 
and perhaps the Atlantic Alliance — rests squarely on Mr. Eisenhower, and we 
admit to the world that we are now an American satellite.’93 Recent events 
seemed to have proved the longstanding complaints about the US’s attempt to 
undermine the British Empire. Julian Amery was reported as having told a 
group of French Conservatives that ‘Never before has any country been treated 
by an ally as we have been’ and complained that Britain’s withdrawal from 
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Empire was ‘due entirely to United States pressure.’94 Some felt disappointed 
that their expectation of Anglo-American solidarity in a crisis had not been 
realised. Peter Smithers was reported as having told a meeting of the 
Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee that he ‘had never based his attitude to 
America on sentimental grounds, but had believed that America would never 
stand aside if this country’s vital interests were at stake.’ Suez ‘had convinced 
him that this was no longer a valid assumption.’95 
As well as these usual dissentients, the objections resonated more widely 
within the party. The growing Anglo-American tension before November led a 
delegate at that year’s party conference to claim that ‘there are no friendships in 
this world today between nations, there are only alliances’ and in response to 
the American pressure on Sterling more than one hundred Conservative MPs 
signed an Early-Day motion condemning the action of the US administration 
and the UN.96 Even within the Cabinet there was significant frustration at what 
was perceived to be a conflict precipitated by American mistakes, oscillation or 
intransigence rather than a diplomatic misunderstanding. Conservative 
politician Randolph Churchill was rare in attributing the crisis to the Eden 
Government, which he claimed was naive to have launched such an operation 
during in the final days of the 1956 US Presidential Election campaign.97 Such 
confidence in American support was not uncommon; Macmillan had noted in 
1953 that ‘Of course, there will be quibbling … But in the event of war, there 
will be no quibbling and the Americans would support us.’98 Others were more 
content to blame their American ally and exonerate their own politicians. In the 
right-wing press before the crisis, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was 
often the target of criticism when the two countries failed to co-ordinate their 
policies in the Middle East. Before the crisis in late 1956, Daily Express 
reporter Sefton Delmer labelled Dulles as the ‘Most Alarming Man Alive’ 
                                                 
94 ‘Russia? Let’s worry about those threats from the US, says MP’, Daily Express, 26 
November 1956, 2. 
95 Minutes of the Conservative Party Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 November 1956, CRD 
2/34/2, CPA. 
96 76th Annual Conference of the Conservative and Unionist Associations,1956, 33. 
97 Randolph Churchill, The Rise and Fall of Sir Anthony Eden (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 
1959), 257. 
98 Alastair Horne, Macmillan, 1894-1956 (London: Macmillan, 1988), 375. 
135 
 
because he believed the statesman was a ‘man who sets out to cross a road 
without looking and then when he is half way across tries to rush back again.’99 
Dulles provided a scapegoat for Britons frustrated by American policy which 
was fuelled by the presumption of British superiority in diplomacy. The Times 
editor William Haley was convinced after meetings with US officials that ‘I 
knew much more about Suez than they did’ and Conservative MP Robert 
Boothby asserted in 1960 that ‘Dulles himself, and Dulles alone, had 
precipitated the Suez crisis.’100 Criticisms of the Secretary of State were rarely 
consistent and at times contradictory as he was variously described as being too 
religious, a vacillator or overly bombastic. The memoirs published decades 
afterwards by Conservative politicians and Cabinet ministers demonstrated that 
their frustration with Dulles failed to diminish over time. According to Chief 
Whip Edward Heath, the Secretary of State was ‘as devious a character as I 
have met’ whilst Selwyn Lloyd remembered his consternation when Dulles 
later asked him why the British invasion had been abandoned.101 Lloyd, who 
was Foreign Secretary during the crisis, recalled his surprise because Dulles 
‘had led the pack against us, supported the transfer of the matter from the 
Security Council to the General Assembly and pulled out every stop to defeat 
us.’102 Notably, though, few other Americans were accorded the same degree of 
critical commentary as Dulles and critics accepted the conventional wisdom 
that Eisenhower was the stooge of his Secretary of State.  
 Suez was for the remainder of the period frequently regarded afterwards as a 
watershed in the growth of anti-Americanism. Before 1956, allegations about 
anti-Americanism had been mainly levelled at the ‘Bevanites’ and the Labour 
left but the outspoken Conservative protests over Suez caused commentators 
and journalists to identify the phenomenon’s prevalence in right-wing circles. 
The Spectator editorialised that the attitude was ‘stronger now than it has been 
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for years’ and a Daily Sketch journalist even claimed that ‘at least half of the 
Parliamentary Tories can be classed as anti-American at this time.’103 
According to journalist Constantine Fitzgibbon, the incident epitomised the 
right-wing strand of anti-Americanism which was based on the belief ‘that 
power is theirs by right and therefore resent it when others (particularly allies) 
are more powerful than they.’ This was an attitude which Fitzgibbon believed 
had been ‘strongly reinforced by Suez.’104 The Conservative protests were 
typically described as another manifestation of the envy and resentment felt by 
Britons as their apparent post-war decline vis-à-vis the US.105 Writer and 
academic Martin Green expanded on this theme, arguing that the educated 
Englishman was ‘made hostile to America, as he is hostile to democracy and 
contemporaneity and normality.’106 For Green, hostility towards the US was 
linked with a broader cultural and existential crisis as Britain, he observed, had 
lost its role as the ‘world’s pulse beat’ and was consequently ‘neither an 
important work place nor a good play place’ but ‘merely drab.’ Its political life, 
Green argued, was redolent of previous declining empires and ‘foreign policy, 
when any initiative is taken, has an air of fantasy – the Suez adventure reminds 
one fatally of Napoleon III’s military escapades.’107 As studies of Britain’s 
post-war ‘decline’ proliferated, the diplomatic episode was regularly cited as 
evidence of the UK’s malaise or an incident which demonstrated the mediocrity 
of the elite. In 1959, Tory politician Christopher Hollis noted that it had 
damaged ‘confidence in governmental sanity’ whilst Rex Malik described the 
‘near stupidity, the bungling, the incompetence and general flabbiness of what 
poses for leadership in one of the most complex societies ever run by man.’108 
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 Despite these claims that Suez marked the growth in anti-Americanism as 
Britons realised the extent of their post-war decline relative to Washington, the 
protests amongst Conservative MPs were brief. Furthermore, the incident 
showed that it was rare in Britain’s bipolar political system for both parties 
simultaneously to voice protests about US foreign policy. Labour’s leadership 
used the incident to attack their opponents’ Atlanticist credentials; in the House 
of Commons Gaitskell claimed that Eden was threatening the foreign policy 
consensus established over the past decade, as the invasion of Egypt risked 
damaging relations with Washington, the UN and the Commonwealth. About 
the Anglo-American relationship, he told MPs that ‘Some of us on both sides of 
the House have worked very hard to strengthen and improve that alliance’ and 
‘a far greater strain is now being placed upon the Anglo-American alliance than 
ever before.’109  
The tension in the Conservative efforts to combine imperial and Atlantic ties 
was not resolved by the events during the crisis and continued to underpin the 
party’s attitudes towards the Anglo-American relationship. There was some 
truth in John Ramsden’s claim that the furore over Suez was ‘the last episodes 
of an old Empire mentality that was soon to pass away’ but the attitude was still 
apparent in the mid-1960s.110 After replacing Eden as Prime Minister in January 
1957, Harold Macmillan embarked on a concerted campaign to repair the 
seemingly fractured relationship with Washington and the Suez Crisis was 
unusual for the intensity and outspokenness of right-wing opposition to the US. 
The protestors lost some of its leadership when Julian Amery (Macmillan’s 
son-in-law) was appointed to the newly-formed administration. Nonetheless, 
continued doubts were expressed within the party, not least by the members of 
the Suez Group who resigned the Conservative whip in mid-1957. Moreover, 
there were signs that the British public continued to support the operation in the 
late 1950s. Not only did the Macmillan Government increase its Parliamentary 
majority in 1959 but Gallup polls even suggested that 23 percent of Britons 
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identified the Suez Crisis and ‘standing up to Nasser’ as the greatest 
achievement of the Conservatives in office.111 This figure was even higher 
amongst Conservatives (38 percent) and was the success most frequently cited 
by the public. Few Conservatives were later willing to accept any responsibility 
for the crisis which was more frequently portrayed as an example of capricious 
of misguided US diplomacy. The notes provided by the party to its general 
election candidates in 1959 advised that: 
 
We cannot accept the position that the British initiative must 
depend on our calculation as to American reactions. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the United States took the lead against 
us in the United Nations was not to be expected and we believe 
that this has since been regretted by many American leaders. 
That the Americans took up an initiative which they have since 
regretted should not be a reason for reproach to the British 
Government.112 
 
Although there was faith that the Conservative Government’s actions were 
justified by the subsequent policies of Washington, there were signs in the 
right-wing press of residual resentment about Suez. At the time of Suez, 
Conservatives drew similar parallels with American policy in Panama, claiming 
that Washington would have acted similarly in Latin America.113 In 1961 after 
the administration of President Kennedy launched a failed coup in communist 
Cuba, conservative commentators described this decision as analogous with 
Britain’s thwarted intervention in the Middle East. Nonetheless, these could 
often be voiced in conjunction with calls for continued co-operation. During the 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the News of the World voiced support of American 
policy but noted ‘We recall the Suez situation, and it would be less than human 
not to remember that Washington did not then give the same immediate 
assurances. But all that should be forgotten. In this struggle we are united.’114 
As much as Suez became a longstanding source of bitterness amongst 
Conservatives, it was the result of more complicated factors than the simple 
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jealousy or envy at having been supplanted by Washington. Subsequent events 
in the Middle East which witnessed the US playing an enhanced role in the 
region did not result in the same right-wing protests or hostility. When the 
Eisenhower Doctrine was promulgated by the President in January 1957, the 
American administration pledged to intervene in the region in order to resist 
any evidence of communist expansion. Though this might have been interpreted 
as further evidence of Washington’s desire to undermine the British Empire, the 
policy was largely welcomed by right-wing commentators and within the 
Conservative Party. A memorandum to the party’s MPs written by Oliver Poole 
noted that Washington had ‘at last accepted her vital responsibility to keep the 
peace in this vital and troubled area,’ a development ‘which the British 
Government has long sought.’115 That the Americans appeared to have 
undergone a volte-face since the crisis seemed to prove the sagacity of the 
operation. The party’s Weekly News Letter was more explicit as it asked ‘If 
Britain had not acted in Egypt, does anyone believe that the Eisenhower 
Declaration would have been made, or that it would not have been made too 
late?’116 The reactions in the conservative press were mixed but there were few 
outspoken complaints about Britain having been supplanted by the US. The 
Daily Mail suggested that the speech was ‘at least a partial confirmation of Sir 
Anthony Eden’s claim that time will justify his actions’ whilst the Sunday 
Times told readers: 
 
We must be thankful for this beginning to an American policy in 
the Middle East; for its motives are sound, its purpose 
necessary, and it decisively ranges the United States alongside 
ourselves in the defence of an area whose security is for us a 
matter of life and death.117  
 
Finding a Role 
 
Although Suez is often regarded as a watershed after which Britain began to 
realise its diminished role in relation to Washington and growing dependence 
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on the US, the conflicting pressure of fulfilling an Imperial and Atlantic role 
continued into the 1960s.118 When Gallup asked Britons in 1961 to name the 
most important international alignment, 48 per cent of respondents identified 
the Commonwealth whilst only 19 and 18 per cent respectively pointed to the 
US and Europe.119 The pessimism about Britain’s world role which existed in 
some quarters was exacerbated by the decolonisation of vast sections of sub-
Saharan Africa and economic statistics which seemed to suggest that Britain 
was performing poorly in comparison with other industrialised Western 
countries. As a concept for understanding Britain’s recent history, ‘decline’ 
became more central by the early 1960s. Statistics about the UK’s flagging 
economic performance were widely cited and Macmillan privately complained 
in 1962 that ‘[i]f only all the people who write, lecture, broadcast, and even 
preach about economic growth did some useful work, the increase in man-
power wd [sic] perhaps enable us to achieve it.’120 This idea had long been 
implicit in British politics but achieved greater attention in the early 1960s. The 
Anglo-American Council on Productivity from 1948-52 demonstrated the 
popularity of the belief that Britain was lagging behind America but by the time 
of the 1964 General Election Labour berated the Conservative Government for 
having overseen ‘thirteen wasted years.’ Developing a case about British 
decline, the then Labour leader Harold Wilson compared British and American 
industrial methods, describing that: 
 
An enquiry comes in: we are still composing a tepid reply while 
our German or American rival has already hopped on a ‘plane. 
We send commercial travellers, keen and dedicated perhaps: 
they send top directors. We too often allow complaints about 
spares and aftersales servicing to go unanswered: they charter a 
plane and take urgent action.121   
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The belief that Americans were inconsistent in their policies towards the 
British Empire and developing world continued to be voiced as the process of 
decolonisation accelerated in the late 1950s. Despite the confidence that the 
imperial ties remained central to the UK’s foreign policy, large sections of sub-
Saharan Africa were granted independence and Britain applied to join the EEC 
in 1961. The growing calls for national liberation needed to be managed in 
order to prevent the socio-economic instability in the non-aligned world which 
was thought to enable communist expansion. Washington’s strident anti-
colonialist rhetoric was less prominent when it threatened to be disruptive in 
Latin America. In British Guyana, for example, there was frustration that the 
US opposed the Conservative Government’s policy that the country should 
move towards independence. An exchange between President Kennedy and 
Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod revealed the differences on the topic as the 
American laughed when Macleod asked ‘do I understand that you want us to go 
as quickly as possible towards independence everywhere else all over the world 
but not on your doorstep in British Guiana?’122 Just as Suez continued to rankle 
with senior Conservatives, this apparent inconsistency in American policy was 
duly noted by right-wing politicians. Macmillan privately noted that it was 
‘rather fun making the Americans repeat over and over again their passionate 
plea to us to stick to ‘Colonialism’ and ‘Imperialism’ at all costs.’123  
Debates about Britain’s involvement with the nascent European Economic 
Community were also conducted with some reference to the Anglo-American 
relationship. The earliest opposition to the ‘special relationship’ was motivated 
by the belief that the UK could be central to a ‘third force’ in Europe which was 
independent of both superpowers.124 Britain’s initial reluctance about being 
involved with a supranational project which could distract from the Atlantic 
Alliance or the Commonwealth began to change by the end of the 1950s. 
Scepticism about the European project was still the dominant reaction and some 
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critics suggested that Washington had pressurised the British Government into 
pursuing this option. Because the continent represented the most likely point of 
Soviet expansion and a potential focal point of East-West hostilities, 
consecutive US administrations encouraged the integration of Europe. Figures 
from both political parties expressed their suspicion that Britain was being 
pressured by Washington to apply for membership of the organisation. At a 
meeting of the Conservative Party Foreign Affairs Committee in 1953, Eden 
dismissed suggestions that Washington was exerting pressure on Britain to join 
the European Defence Committee but such concerns persisted after the UK’s 
first application in 1961 to join the EEC.125 In a Parliamentary debate about the 
subject, there was agreement amongst left and right-wing critics of the ‘special 
relationship’ that Washington had pressurised the Conservative Government 
into applying for membership of the organisation. Labour MP Jennie Lee was 
not alone in stressing that ‘[n]o matter how much I admire my American friends 
and wish for good Anglo-American relations, I hotly resent the way in which 
time and time again, at crucial moments in our history, America has interfered 
in a way going far beyond the bounds of propriety.’126  
 The need to retain some influence over decision-making in Washington 
featured in the arguments of both the advocates and opponents of British 
membership of the nascent EEC. Supporters argued that the UK could become 
irrelevant in international affairs if it did not integrate with Europe. For Labour 
politician Roy Jenkins writing in 1962, there was ‘no use pretending that it will 
help us to co-operate with the new frontiersmen in Washington if we remain 
extremely stubborn old frontiersmen in Europe.’127 Others who were impressed 
with the post-war American economic success argued that the achievements of 
the US and USSR in Europe could be replicated in Europe if co-operation led to 
greater unity and a similar reduction of tariff barriers.128 An issue which 
provoked divisions on the left, the critics of membership pointed out that the 
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EEC could weaken Britain’s ties with NATO and the Commonwealth or 
diminish British influence over the US.129 In 1960, Denis Healey suggested that 
joining the EEC ‘might greatly weaken Britain’s ability to influence the 
outcome of the two major issues of our age – the Cold War between the West 
and the Communist bloc, and the problems of Afro-Asia.’130 Although there 
were different attitudes towards Britain’s membership with Europe, the Anglo-
American alliance was by the end of the period increasingly mediated and 
shaped by these views on the EEC. Reflecting on his period as Foreign 
Secretary after leaving office in 1960, Selwyn Lloyd disputed the notion that 
Macmillan had been dominated by the desire to remain close to Eisenhower 
noting that it ‘has been the kernel of Foreign Office policy’ and ‘was Winston’s 
policy and Eden’s (even over Suez, Eden really believed that the U.S. would be 
benevolently neutral).’ Lloyd noted that the Foreign Office ‘have been loyal to 
the Anglo/U.S. relationship to such an extent that I have had from time to time 
to try to impress the importance of […] Europe.’131  
 
Conclusions 
 
Throughout the long 1950s, there was tension between Britain’s Atlantic and 
Imperial roles and responsibilities as policy-makers sought to reconcile the 
nascent commitment to a ‘special relationship’ with the attachment to the 
Empire and Commonwealth. Some Conservatives regarded Washington’s 
foreign policy as a threat to British interests but there were others who insisted 
that the two countries were linked by a common heritage with the US acting as 
the successor to Britain. The attempt to balance these relationships and alliances 
was at times strained, particularly when it was perceived that American policies 
aimed to undermine Britain’s global links or economic fortunes. Despite the 
occasional difficulties in pursuing these separate links, there were seldom signs 
of open conflict on the subject as the Conservatives were less frequently 
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involved in public disputes about the subject. Even the Suez Crisis — which 
has often been identified as a turning point in British foreign policy — failed to 
prompt a major re-evaluation of the UK’s world role as few Conservatives 
accepted the idea that it had been a mistake. The 1950s was an era during which 
both countries experienced changes in their international roles. Given the 
complexity of this process, though, it is inadequate to ascribe the opposition 
towards US foreign policy or criticism of its objectives as mere envy, 
resentment and bitterness which manifested itself as anti-Americanism. The 
idea that Britain had declined in relation to the US — which was central to this 
assumption that neuroses fuelled anti-American sentiment — was questionable. 
In spite of the growing debate about ‘decline’ by the early 1960s, Britain 
remained an international actor with global aims and objectives, which made 
many interested observers reluctant to accept the evidence of their diminished 
status. Moreover, the objections voiced when Washington’s international policy 
seemed to undermine the Empire and Commonwealth or Britain’s economic 
objectives were not so much the result of irrational prejudices as the result of 
divergent aims and interests of both countries. Chapter Four explores an issue 
which was closely associated with these questions of British independence from 
Washington. As the UK suffered periodic financial crises, it was less able to 
compete with the US on defence questions or exercise an independent policy, 
particularly concerning the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It assesses the 
ways in which various subjects pertaining to the defence relationship were 
debated for evidence of the responses to the growing links with the US and 
interdependence of their policies. 
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Chapter Four: 
Defence 
 
On 3 October 1952, the British Government exploded its first atomic weapon 
over the Montebello Islands, becoming the first country besides the United 
States and the Soviet Union to manufacture nuclear weapons. Although the US 
had by this point already possessed the device for seven years and had a 
monopoly over the weapon until 1949, many British observers concluded that 
the United Kingdom had overturned Washington’s advantage in nuclear 
research. Because the British explosion did not resemble the familiar mushroom 
cloud but appeared ‘z-shaped,’ it was believed that the tests heralded new 
advancements as with several wondered if the test was the first detonation of a 
hydrogen bomb.1 Headlines stressed that the atomic tests had boosted Britain’s 
international prestige, particularly vis-à-vis the American Government: the 
Daily Express announced ‘One up on America’ whilst the Daily Mirror boasted 
that ‘Today Britain is GREAT BRITAIN again.’2 The British Government was 
keen to encourage the idea that the successful test demonstrated independence 
from Washington; no Americans were invited to oversee the proceedings and 
Australia was chosen as a test site for this reason.3 The Economist at least was 
convinced by this window dressing and asserted that Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill should now ‘be able to formulate much convincingly than hitherto — 
to the Americans and others — his views on what strategy should be in the age 
of atomic artillery and guided missiles.’4 When five years later the UK tested its 
first hydrogen bomb, various commentators drew similar conclusions and again 
judged the event with reference to American achievements. The Daily Mail 
editorialised that Britain had ‘regained her independence’ because previously 
she ‘was, let us now admit it, a nuclear satellite of the United States.’5 Writing 
in the Daily Express, Chapman Pincher praised Sir William Penney, the 
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scientist who was headed the team responsible for the development of Britain’s 
hydrogen and atomic weapons, as the ‘quintessence of the quiet Englishman,’ 
remarking that ‘the Americans have no comparable character.’6 Not all were as 
ready to accept that this provided Britain with leverage over Washington. 
Labour MP Richard Crossman challenged the Conservative Government’s 
‘delusions of grandeur’ and claimed that the ‘production of a British H-bomb 
will to my mind do nothing whatsoever to reduce this humiliating dependence 
on the United States.’7 
 These reactions to the explosions of British atomic and hydrogen weapons 
demonstrate the extent to which developments in the UK’s nuclear and defence 
policy were judged against those of Washington and provoked debate about the 
state of the Anglo-American relationship. The close defence links between the 
two countries were one aspect of the alliance which contributed to its unique 
status in international relations. Both countries were major contributors to 
NATO, the United States Air Force (USAF) controlled a network of RAF bases 
in England, and by the early 1960s Britain’s nuclear deterrent was acquired 
from the US. However, this aspect of the relationship often caused friction and 
frustration for Britons because it exemplified the concerns about the UK’s 
subservience within the ‘special relationship,’ or dependence on Washington. 
This chapter examines the responses in Britain to the development of various 
aspects of the defence partnership during the long 1950s. By evaluating debates 
about NATO, nuclear weapons and US bases, it investigates the ways in which 
Britons reacted to the various features of the growing links between the two 
countries, particularly as the growing defence ties meant reliance on American 
officials. Through an examination of the ideas of the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND), the group which by the late 1950s provided the most 
prominent opposition to the Anglo-American defence relationship, it also 
examines the section of British politics which was most sceptical about the 
defence ties and renowned for its ‘anti-Americanism.’ Ultimately, it suggests 
that several assumptions were shared in Britain despite the differing positions 
on defence policy and the conflict which was often fierce by the end of the 
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decade. It was common for commentators and politicians from across the 
political spectrum who disagreed on foreign and defence policy to argue that 
Britain could influence American defence policy. Moreover, the shared 
language and close ties between the two countries ensured that American ideas 
about the subject were accessible and widely discussed and debated by a wide 
variety of British onlookers. 
 
NATO, Containment and Anglo-American Defence 
 
Throughout the long 1950s, the Anglo-American defence co-operation ranked 
as one of the most intimate features of the alliance and distinguished it from 
other bilateral relationships. As Cold War tension escalated in the years after 
the Second World War, this aspect of the ‘special relationship’ conformed to 
the general pattern of the alliance: growing co-operation occurred in spite of 
occasional discord about certain issues.8 Amidst diplomatic disagreements over 
the sudden cancellation of Lend-Lease, the terms of the post-war Anglo-
American Loan and the future of Palestine, the defence ties formed in wartime 
dwindled or were dismantled entirely. The field of atomic energy was one such 
area in which the defence partnership initially foundered, as peacetime resulted 
in the end of the collaboration apparent since 1943 through the Manhattan 
Project. Though informal agreements had specified co-operation ought to 
continue after the end of the Second World War, the US Senate passed the 
McMahon Act in 1946 which forbade the American Government from sharing 
nuclear research with its allies. Despite this evidence of deterioration in the 
defence links which had helped to defeat Nazi Germany, the alleged threat of 
Soviet expansionism helped to revive the defence partnership in the late 1940s. 
As a result of the 1948 blockade of Berlin, seventy American B29s with the 
capability of delivering nuclear weapons were located in East Anglia but the 
USAF had sought the usage of RAF for several years before its return. The anti-
communism which was widely articulated across the British political spectrum 
provided the main justification for this relationship. It led to the establishment 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949 and, though tension 
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continued to be apparent on nuclear questions, the outbreak of was in Korea in 
1950 led to the organisation’s expansion and the Attlee Government’s decision 
under US pressure to increase expenditure on rearmament.   
 According to those who supported a close Anglo-American relationship as a 
response to the putative aggression of the Soviet Union, it was important for 
Britain to make a valid contribution to the Cold War efforts at containment. For 
the editors of Socialist Commentary, being involved with the combined efforts 
to withstand Russian belligerence were important even if they appeared to 
contradict ‘socialist’ values: 
 
We cannot shirk the tasks arising from the deadly danger of 
Russian expansion, but these very tasks- which mean a pre-
occupation with rearmament and defence- severely limit our 
freedom to shape the world according to our dreams. We are 
compelled to operate in the thick of sordid power strategies- a 
calamity which former generations of socialists … had hoped to 
avoid.9 
 
A journalist in another left-wing Atlanticist journal Labour Woman supported 
rearmament for similar reasons because ‘of the preponderance of Russian 
armed forces and her immense strategic advantages we cannot rely on the 
superior industrial potential of the West.’ Moreover, it was noted, the ‘Atlantic 
Pact will not be effective without adequate arms.’10 Although Conservatives 
and Labour both denigrated one another’s capability in managing defence 
issues as allegations of right-wing warmongering and left-wing pacifism were 
exchanged in political debates, both parties shared this support for the Anglo-
American defence relationship. A Conservative Party statement seemed relaxed 
about the prospect of sheltering under the American nuclear umbrella given the 
greater threat of Russian expansion. It asserted that ‘Nothing stands between 
Europe to-day and the complete subjugation to Communist tyranny but the 
atomic bomb in American possession.’11 In line with their Labour Party rivals, 
Shadow Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden noted that Britain, in order to be 
listened to around the world, should build up its defences ‘with all speed and 
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vigour, not to make a war, but negotiate peace through strength.’12 NATO was 
unfamiliar to many Britons compared with other international organisations as 
only 38 percent were able correctly to identify the meaning of its initials in 
December 1957 almost a decade after its creation.13 Nonetheless, membership 
of NATO was a key tenet of the agenda of both parties and their ancillary 
organisations throughout the period. The Labour Government’s role in its 
formation was an important aspect of the foreign and defence policy legacy of 
post-war Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. When by the end of the 1950s there 
were calls on the left for British withdrawal, these were met with suggestions 
such action would amount to a betrayal of the UK’s main ally and supporters 
maintained that it was a defensive grouping which aimed to prevent Soviet 
expansion.14  
Although NATO was an important element of Britain’s defence policy after 
1945, there were various doubts about the balance of power within the alliance 
as well as complaints about the amount of expenditure devoted to military 
spending. The dominant historical narrative concerning the defence alliance has 
emphasised British subservience or, as Melissa Pine has put it, the ‘accepted 
story is one of increasing British dependence on the United States.’15 Signs of 
British unease about this supposed American hegemony within the alliance 
were apparent early in the decade and many contemporary observers would 
likely have agreed with Christopher Grayling and Christopher Langdon’s later 
judgement that the creation of NATO illustrated ‘just how dependent Europe 
had become on the United States and how relatively powerless Britain now 
was.’16 This was particularly true of the pacifistic sections of the British left 
which persistently voiced concern about the activities of the US Pentagon as 
unease about the military establishment across the Atlantic was apparent 
regardless of which party controlled the White House. Left-wing Labour MP 
                                                 
12 Conservative Party Weekend Talking Point No. 153, 2 June 1951, 1 
13 BIPO Survey CQ 498/508, December 1957, CCO 180/2/1/2, CPA. By contrast, 68 percent 
could identify the meaning of UNO.  
14 R. G. Cook, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’, NUGMWJ, November 1958, 345. 
15 Melissa Pine, ‘Transatlantic Nuclear Cooperation: The British Perspective, 1945-1991’, in 
Matthew Grant (ed), British Way in Cold Warfare Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945-
1975 (London: Continuum International Publishing, 2009), 105. 
16 Christopher Grayling and Christopher Langdon, Just Another Star? Anglo-American 
Relations since 1945 (London: Harrap, 1988), 8. 
150 
 
Bob Edwards criticised the Pentagon in 1962, describing it as ‘a state within a 
state transforming democratic principles into a mockery.’17 Added to these 
concerns about being too closely linked with US policy-makers was the belief 
that the Anglo-American relationship diverted government expenditure, which 
was best spent on socio-economic issues instead of defence. This was amongst 
the reasons for Aneurin Bevan’s resignation from the Cabinet in 1951 and, in 
Tribune journalist Mervyn Jones’s 1953 novel The New Town, these ideas were 
closely linked with other grievances about the Anglo-American relationship. 
Set in the fictional new town of Long Ness in the final months of the Attlee 
Government, it stressed the negative impact of the Korean War on Labour’s 
socio-economic agenda. When rearmament causes reductions in expenditure on 
the housing project, the government agrees to allow the US controlled Anglo-
Saxon Oil Company to build a refinery in the area in exchange for funding the 
completion of the town. Despite the concerns of the idealistic yet indecisive 
planner Harry Peterson and a handful of left-wing activists, the refinery’s 
construction is supported by an alliance of local right-wing Labour figures, 
Conservatives and US big businessmen. These were more substantial 
grievances on Jones’s part than one reviewer in the Listener appreciated, 
writing that the book was one of several novels in which America was regarded 
‘with a mixture of terror and awe’ as the US was ‘living a life of power, 
splendour — and damage — remote from our reach.’18 However, Jones had 
criticised the power of US big business in Tribune and his novel reflected some 
popular concerns that the defence relationship could derail Labour’s socio-
economic reforms. 
Equally problematic as these ethical concerns was the perception in Britain 
that the US dominated the defence arrangements. Amongst Conservatives, there 
was frustration when Britain was excluded from the ANZUS Pact in the Pacific 
between Australia, New Zealand and the US. At the Conservative Party Foreign 
Affairs Committee, future Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd warned that 
the UK ‘must not slip into an inferior position; we must be a party to any 
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regional pacts within the Empire.’19 As NATO expanded in the early 1950s 
with the creation of Supreme Commanders for the Atlantic (SACLANT) and 
Europe (SACEUR), there were additional anxieties that Britons were 
overlooked or marginal in policy-making. With the announcement in 1951 that 
an American General would command NATO forces in the North Atlantic, 
there was incredulity that Britain seemed to have been supplanted in an area 
which was vital to its foreign and defence policy. On the BBC radio programme 
Argument, Conservative politician Randolph Churchill claimed that for Britain 
unlike the US, the area was ‘a matter of life and death.’ Though not opposed to 
the creation of the position in principle, the former MP and son of Winston 
Churchill was typical amongst Conservative opinion in noting that a ‘nation 
which shirks its primary responsibility cannot hope to maintain its prestige or 
its power in this wicked modern world.’ It was left to the left-wing Labour MP 
and journalist Tom Driberg to counter Churchill as he remarked that ‘if you 
accept the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty […] then it is really quite 
irresponsible and unstatesmanlike to start nattering about something which may 
have some demagogic appeal, and to behave in this way and to kick up a great 
hullaballoo.’20 As somebody with links to the Labour left who had opposed the 
formation of NATO in 1949, it was unusual for Driberg ostensibly to be 
defending the organisation, especially given that the ‘Bevanites’ would be 
subjected to charges of anti-Americanism only weeks later after Bevan’s 
resignation from the Cabinet. On the occasion of the debate about SACLANT, 
the members of the Keep Left Group within the Labour Party were more eager 
to criticise the Conservatives than British subservience to Washington. This 
group of Labour critics of the ‘special relationship’ stressed that the Tory 
objections were evidence ‘that each of the NATO countries is still not ready for 
the degree of abandonment of national sovereignty without which NATO can’t 
work.’21 
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Criticism of British membership of NATO was cautious and usually 
confined to the fringes of the political system. The Labour MPs who opposed 
the organisation’s establishment in 1949 were soon expelled from the party and 
thereafter had a marginal position in British politics.22 One Way Only stopped 
short of calling for Britain’s withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance and Labour 
activists were similarly reluctant to call for a break. Of the responses to 
Labour’s 1952 survey of attitudes to foreign affairs within the party only a 
handful of respondents were reported as being ‘against NATO,’ with the 
opponents of the organisation almost equal to those who called for its 
development.23 Although the Bevanites gained a reputation for anti-
Americanism because of this position and due to their criticism of rearmament 
in 1951, these concerns were prescient given that the Attlee Government had by 
the time of its defeat begun to attempt to control inflation by limiting defence 
expenditure and the Churchill administration which succeeded it reduced it 
altogether.24 Nonetheless, there were evidently some doubts about the 
arrangements even if few senior politicians would admit them at the time. 
George Brown, Labour’s Shadow Defence Secretary during the 1950s, later 
recalled that NATO ‘wasn’t really an alliance of fourteen powers – it was 
thirteen little chaps who couldn’t say ‘Boo’ to a goose, the goose being, of 
course, America.’25 
 
Whose Finger on the Button? 
 
These questions and anxieties about who was responsible for strategy within 
NATO and the Anglo-American relationship caused extensive debate in Britain. 
It was not only a matter of whether British politicians had an important say in 
influencing successive American administrations but also centred on the role of 
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defence and military personnel in foreign policy decision-making. As co-
operation between the two countries increased and Britain was reliant on the 
American nuclear umbrella, there were worries that an errant official could 
instigate world war. British governments attempted to secure understandings 
that the bomb would not be used without allied consultation but obtaining a 
formal agreement to this effect proved elusive. Attlee was unable to reach such 
an agreement from Harry Truman after a visit to Washington in 1950 and a deal 
concluded by Winston Churchill and Truman in 1952 claimed only that ‘the use 
of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision […] in the 
light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.’26 Although this agreement 
amounted to neither a contract nor a treaty, it was regularly reiterated 
throughout the decade. Subtle semantic differences between consultation, 
guidance, counselling and influence concealed some of the uncertainties about 
British control but, for Duncan Campbell writing in the 1980s, the idea of ‘joint 
decision-making’ during a crisis was ‘quite absurd.’27  
Throughout the decade and even after Britain acquired nuclear weapons, 
there was sensitivity amongst British policy-makers about their ability to 
influence their American ally. This was particularly the case because several 
servicemen provoked criticism in Britain because of their temperament or 
political views. Few attracted the same amount of controversy as Douglas 
MacArthur. During the first year of the Korean War, the American General — 
who simultaneously served as an American General, Commander in Chief of 
UN forces in the Far East and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in 
the region — personified the anxieties about the close ties. The popularity of 
the anti-communist response to the Korean War did not prevent questions being 
asked about Britain’s vulnerability in a nuclear war. Not only did his various 
roles mean that it was unclear to whom MacArthur was accountable but his 
political views were unpopular in Britain. Close to the Republican 
‘isolationists,’ MacArthur sought to defeat communism in the Far East and was 
close to the Formosan regime of Chiang Kai-shek. On the left, the General’s 
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political background and his seemingly unilateral attempts to expand the 
conflict elicited criticism. With the war in Korea ongoing when M-O asked 
respondents in August 1950 for their attitudes towards the US, MacArthur was 
the most frequently mentioned US official. A 27 year-old housewife reported 
that ‘I do think America since the last war has become very aggressive, and I 
particularly dislike MacArthur.’28 A 24 year-old armament artificer made a 
distinction between the military and civilian personnel when criticising the 
General. He feared ‘that people, such as MacArthur, should be in a position to 
influence the affairs of an adolescent nation that, at the moment, appears to 
control the Western world.’ Nonetheless, he noted that ‘I believe, however, that 
Truman’s administration will not succumb easily to their blandishments.’29 
Amongst the wider population the doubts were less acute as the General 
commanded respect for his wartime achievements, particularly from 
Conservatives.30 When Mass Observation surveyed Londoners about the 
General in October 1950, the majority of respondents praised his personality or 
military skills.31 After the General was dismissed by President Truman in April 
1951, though, a majority of the public approved of the decision even though 
there were favourable tributes to MacArthur in the House of Commons and his 
return to the US was extensively and at times admiringly reported in the 
conservative press. 
 That some Britons believed certain Americans could instigate a third world 
war was regarded by some observers as evidence of the growing British anti-
Americanism. Hugh Gaitskell privately noted that this was amongst the reasons 
for the apparent post-war growth in the phenomenon and one post-Cold War 
account has noted that the fear that the US could use atomic weapons in Korea  
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‘resulted in increasing anti-Americanism in Britain.’32 Although figures such as 
MacArthur caused doubts in Britain about the American policy-making process, 
there was usually faith that these individuals could be curbed by more 
‘moderate’ British officials or US politicians. Clement Attlee’s visit to 
Washington in December 1950 was one such occasion when British policy-
makers were said to have exercised decisive influence over their American 
counterparts. After Truman implied in a press conference that the US might use 
nuclear weapons in the Far East, the Prime Minister embarked on a hasty trip 
across the Atlantic for talks with the President. Although he failed to secure 
assurances that the British Government would be consulted before the weapons 
were deployed, Attlee was widely interpreted in the UK as having prevented a 
third world war.33 Tribune editorialised that Attlee ‘arrived in the nick of time 
to stop a vast expansion of the war’ and even the conservative Daily Mail noted 
that the Labour Prime Minister’s visit ‘will have a steadying effect.’34 The 
belief that Attlee had ensured caution, which was another manifestation of the 
idea that Britons had diplomatic skills and experience which were invaluable to 
Washington, was apparent for the remainder of the period. On the left, the trip 
was invoked by both critics and supporters of the ‘special relationship’ as 
evidence that London could influence events across the Atlantic.35 Despite the 
disagreements about the need for a close Anglo-American relationship, most on 
the left could agree that Britain had the potential to guide the US.36 At the TUC 
conference in 1951, General Secretary of the far-left led Fire Brigades Union 
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John Horner used the incident to support a policy of independence from the US 
whilst Atlanticist Transport and General Workers’ Union leader, Arthur 
Deakin, claimed that it showed Labour’s ‘sturdy independence in the field of 
foreign relationships.’37  
  It was not only Attlee’s visit to the US that was identified as an occasion 
when British policy-makers prevented the outbreak of a Third World War. 
When debates about Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons intensified in the 
1960s, Attlee’s visit to Washington was again invoked by both unilateralists 
and those who supported the Atlantic Alliance and the development of the 
British nuclear deterrent. At the General and Municipal Workers’ conference in 
1960, Hugh Gaitskell cited the events of 1950 as an example of the need to 
remain in NATO and act as ‘a tremendous force and influence for peace.’38 
Given that the meeting occurred before Britain had developed the atomic bomb, 
critics of the Labour leader claimed in response that Attlee’s apparent success 
demonstrated that it was possible to guide the US even if Britain denounced 
nuclear weapons. As one speaker argued: 
 
Attlee had no deterrent behind him; we had no bomb in 1950. 
Sanity prevailed and it prevailed because Attlee spoke on behalf 
of the Government of the country, and more important on behalf 
of you and I, the ordinary people in the country. What Attlee 
could do in 1950, believe me if he could do it with the 
Americans then he can do it with anyone else in 1960.39 
 
 Right-wing commentators also pointed to occasions when Conservatives 
were said to have encouraged restraint in Washington, showing that both left 
and right on the political spectrum wanted to prove that their representatives 
could restrain or guide the Americans. After Churchill visited Washington in 
1952, the Economist editorialised that ‘if he has succeeded in convincing the 
Americans that he is a trustworthy ally in the Far East as elsewhere, he will 
have far more opportunity of influencing American policy towards moderation 
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than ever Mr. Attlee did.’40 More revealing of this view’s popularity in right-
wing circles was the Geneva conference in 1954, during which Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden was widely praised for having averted the outbreak of 
world war or the use of nuclear weapons in South-East Asia. During the 
negotiations which concluded a peace treaty in Indo-China, there were 
warnings that a faction within the Eisenhower administration lobbied for the 
use of nuclear weapons to defeat the nationalist groups that desired 
independence from France. In Tribune, Michael Foot reported the rise of a 
‘Washington War Party’ including Vice-President Richard Nixon and Admiral 
William Radford, warning that had ‘done enormous damage, some of it 
irreparable.’41 When an agreement was concluded and war averted, the British 
press stressed the importance of Eden’s role in securing peace with the 
Manchester Guardian noting that the outcome ‘should be regarded as a triumph 
for the diplomacy of Mr. Eden and the energetic initiative of M. Mendes-
France.’42 Parallels were drawn with Attlee’s visit to Washington four years 
earlier, not least because in both cases British officials were accused of 
‘appeasement’ by their American counterparts. A Conservative Party 
publication reported afterwards that, as a result of the meeting, the US ‘now 
more fully appreciated the factor of Asian co-operation.’43 During the Cuban 
Missile Crisis — when the American Government blocked Soviet attempts to 
establish a missile base in Cuba — there were again calls from the left for 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to embark on a trip to the US to guide and 
steady President Kennedy. Even though such a summit did not materialise, 
there was confidence that Macmillan had been able to exercise such a function 
even from the other side of the Atlantic. Remembering the incident in his 
memoirs, Macmillan’s Chief Whip John Boyd Carpenter claimed that the 
President ‘was aware of his own inexperience in such a situation, and had no 
doubt a rueful memory of the Bay of Pigs fiasco’ but ‘had the good sense to 
                                                 
40 ‘Far Eastern Fears’, Economist, 26 January 1952, 189. See also ‘Far Eastern Course’, 
Economist, 2 February 1952, 278. 
41 Michael Foot, ‘Washington War Party’, Tribune, 18 June 1954, 4. See also, ‘Heaven Save us 
from the Generals’, Tribune, 11 June 1954, 1.  
42 ‘Peace in Asia’, Manchester Guardian, 21 July 1954, 4. 
43 Conservative Party Weekend Talking Point, No. 106, 17 July 1954. 
158 
 
recognise Harold Macmillan’s experience and steadiness in a crisis.’44 
Similarly, Labour politician and the left-wing press — remembering Attlee’s 
visit to Washington in 1950 — urged Macmillan to embark on a similar trip.45 
This British tendency to regard American servicemen as easily restrained by 
more rational or calm voices on both sides of the Atlantic conformed to the idea 
that Britons could dispense valuable wisdom, guidance and advice for the 
sometimes naive or excitable Americans. Uncertainties about the power and 
authority of these individuals tended to contribute to the idea that servicemen 
were easily curbed. Compared with Britain, the admirals and generals had a 
much greater role both in policy-making and the US also had a history of 
electing prominent servicemen. The unfamiliarity of this situation likely 
informed the confidence that military personnel would be defeated in disputes 
with civilian politicians and encouraged Britons to draw clear distinctions 
between the attitudes of the both types of policy-makers. For example, when 
Truman and MacArthur met on Wake Island in October 1950 as the President 
continued to be frustrated by his General’s obduracy over Formosa, the Daily 
Mail’s front-page headline read ‘Truman Wins in One Hour.’ Oliver Franks, the 
UK’s former Ambassador to Washington, advanced a similar idea during a 
BBC Reith Lecture in 1954 as he argued that the British fear that the US could 
instigate a world war was the chief cause of tension between the who countries. 
Franks claimed that this belief had some legitimacy as ‘the Americans appear to 
convict themselves out of their own mouths’. Nevertheless, ‘The senators, the 
admirals, and the generals do not […] speak for the President or for the United 
States.’46  
It was not only military personnel who caused anxieties for the British 
public. President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s outlook 
on world affairs troubled various commentators in the UK. During the 1952 
Presidential Election campaign, his calls for liberation of countries behind the 
Iron Curtain were criticised but his brinkmanship in defence policy provoked 
even greater suspicion about Dulles’s temperament and approach to 
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international affairs. At a meeting of the Conservative Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Astor suggested that the party ‘would only make themselves 
ridiculous if they appeared to blame Mr. Dulles for everything, without having 
any clear idea what was the direction of our own foreign policy.’47 However, 
there was often confidence that the Secretary of State would be constrained by 
President Eisenhower. When Dulles was reported at the end of the Korean War 
to have re-stated opposition to the recognition of communist China, the Daily 
Mirror urged the need for the world to hear ‘America’s policy from America’s 
President.’ It noted that if ‘the damage of Dulles can be undone, it will take Ike 
to do it.’48 Despite the worries about American policy-makers, then, these 
comments demonstrated that the discussions were often based on the 
assumption that the US was nuanced as its political system contained various 
competing factions and groups. Though there were individuals and groups who 
caused frequent alarm in the UK, there was often confidence that they would be 
defeated or contained by civilian politicians. As well as showing that many 
commentators underestimated the influence of defence officials, it revealed 
their willingness to identify nuances in Washington: though Dulles was 
unpopular not all were believed to share his ideas.  
 
American Bases 
 
Concerns about the effects of American actions on Britain were intensified by 
the United States Air Force’s (USAF) presence on British soil, a situation 
which Winston Churchill described as placing the UK at ‘the bull’s eye of a 
Soviet attack.’49 After 1945, the USAF made plans to maintain and develop its 
presence in the UK even as the diplomatic relationship was briefly soured over 
the cancellation of Lend Lease and the terms of the Anglo-American loan. 
American military forces remained in Britain in the post-war period and began 
preparing for a possible war with the USSR soon after the defeat of Nazi 
Germany. Even before the onset of the Cold War, the USAF sought permission 
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for use of RAF bases and secret agreements were concluded which gave it 
access to bases in East Anglia. The Berlin Blockade led to the extension of this 
presence, when a Cabinet committee agreed that heavy bombers could be 
stationed in Britain. The renewed American presence was secretive as officials 
sought to prevent hostility from the wider public, particularly the population in 
the communities surrounding the bases; defence facilities remained designated 
as RAF stations despite the foreign presence as British military personnel 
wanted to avoid charges of subservience to the US. Even so, the Labour left 
interpreted this growing American presence in the UK was another sign of the 
inequality of the Anglo-American relationship and added to its criticisms of the 
intimacy between the two countries. In 1955, Bevan described the bases as 
‘Socially and politically obnoxious because they ‘give us the appearance of 
being an “occupied country” and serve to cast doubt on our freedom of action 
with respect to America.’50 As well as the arguments that contributed to the 
unease about the subject amongst the Labour left, there were fears about social 
expenditure being devoted to the Americans. In Forward, Bevan’s ally Emrys 
Hughes complained that the government was building cheap housing for 
American military personnel whilst overlooking the needs of the local 
populations.51 Furthermore, there were concerns that the US presence would 
result in efforts to stifle criticism of the Anglo-American relationship and a 
delegate at the Labour Party conference in 1958 claimed that the US Federal 
Bureau of Investigation was discouraging Britons from protesting or enrolling 
as Labour members.52  
 Despite the frequency with which the American bases were criticised on the 
Labour left, their objections often failed to attract wider support. Both party 
leaderships were supportive of bases and journalists reporting on attitudes in the 
vicinity of the bases often concluded that their presence had had few damaging 
effects on Anglo-American relations. René MacColl argued in the Daily 
Express in 1953 that the ‘news is nearly all good.’53 Whether this was a 
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reflection of the journalists’ own views or impartial evidence of public attitudes 
is moot but the government was evidently worried enough about the reaction to 
the bases to control the information that the public received about its 
operations. An accident at RAF Lakenheath in July 1956 was not made public 
knowledge until 1979 as British and American officials suppressed information 
about the crash-landing of a B-47 into a storage igloo. Duncan Campbell has 
argued that if the public had received more information about the incident, ‘it is 
not unreasonable to suggest that its effect on British history would have been 
considerable.’54 However, it is questionable whether such information would 
have been controversial enough to provoke a re-evaluation of the Anglo-
American relationship or even prompted a greater campaign for the removal of 
American bases from Britain. Indeed, subsequent accounts of the Lakenheath 
incident have claimed that the events would never likely have resulted in 
nuclear explosion.55 After the accidental dropping of a deactivated nuclear 
weapon in South Carolina in 1958 resulted in no fatalities, proponents of the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons interpreted the incident as evidence of the their 
safety. The Daily Express used the incident to defend government policy, 
reporting that the events in the US confirmed predictions that a nuclear weapon 
if dropped in error would be no more destructive than a regular bomb. It was 
‘such a freak that even under present conditions the chance of it happening 
again is NEGLIGIBLE—and under new instructions it will be 
IMPOSSIBLE.’56 Its readers were less convinced by this argument that the 
accident proved the safety of the bombs and one correspondent questioned why 
American officials seemed to be pleased with the incident. One reported that ‘I 
appreciate there are good reasons for and against nuclear weapons and for bases 
to be established in England, but I do not want them near me. Are we to be 
condemned to live haunted by the fear of such accidents happening here?’57 In 
spite of these concerns, calls for a re-evaluation of the stationing of nuclear 
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weapons in Britain were unsuccessful, with the protests limited to a group of 
thirteen left-wing Labour MPs.  
 In the same way that there was uncertainty about whether Britons could 
influence or persuade American servicemen’s use of nuclear weapons, there 
were anxieties that the RAF bases were being used for Cold War espionage 
without British consent. When an American U-2 plane was shot down over the 
Soviet Union in May 1960, the possibility that it had been launched from an 
RAF base caused some concern that British officials and politicians had little 
control over the activities of the US personnel based in the UK. The Daily Mail 
claimed that the mistake arose ‘not from original sin in the Americans but from 
a lack of subtlety’ as they ‘too often do things at the wrong time and put 
themselves in a false position.’58 Other commentators were more perturbed 
because the incident again seemed to reveal the influence of unelected officials 
on US foreign policy. The Sunday Times believed that British criticism of US 
foreign policy was legitimate because ‘we fear that their foreign policy is not 
under such clear-cut control as our own’ with the ‘State Department, Defence 
Department, Treasury, Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence 
Agency all seem to have a finger in the pie.’59 Some remained convinced that 
civilian politicians would ultimately be able to prevail on questions of policy. 
For the Daily Mirror, it was important that President Eisenhower ‘deal sternly 
with the idiots who were responsible for sending an American spy-plane over 
the middle of Russia.’ Exonerating politicians of any blame, it claimed that 
‘American Brasshats and military meddlers have tried to show themselves the 
bosses of American policy.’60 
 As well as the loss of British sovereignty which some feared would result 
from the presence of the USAF at RAF bases, the public had to come to terms 
with the sight of American GIs — a generic term for the servicemen which 
referred to government issue or general issue — in English towns and cities. It 
was not only the American military officials in the Pentagon who caused 
Britons anxiety as the late 1940s marked the return of US GIs who had been 
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based in Britain during the Second World War.  Whereas defence and nuclear 
issues were somewhat opaque, this human aspect of the American presence was 
more tangible and provoked varied reactions. As David Reynolds has noted of 
the wartime influx of the GIs, they ‘became a symbol of American wealth, 
values and power’ and ‘contributed […] to longer-term patterns of 
Americanization.’61 This continued with the second wave of US servicemen 
who arrived in Britain during the Berlin Blockade in 1948; their glamorous and 
opulent lifestyles once again caused admiration and jealousy. Although far left 
commentators were hostile to this American ‘invasion’ — with Daily Worker 
headlines stating ‘Yanks Go Home’ — attitudes towards the GIs were more 
complicated.62 There were signs that this type of hostility towards the 
Americans was unpopular with at least some Britons; reports suggested that the 
GIs and women near to the USAF bases heckled communist speakers and 
campaigners who objected to the American presence.63 Nonetheless, various 
aspects of the American soldiers’ lives were the subject of criticism from 
Britons. Communities surrounding the bases were troubled by the expansion of 
the facilities which often necessitated alterations to the existing infrastructure 
whilst the noise of American jets also provoked the annoyance of some nearby 
residents. Combined with this was the tension caused by the fact that American 
salaries far exceeded those of British workers and the GIs were protected from 
prosecution by diplomatic immunity.  
Given the popularity of caricatures which emphasised the recklessness or 
aggression of Pentagon officials, their presence in the UK and ability to act 
without British authorisation were often apparent in films. Paul Rotha’s 1958 
film Cat and Mouse played on fears and newspaper headlines of the GIs’ 
exploits as it portrayed a deserter from the USAF who kidnaps a woman whose 
diamonds he is trying to steal. GIs were frequently the subject of fictional 
representations and provided an easy way of casting the Hollywood actors and 
as such the characterisations of their temperaments were complicated. Orders to 
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Kill (1958) depicted young American pilot Gene Summers (Paul Massie) whose 
indifference about warfare had led to great success during wartime. When 
assigned the task with conducting espionage and having to murder a French 
collaborator, though, the USAF pilot becomes traumatised and unable to cope 
with the physical effects of war. The British entry to the Cannes Film Festival, 
it attracted complaints from American judges on the panel for ‘being offensive 
to the United States’ in its portrayal of the Americans.’64 In reality, though, the 
portrayals were diverse and not easily categorised as pro or anti-American. 
Whilst the on-screen GIs were often involved in criminal behaviour, in films 
such as Prize of Gold (1954) and The Depraved (1957) they were aided and 
encouraged by Britons. In the former, a well-meaning US Army Sergeant 
participates in a smuggling operation in order to aid a group of orphaned 
children. Even the films which invoked the caricature of American servicemen 
as erratic, aggressive or bombastic had subtleties. The War Lover (1963) 
focused on Captain Buzz Rickson (Steve McQueen) who was based in East 
Anglia during the Second World War. Described by a reviewer as ‘one of those 
superficial and warped men for whom destruction is an aim in itself,’ Rickson 
ignores orders to abort a mission to bomb Northern Germany but the successes 
of his efforts earn admiration as well as criticism.65 However, this was not the 
only stereotype of the US servicemen as the more pacifistic and diffident Ed 
Bolland is alarmed by Rickson’s unilateralist behaviour. Even this 
characterisation was unappealing to some Britons, though, as the Daily Express 
described Bolland as ‘a soppy sort of chap who hates war and loves 
everyone.’66 Both attempted to charm a British woman from Cambridge but it 
was Bolland who was ultimately successful despite her initial attraction to the 
reckless Rickson. 
 All of the concerns about the GIs encouraged the idea that Britain was 
losing its political, military or cultural independence as a result of the US 
presence in Britain. As early as 1952, the Economist noted in a report about the 
conditions nearby the USAF bases that the ‘“coca-colonisation” of many pubs 
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and restaurants is almost complete.’67 For others it was the political effects of 
the GIs’ presence which were cause for complaint. Journalist Harry Hopkins 
reported the seeming ubiquity of US servicemen on a tour of England in the 
early 1950s. Visiting his home county Lancashire and the towns close to the 
USAF maintenance base at Burtonwood, Hopkins reported that the facility was 
‘a complete American enclave inside England: at times one feels that it might 
almost qualify as a Fiftieth state of America. It has everything, right down to 
the sickly sweet smell of popcorn.’ Although he described mixed opinions 
about US servicemen in nearby town Warrington, Hopkins noted one resident’s 
reply when questioned about the GIs. “American town?”’ […] You might as 
well say American country … We’ve given up our independence now.”’68 
Others were less convinced of the transformation brought about by the troops’ 
presence. A Daily Mirror journalist visiting Lancashire shortly after the GIs’ 
arrival suggested that the town had confounded the expectation that it would be 
‘Americanised.’ He stated that ‘[a]round Warrington everybody says Fancy 
That in the purest accents and in the bar parlour there is only one conversation 
— football and the football pools.’69 Investigative reports into attitudes in East 
Anglia were often at pains to stress that the US soldiers were well received and 
that Anglo-American relations had withstood the possible tensions caused by 
their presence. CIA-funded Anglo-American cultural journal Encounter’s 
discussion of the subject in 1960 told readers that the wartime stereotype of the 
bachelor American serviceman was becoming ‘statistically less significant’ and 
[f]or better or worse, the day of the swashbuckling, open-handed GI is drawing 
to a rapid close.’70 Others emphasised that there were economic benefits which 
accrued from the American presence. A Daily Mirror correspondent reported 
that ‘everyone in Suffolk knows that prosperity wears a U.S.A.F. tunic, and few 
people put up any violent resistance against collecting their share of the 
gravy.’71 
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 It was often Britons rather than the GIs who were blamed for the friction. In 
1952 GIs from the Burtonwood base were prevented from visiting Manchester 
after reports of attacks on soldiers and an investigate report in the Daily Mirror 
in 1954 criticised British landlords for increasing rent prices for Americans.72 
Frequent targets for condemnation from journalists were the young British 
women who became romantically involved with the servicemen. When the GIs 
were based in Britain during the Second World War, young women were 
attracted to the glamour of the visiting servicemen as their luxurious lifestyles 
contrasted with the British males. Many married Americans but had differing 
experiences when they settled across the Atlantic after the war.73 The female 
interest continued with the return of the US troops during the 1950s and there 
were even official attempts to organise meetings between the Americans and 
the most ‘decent’ women.74 For the British women, the visitors appeared more 
glamorous and exotic than the local males. A girl in Warrington was typical in 
asserting that she ‘couldn’t marry an English boy now,’ and a letter published in 
the Daily Express from a female reader in Birmingham exclaimed ‘How we 
wish they would invade our city and give some competition to our conceited 
males!’75 Not all commentators approved of the attention that British women 
gave these troops or their pursuit of the GIs. Clifford Davis, a journalist for the 
Daily Mirror, complained that ‘It is shoddy, shameful and shocking. It is sex 
for sale — a frightening, awful thing of teen age girls, some no more than 
twelve — waiting nightly in twos and threes.’76 His report elicited some 
supportive responses; one woman from Birmingham claimed that ‘our teen-
agers of the worst type pursue the Americans at Burtonwood.’77  
Given the growing sensitivity about the state of the Anglo-American 
alliance, it is unsurprising that some of the investigative reporting was rebuked 
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for being overly critical of the troops based in the UK. After an article in the 
Picture Post studied the conditions at US bases at East Anglia, an American 
sergeant wrote to the journal to complain that its tone did not reflect the warm 
welcome that the soldiers had received from the local population. He claimed 
that it presented the troops as ‘a bunch of immoral dipsomaniacs’ and wondered 
whether this was ‘just more anti-American propaganda, or what the people 
actually feel behind our backs.’78 Ultimately, though, the cliché that Britons 
regarded their guests as ‘over sexed, over paid and over here’ captured some of 
the reasons for suspicion but none of the reasons for the favourable views of the 
Americans soldiers.  
 
The Bomb 
 
Central to the defence relationship between Britain and the US throughout the 
long 1950s was the question of nuclear weapons. This had been an important 
aspect of the wartime co-operation as Anglo-American co-operation had been 
realised in the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the atomic bomb in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The McMahon Act ensured that US-UK co-
operation lagged behind other aspects of the defence partnership. With this 
legislation in force until 1958, it was a subject about which attitudes were 
beforehand informed by perceptions of Britain’s independence and the alliance 
with Washington. The Attlee Government’s initial decision to produce atomic 
weapons was based as much on political considerations as the need to defend 
the UK. Influencing US policy-makers and the prestige associated with playing 
a major role in international affairs were central to the rationale behind 
manufacturing the weapon. Despite the warnings of Cabinet Ministers Hugh 
Dalton and Stafford Cripps that the costs of the weapon were too large, Ernest 
Bevin claimed that ‘we’ve got to have this thing over here, whatever it costs. 
We’ve got to have a bloody Union Jack on top of it.’ The Foreign Secretary’s 
comments revealed his belief that the weapon would confer influence on the 
British policy-makers and that it would prevent their American counterparts 
from dismissing British interests. He stated that ‘I don’t want any other Foreign 
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Secretary of this country to be talked to or at by a Secretary of State in the 
United States as I have just had in my discussions with Mr Byrnes.’79  
 Bevin’s comments were indicative of an assumption which would remain 
prevalent amongst Labour politicians until the end of the period: through the 
possession of nuclear weapons Britain could exercise effective influence over 
the US. Despite the Atlanticism of many senior Labour politicians, Bevin’s 
suggestions about the American Secretary of State revealed that there was also 
willingness to imagine a scenario in which Anglo-American political 
divergences meant that Britain would need its own bomb. In retirement, Attlee 
remarked that ‘we had to bear in mind that there was always the possibility of 
[Washington] withdrawing and becoming isolationist once again’ and, as a 
result, the ‘manufacture of a British bomb was therefore at this stage essential 
to our defence.’80 Even as the defence relationship became institutionalised 
with the USAF based in England, there was suspicion amongst Labour leaders 
that British and American interests might not always coincide or that 
Washington could retreat from its role in Europe. Future Foreign Secretary 
Patrick Gordon Walker recorded a meeting in 1957 in which he told Indian 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that ‘we must have the bomb in order not to 
be a satellite of America’ as [w]e could not trust America to resist Russian 
attack in Europe.’81 With Anglo-American disputes in the Far East and the 
Middle East having caused public strains in the alliance, there were fears that 
the US could act without British authorisation or approval should it need to 
protect its interests. The party’s leader Hugh Gaitskell told Guardian editor 
Alastair Hetherington in 1958 that it ‘was very important to have our own 
weapons both because of influencing policy now and because of a possible 
American abrogation of the alliance.’ Gaitskell was particularly concerned 
about the recent threat of Anglo-American disagreement in the Far East over 
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the Quemoy and Matsu islands and was ‘emphatic’ that ‘[w]e must have that 
influence even if the insurance was small.’82  
 The Conservative leadership was no less eager to secure the prestige and 
autonomy which Britain was thought to derive from possession of an 
independent nuclear deterrent. According to Churchill, it was ‘the price we pay 
to sit at the top table’ and Macmillan stated in 1955 that:  
 
Politically, it surrenders our power to influence American policy 
and then, strategically and tactically it equally deprives us of any 
influence over the selection of targets and the use of our vital 
striking forces. The one, therefore weakens our prestige and our 
influence in the world, and the other might imperil our safety.83 
 
At times, though, it was unclear as to whether the bomb was thought to 
guarantee the UK global prestige or if policy-makers adopted this approach 
because such a decision was in keeping with the activities of a ‘Great Power.’ 
For example, the Conservative Party’s Weekly News Letter asserted in March 
1956 after left-wing criticism of the government’s defence policy that nothing: 
 
can alter the fact that history and geography have combined to 
make us a great Power, and the heart and centre of a worldwide 
Empire and Commonwealth. We can’t just abdicate our position 
in the world, and settle down to an easy and comfortable life of 
neutral irresponsibility.84  
 
When commentators spoke of the need for Britain to exercise ‘influence,’ the 
concept tended to refer to Britain’s relationship with the US rather than any 
other of the UK’s NATO allies or even the Soviet Union. In the Spectator in 
1957, Peregrine Worsthorne, the Conservative journalist who was amongst the 
chief analysts of anti-Americanism in Britain, argued that the reason for the 
continuation of Britain’s nuclear programme was ‘the right not to be dragged 
along in foolhardy adventures which the United States might decide to 
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launch.’85 Thus, even those who were worried about the role of ‘anti-American’ 
attitudes in 1950s Britain could voice concerns about the power and ideas of US 
officials.   
 The belief that nuclear weapons enabled Britain to influence Washington 
was apparent outside of the major political parties and — as calls for the 
unilateral disarmament of Britain’s hydrogen bomb increased in the late 1950s 
— this was identified as a major reason for retaining the device. Former 
Marshall of the Air Force John Slessor argued in 1957 that abandoning the 
bomb would mean that Britain would ‘gratuitously’ throw away the ‘right to be 
regarded as a great nation, and all power to influence or control the use of that 
bomb by her Allies.’ Moreover, British ‘experience, authority, record of 
courage and resolution in the last two World Wars had won the nation a 
position in the councils of her Allies in which what she said was bound to have 
an influence’ and unilateralism would mean that ‘the country would sink to the 
position of a second- or third-rate power.’86 Even those who were sceptical 
about the need for Britain to possess nuclear weapons utilised arguments which 
prioritised influence, suggesting that the UK could provide a valuable lead in 
disarmament talks. On the BBC television programme Panorama after the US 
Government tested the Hydrogen Bomb in 1954, Labour MP John Strachey 
called for a conference of the US, USSR and Britain, asserting ‘I believe that if 
the British Government gives the lead then the Russian and American 
Governments will follow, that they will be forced to follow by their 
principles.’87 The notion that even smaller countries could influence world 
affairs through possession of the bomb was central to the plot of the 1959 film 
The Mouse that Roared. When the bankrupt, English-speaking European duchy 
of Grand Fenwick invades the US in the hope of being defeated and securing 
post-war aid from Washington, its army led by Tully Buscombe (Peter Sellers) 
is accidentally successful after arriving during an air raid test. Capturing the 
secret Q-Bomb and its world-renowned inventor gives the small province the 
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leverage to demand that the US cease producing the wine which damaged 
Grand Fenwick’s export trade. In possession of a weapon one hundred times 
more powerful that the hydrogen bomb, the country is courted by the former 
colonial powers who become eager to forge an alliance but eschews these 
advances by demanding that the ‘little countries of the world’ look after the 
weapon. Though it was interpreted by some as portraying America as ‘a 
nebulous and slightly menacing Big Brother, indistinguishable from Russia,’ it 
was notable that Grand Fenwick gained considerable prestige through the 
acquisition of the Q Bomb and was able to dictate peace terms to the United 
States.88  
 Although the two major parties supported the manufacture of a British 
independent nuclear deterrent before the cancellation of the UK’s Blue Streak 
programme in February 1960, there were sections of Labour and Conservative 
opinion which objected to the proliferation of the weapons. Macmillan’s brand 
of Keynesian economic policies was anathema to some individuals within his 
Cabinet who called for reductions in expenditure. Suez, it was argued by 
Chancellor Peter Thorneycroft and his Treasury ministers who resigned in 
1958, had proved the need for financial solvency as Britain was too easily 
pressured by Washington into altering its policies. Therefore, the UK should 
not incur the costs of producing the weapon and duplicate the efforts of the 
American administration.89  Economic Secretary for the Treasury Nigel Birch 
claimed ‘I do not think our influence with the US depends on our strength as a 
nuclear power and ‘[a]s far as our independence of action in other parts of the 
world is concerned the one thing really needed is solvency rather than 
weapons.’90 A British nuclear programme, it was claimed, only led to the 
duplication of resources and manpower which could be pooled by the western 
powers. Delegates at the Conservative Party conference in the days after the 
launch of Russian satellite Sputnik in October 1957 argued for the repeal of the 
McMahon Act preventing the sharing of nuclear intelligence. Economic factors 
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and the duplication of resources were cited as reasons for co-operation and one 
speaker stated that ‘America has great potential for undertaking these tasks — 
greater than we ourselves, and I feel that when backed by our brains and 
ingenuity the effort will be even greater.’91  On the left, Socialist Commentary 
similarly editorialised that the ‘great weakness of the Western Alliance is that 
each nation insists on its sovereignty in military action, yet all the others are 
irrevocably bound up with the consequences.’92 Sputnik encouraged the popular 
belief that the USSR was ahead in technological and scientific research and in 
1958 36 percent of Britons even claimed that the Soviet Union would ‘be 
strongest 10 years from now’ whilst only 27 percent held this view about 
America.93  
 It was this perception of the Western deficit in the Cold War which led to 
the repeal of the McMahon Act in 1958. For Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, 
the growing perception of its financial malaise and the need to revive the 
Anglo-American relationship after Suez informed the growth of rhetoric which 
stressed the need for ‘interdependence’ in foreign policy. As he put it in a diary 
entry in August 1958 ‘We had seen the old Empire fade away into a new 
concept. Independence was over; interdependence must take its place.’94 After 
it became central to Macmillan’s foreign and defence policy agenda and 
rhetoric, the concept of ‘interdependence’ was used more widely to summarise 
the Anglo-American relationship95 Though it was employed by both the British 
and American governments, however, Nigel Ashton has noted that this term 
was fiercely contested at the time. Whilst the British Government regarded the 
term as referring to a form of partnership in which resources were pooled more 
consistently, for US officials it more related to the effective central control of 
Western defence policy from Washington.96 Moreover, the calls for Anglo-
American interdependence in foreign affairs did not prevent competitiveness 
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between the two countries. By contrast with the triumphalism from many 
commentators following the tests in 1952 and 1957, the American successes 
were less extensively reported or celebrated. Indeed, the series of US hydrogen 
bomb tests in March and April 1954 provoked a reaction against thermonuclear 
weapons much greater than any response to past British or Russian tests. Even 
after the Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957 exposed the Western deficit 
on questions of scientific and technological developments, there were signs that 
Britons were reluctant to accept that the interdependence of Anglo-American 
efforts. When the Vanguard TV3 — the US’s response to Sputnik — failed to 
launch in December 1957, the British press mocked the project rather than 
accepting any suggestions about the interdependence of their projects. It was 
labelled “Kaputnik” and “Phutnik” in the tabloid press and there were reports 
that an American had been involved in a fight in London after being mocked 
about the Vanguard project.97 In the Daily Mirror, “Cassandra” claimed that 
‘all this cheerful derision is not a bad thing’ because it ‘will make our American 
friends hopping mad and when they get hopping mad they will bring all their 
technical genius into operation again.’98 Others were more conscious of the 
danger that such displays of British derision of the efforts of their chief ally 
would strengthen the Soviet Union. A cartoon in the Daily Express depicted 
Britons laughing at the headlines about Vanguard whilst Khrushchev laughed 
louder in the background.99  
Assumptions about the importance of influencing American policy-making 
even survived the changes in defence policy and the cancellation of Britain’s 
independent nuclear deterrent. After the cancellation of Blue Streak in 1960 — 
a project which was proving to be outdated and expensive — and its 
replacement with American Skybolt missiles, Labour figures called for the 
purchase of US weaponry for reasons that were similar to those it had advanced 
in favour of maintaining the weapon: to retain influence on the international 
stage. At that year’s Labour Party conference which defied the party’s 
leadership by voting in favour of unilateral disarmament, Gaitskell told 
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delegates that Washington would no longer listen to Britain if she were to 
‘betray’ the US by withdrawing from NATO.100 Atlanticist journal Socialist 
Commentary pointed to the need for Britain to ‘reduce the risks of possible 
American foolhardiness.’101 Rita Hinden asked whether the unilateralists ‘want 
America to be driven into a new isolationism, or else to turn to Germany to fill 
our leading place in the Western alliance?’102 In Labour’s debates about 
unilateralism in the early 1960s, influence was again central to the arguments of 
Atlanticists even though the party had abandoned the aim of manufacturing an 
independent nuclear deterrent.  One referred to the anti-communist policies of 
Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin when noting that ‘This movement of 
ours still has a tremendous influence in the social democratic parties of Europe 
and North America. If we accept the principle of unilateral disarmament, we 
will be treated as having adopted neutralism. It will estrange and embitter our 
friends.’103 One participant claimed that only by decommissioning nuclear 
weapons ‘may we use our influence in the world, which at the moment we are 
impotent to do because we are tied to the United States and to the NATO 
bloc’104 The recent shooting down of an American U2 spy plane over the Soviet 
Union which was reported to have flown from a British base only added to the 
fears that Britain lacked influence in Washington. Michael Foot told delegates 
that:  
 
Even with the bases we are not having a great influence on the 
Americans now. We were told of one of the most disgraceful 
incidents in British history, when an American Secretary of 
State in Paris, at a critical moment in world affairs was willing 
to give orders about planes flying over these bases without 
consulting the British Prime Minister about it. We all might 
have been blown to pieces by that monumental folly.105 
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Questions about Britain’s ability to influence the direction of the Cold War 
and the actions of American policy-makers apparent again in1962 following the 
abandonment of Skybolt. President Kennedy’s Defence Secretary Robert 
McNamara had pressed for the cancellation of the programme, which had 
proved to be expensive, unreliable and inaccurate compared with other 
American strategic missiles. By this point, the Macmillan Government was 
beset with domestic and international crises, beleaguered after by-election 
defeats and its unpopularity exacerbated by for example the announcement of 
pay pauses and the decision to apply for EEC membership. Although a meeting 
between Macmillan and Eisenhower in Nassau led to Skybolt’s replacement 
with Polaris, a submarine based missile system also acquired from the US, the 
outcome resulted in some criticism. Macmillan described that the moves 
‘represent a genuine attempt (wh. the Americans finally accepted) to make a 
proper contribution to interdependent defence, while retaining the ultimate 
rights of a sovereign state.’ In another sign that Conservative Cabinet ministers 
reluctantly suppressed their doubts about policy towards the Anglo-American 
relationship, the Prime Minister noted that the Cabinet ‘did not much like it, 
altho’ they backed us up loyally.’106 Amongst the press which was not inhibited 
by the pressures of office, there were mixed reactions to the replacement of 
Skybolt with Polaris. The front-page of the conservative Daily Mail argued that 
Britain was ‘Still Independent.’  Its correspondent Bruce Rothwell claimed that 
the ‘basic point is that Britain’s new Polaris force will be for her own use at any 
time of grave emergency.’107 For other observers, the prospect that Britain was 
inferior to European rivals encouraged support for the policy and the Sunday 
Times editorialised that it was ‘important that Britain should not accept a 
position of nuclear inferiority to France.’108 Some were unable to avoid the 
conclusion that this represented a defeat for British diplomacy and the country’s 
world position. A group of Conservative MPs opposed the decision on the 
grounds that it would compromise British independence. For longstanding critic 
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of the Anglo-American relationship John Biggs-Davison, it represented a 
‘diplomatic Dunkirk’ and he advocated that Britain instead undertake renewed 
efforts to manufacture nuclear weapon to prevent becoming ‘an American 
Satellite or the victim of communist blackmail.’109 The Sunday Times 
editorialised that ‘entire independence as a nuclear Power is for us an illusion’ 
and claimed that ‘Britain can never be a nuclear Power in the same sense as the 
[US] or Russia is. Any attempt to become one would be as futile as 
crippling.’110 In a letter to his constituents, Shadow Defence Secretary George 
Brown accused the Conservative opponents of encouraging ‘an atmosphere of 
bitter anti-Americanism,’ a charge also levelled at the 34 Labour MPs who 
weeks earlier opposed the positioning of a Polaris base in the UK.111 Despite 
Brown’s efforts to exaggerate his rivals’ hostility towards the US, some Labour 
figures also entertained doubts about the weapon. The party’s defence specialist 
later noted that it was an ‘idiotic alternative […] to buy Skybolt from the United 
States upon whom, already, we relied for developing defence measures like the 
Ballistic Early Warning System.’ Its replacement Polaris — granted to Britain 
in December 1962 — was according to Wigg ‘targeted to suit NATO, that is 
American, interests.’112 Thus, the question of British independence from the US 
was an important consideration in debates about nuclear policy which existed 
alongside the growing imperatives for Cold War Anglo-American co-operation.  
 
Protest, Unilateralism and anti-Americanism 
 
Whilst both of Britain’s major political parties supported the maintenance of 
nuclear weapons, there were varied attitudes amongst the wider public towards 
this aspect of the Anglo-American relationship. Gerard de Groot has claimed 
that the British public’s sense of patriotism and eagerness to maintain global 
prestige on the international stage resulted in broad support for government 
policies.113 However, there were prominent signs of opposition to the consensus 
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on this subject which often incorporated criticism of Washington or particular 
American foreign policy-makers. Undoubtedly, significant sections of the 
British population were motivated to endorse the manufacture of the bomb by 
the nationalistic impulses apparent in the press after the nuclear weapons tests 
in 1952 and 1957. Surveys conducted at several points in the late 1950s showed 
that a majority of Britons were reluctant to relinquish the weapon and voiced 
support for the production of a British hydrogen bomb. In March 1955, 54 
percent agreed that Britain should make the device whilst only 32 percent 
opposed its manufacture.114 Despite the increased calls for the unilateralism of 
British weapons in the late 1950s, in February 1958, 58 percent expressed their 
disapproval at such a policy.115 Nonetheless, there was also evidence of concern 
about certain aspects relating to the bomb, particularly the testing of the device.  
After American hydrogen bomb tests in 1954 had harmed a group of Japanese 
fishermen who were situated outside of the exclusion zone, there were ethical 
concerns of the effect of explosions and the effects of the presence of Strontium 
90 in the environment. Calls for the cessation of nuclear testing were supported 
by a majority of the public as 48 per cent claimed they wanted ‘to stop H-tests 
for all time.’116 Furthermore, three years earlier 53 percent of the public had 
supported the idea that Britain should ‘devote atomic energy solely to peaceful 
uses as France is doing.’117  
Most of the opposition to Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons was co-
ordinated by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a group of mainly 
left-wing, middle class intellectuals which derived support from the trade union 
movement and left-wing of the Labour Party. CND attracted significant 
attention with its prominent marches to Aldermaston and demonstrations in 
Trafalgar Square but scepticism about nuclear weapons pre-dated its foundation 
in 1957. The series of American hydrogen bomb tests which began in March 
1954 provoked complaints amongst the left-wing activists and spokesmen who 
were already sceptical about the Anglo-American alliance or critical of 
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particular aspects of US policy. On the left, there were worries that this 
proliferation of nuclear weapons could lead to a nuclear war in which Britain 
was vulnerable. The Daily Mirror described it as the ‘Horror Bomb’ and 
criticised Churchill for having been uninformed about the American tests whilst 
a Keep Left Group resolution called the recent experiments a ‘grave threat to 
civilisation’ and called for meetings between the ‘Big Three.’118 Labour journal 
Forward even claimed after the American test that: 
 
Britain is no longer a Great Power, and quite incapable of 
starting a world war (even if this was desirable!) on her own 
initiative. Dropping a British-made, or, for that matter, an 
American hydrogen bomb from this country would be our 
passport to extinction—for no country in the world is more 
vulnerable to an H-bomb attack than Britain.119 
 
The American tests attracted much greater controversy than had those of the 
Soviet Union or Britain and, for some commentators, the resulting objections 
did not amount to reasonable objections but were evidence of the biases of the 
critics. One Conservative Party publication advanced a view which would 
become common as protests about nuclear weapons grew throughout the 1950s: 
because it seemed to have criticisms of Soviet testing it was apparent that ‘Far 
too often elements in the Labour Party give way to an anti-Americanism which 
destroys all objectivity.’120  
By the time of CND’s formation, the left-wing critics of Britain’s 
Atlanticism and Washington’s international policies were well-versed in 
defending themselves against charges of anti-Americanism. CND often 
dismissed such allegations but, in common with the Labour left, struggled to 
dissociate itself from this attitude. After American tests of nuclear weapons in 
1962, its journal Sanity claimed that ‘day and night since the United States of 
America resumed nuclear tests, members of [CND] have kept up a vigil of 
protest outside the American Embassy in London. If the Soviet Union holds 
another series of tests, another vigil of protest will be maintained outside the 
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Soviet Embassy.’121 Despite this rhetoric from the leadership, the movement 
undoubtedly contained figures whose criticism of the US was motivated by 
more than simply opposition to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or its 
military presence in Britain. Although the minutes of CND’s executive 
committee recorded little evidence of wider objections to US politics or culture, 
these sentiments were often overt in the activities of the protestors. The songs 
of the Aldermaston marchers focused more on Washington than Moscow, 
imagining an attack instigated by a rogue General and complaining about the 
social and economic effects of the American bases. ‘The Button Pusher’ in the 
Pentagon whose actions threatened the whole of humanity was ‘More vicious 
than Adolf Hitler’ and ready to instigate war with ‘a wink and nod from 
Kennedy.’122  
Although the movement’s leaders claimed to be equally opposed to the 
nuclear proliferation of both superpowers, much of its energy was focused on 
criticising the US. With American bases situated on British territory, they were 
a natural target for protests but CND activists only encouraged the conclusion 
that it was biased against the USA with the claim that it would be preferable for 
Britain to be a Soviet satellite than obliterated in a nuclear war.123 Several 
works of fiction written by campaigners portrayed Americans as the major 
threat to world peace. In Peter George’s Two Hours to Doom (1958) an insane 
Pentagon General unilaterally launches an attack on the USSR. The US and 
Soviet officials manage to avert disaster but the fictional President is prepared 
to allow the destruction of a major US city in exchange for any damage caused 
by the American attack. The danger posed by the US’s military-industrial 
complex was central to John Brunner’s The Brink (1958) in which the 
accidental crash-landing of a Soviet satellite in Nebraska provokes an automatic 
American retaliatory nuclear response which is only averted by Colonel Ben 
Goldwater. Instead of being proclaimed a hero for having averted a nuclear war, 
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Goldwater and the journalist who attempt to expose the cover-up are silenced 
by the American establishment. Broadcast on BBC television in 1959, 
Marghanita Laski’s The Offshore Island was controversial enough to provoke 
public complaints to the BBC, calls for the ‘anti-American’ play to be banned 
and warnings from Conservative MPs about its effects on the Anglo-American 
alliance.124 Set several years after a nuclear war had destroyed the majority of 
Western Europe, the play focused on a family which had managed to survive 
the radioactive fall-out and lived off the land. This English rural idyll was 
disturbed by the arrival of a group of American servicemen who demand that 
the family leave as the area is scheduled to be bombed and ‘neutralised’ by the 
still warring superpowers. Faced with resistance from the English family, an 
American Captain shoots a teenage boy and a Sergeant reported that ‘You’ve 
got to have an enemy because that’s the condition of mankind’ and that ‘Peace 
corrupts you, makes you soft, makes a fool of you.’125 Rather than acquiescing 
in their evacuation to America before their home is destroyed, the English 
family opts to remain, an action which inferred that obliteration was preferable 
to life in a US concentration camp for contaminated persons. 
Whilst many CND supporters directed greater criticism at the US than the 
USSR, it would be mistaken to dismiss all of its activists or opponents of 
nuclear proliferation as anti-American. There were a host of reasons for doubts 
about the manufacture of these weapons which did not relate to America as 
such, including the fears that such technology could damage the environment or 
lead to a nuclear apocalypse. One 38 year-old housewife’s complaints about the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not solely targeted at Washington as 
she described that it was ‘a blot on my honour as an English woman. It was 
devilish, and not befitting for the white races, to use such a weapon, in 
warfare.’126 Those involved with CND had varied motives but also differing 
perceptions of the Cold War and both superpowers which evolved over the 
                                                 
124 Nancy Spain, ‘The Night When the BBC Grew Up’, Daily Express, 15 April 1959, 9. Sir 
John Crowder, House of Commons Written Questions, Hansard, 29 April 1959, Volume 604, 
Column 121W; Minutes of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee, 22 April 1959, CRD 
2/34/3, CPA. 
125 Marghanita Laski, The Offshore Island (London: Cresset, 1959), 57-8. 
126 DR 1865, reply to August 1950 Directive, MOA.  
181 
 
course of the 1950s. For example, Bertrand Russell had been outspoken in his 
anti-communist since the 1920s whilst also contemptuous of US capitalism but 
nonetheless called in the 1940s for America to assert world leadership. As the 
Cold War developed before the Korean War, the philosopher’s opinions 
corresponded with the majority opinions in Britain and he even asserted that 
‘America, in my opinion, has proved to be the best of the Powers since 
1945.’127 However, his overriding aim to prevent nuclear war as well as the 
policies of the Eisenhower administration at home and abroad encouraged him 
to regard the US as the major threat to world peace by the mid-1950s. For 
others, the stance was at times more redolent of Cold War neutralism than 
pathological hostility towards American aims. Historian and prominent CND 
supporter A. J. P. Taylor said in 1948 that ‘I know what I’m for – for a single 
humanity, not for British culture, not American culture, not Soviet culture, but 
for a single human culture.’ If this were not possible, Taylor argued for the 
development of a European bloc ‘that is neither Communist nor American.’128 
This belief that an alternative existed to the state of global tension and 
superpower rivalry was common even though CND included many left-wing 
activists and intellectuals whose sympathies were said to be with the USSR. 
After visiting both Russia and America in the early 1960s, even the former 
communist Mervyn Jones concluded that there was no need for Britons to 
‘envy’ either superpower as he claimed that ‘theirs is not the way to live; we 
can do better.’129  
Whilst Washington’s control of RAF bases was a major target for protests 
about nuclear weapons, CND activists even shared some assumptions with their 
rivals who were Atlanticist or advocated multilateral disarmament. The 
campaign’s calls for unilateralism were based on the idea that it could convince 
world opinion about the need to decommission nuclear weapons – ideas which 
were redolent of the claim that Britain needed to retain its weapons to influence 
Washington. As Stephen King-Hall put it in his 1958 plea for unilateralism, 
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Britons were ‘a considerable people whose general influence on human history 
during the past 500 years has been more significant than that of any other 
national group.’ Invoking John Milton’s dictum which was oft-cited by 
campaigners (‘Let not England forget her precedence in teaching the nations 
how to live’) King-Hall argued that Britain was in the best position to end the 
political deadlock between the superpowers.130 Moreover, the protestors were 
not as unequivocally opposed to all aspects of the US as their critics suggested. 
Jazz music provided the soundtrack to the protest marches to Aldermaston and 
Adrian Mitchell, a writer involved with CND recalled being influenced by 
American films such as Dr Strangelove and Fail Safe — both of which were 
inspired by Brunner’s The Brink — and US writers such as Kurt Vonnegut, 
Allen Ginsburg and Denise Levertov.131 Some Americans played an active role 
in CND’s protests; in Trafalgar Square in 1958, African-American civil rights 
activist Bayard Rustin told campaigners that there were ‘thousands of people in 
United States prepared to stand behind this’ and Dulles, he noted, ‘does not 
speak for the best of the United States.’132 It was not only the arguments of the 
far left to which these individuals and activists were exposed; American official 
George Kennan attended CND’s first meeting and his 1957 Reith Lectures 
helped to stimulate debate about British defence policy and unilateralism. The 
Pentagon was eager to invite burgeoning politicians for defence lectures with 
senior military figures. Even some past critics of the alliance were invited on 
these tours.133 Richard Crossman’s report on one such trip in the New 
Statesman in 1958 demonstrated the wariness some participants in these visits 
felt about the Pentagon and American Generals. Remembering a speech in 
Washington by General Nathan Twining which expressed a desire to 
circumvent the limitations imposed by political leaders, the Labour MP 
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described visiting the Lincoln Memorial and questioned how the former 
President would have responded ‘if one of his subordinates had talked in that 
way?’ Overlooking the longstanding role played by the American military and 
the fact that former General Dwight Eisenhower occupied the White House, he 
criticised ‘the breed of politicians who have permitted policy to be subordinated 
to strategy’ and who had failed to restrain the Pentagon.134 
  In this, CND and the critics of aspects of the Anglo-American defence 
relationship had some habits in common with their opponents. The shared 
English language and close US-UK defence ties ensured that American writing 
and theorising about defence policy was more relevant and accessible than was 
the case for any other NATO ally. Kennan, Vannevar Bush and Paul Nitze or 
even American military personnel and politicians such as Dulles and General 
Matthew Ridgway were often discussed in books published about British 
policy. 135 The group of military, defence and foreign policy specialists who 
called for the development of tactical nuclear weapons and the reform of NATO 
were also inspired by arguments expressed across the Atlantic. For these critics 
who disapproved of the results of the 1957 Defence Review, in which 
conscription was abolished in favour of reliance on Britain’s nuclear deterrent, 
American lessons were important. Future American Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger’s Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1958) attracted attention in 
Britain and influenced the growth of a group of intellectuals, politicians and 
journalists who called for the reform of NATO and the use of tactical atomic 
weapons. Advancements in nuclear technology and the destructive capacity of 
hydrogen weaponry led to questions about whether all wars needed to be total 
and the possibility of pursuing limited warfare to resist Soviet aggression was 
mooted. The Institute of Strategic Studies was created by individuals who were 
influenced by the work of American writers such as Bernard Brodie, Albert 
Wohlstetter, Thomas Schelling and Hermann Kahn. Labour defence specialist 
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Denis Healey, who was also involved with the Institute of Strategic Studies 
which debated these questions, described this as the ‘new breed of defence 
intellectual’ which was then emerging on both sides of the Atlantic.136 In a 
political culture in which it was becoming routine to look across the Atlantic for 
ideas or inspiration from the US, it is not surprising that critics of the ‘special 
relationship’ worked with their American counterparts to hone their arguments. 
Though there was conflict in Britain over defence and nuclear policy, the 
willingness to learn from American writers on this subject was something 
which united commentators, politicians and officials.  
 
Conclusions 
 
As the Anglo-American defence relationship developed during the long 1950s, 
it was a subject which epitomised concerns about British dependence on or 
subservience to Washington and the question of the extent to which policy-
makers were able to influence their American counterparts. Within the Western 
defence arrangements, it was the United States which had the largest role and 
Britons had to cope with the reality of being dependent on decisions made by 
officials in the Pentagon. The presence of US forces at British RAF bases, the 
growing dependence on American policy-makers for the UK’s nuclear deterrent 
and Britain’s position within NATO all prompted questions as to whether this 
amounted to dependence on Washington. Nonetheless, most were agreed that 
Britain retained the capacity to influence the direction of American policy 
regardless of their positions within the fierce conflicts over defence and nuclear 
matters. The Generals and Admirals whose capacity to instigate a third world 
war were a continual source of anxiety but there was typically confidence that 
their demands could be mitigated by the steadying influence of British 
politicians. The political and diplomatic links between the two countries as well 
as the shared English language meant that ideas about defence could be easily 
transferred to Britain. Such was the focus on debates in the US that even the 
opponents of Britain’s nuclear deterrent in CND who often criticised the US or 
called for an end to the transatlantic defence partnership utilised ideas from 
                                                 
136 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, 240. 
185 
 
across the Atlantic. Although defence questions were somewhat rarefied or 
opaque, other issues which affected British views of America were more 
tangible and relevant to the wider population. Chapter Five assesses a subject 
which was more relevant to everyday life than defence policy and nuclear 
weapons: British perceptions of American culture and reactions to its export to 
the UK. Warnings about the ‘Americanisation’ of British culture were common 
in response to the introduction of a range of products including commercial 
television, rock ‘n’ roll, and bowling alleys. It assesses the unique role that the 
US because of its reputation as the home of modernity played in British debates 
about cultural change.    
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Chapter Five 
The American Future 
 
In June 1956, a series of reports in the Sunday Times described the existence of 
a new sales method being utilised across the Atlantic. Correspondent William 
Foster told readers about a recent experiment in ‘subliminal’ or ‘sub-conscious’ 
advertising at a New Jersey cinema; the displaying of an ice cream commercial 
for a fraction of a second was said to have led to a 60 per cent increase in 
demand for the product. For Foster, this was a ‘selling technique straight from 
George Orwell’s “1984”’ and the anxieties about this type of advertisement 
neared moral panic by the end of the decade.1 Although the details about the 
New Jersey tests were vague and even proved to be fraudulent several years 
later, the fear grew that companies or politicians could manipulate the opinions 
and tastes of the British public.2 BBC television’s A Question of Science tested 
subliminal messaging on its viewers, there were questions in the House of 
Commons about whether Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was using such 
methods in political campaigns, and the 1962 committee on broadcasting called 
for legislation restricting its use. As E. S. Turner, a sceptic about advertising, 
noted in 1965, ‘it is quite clear that the threat of the subliminal technique ‘was 
blown up into an absurd bogy.’3  
The worries about subliminal advertising in the late 1950s were not the first 
or last occasion during which the prospect of an import from the United States 
caused anxiety. In the two decades after 1945, various other cultural products, 
trends and habits were met with suspicion as it was feared that their export to 
Britain could undermine its traditional culture. It was a cliché to suggest what 
happened in America would inevitably occur five years later in Britain and the 
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apparent Americanisation of Britain was a topic for much debate. Hollywood 
films, American television programmes and youth culture symbolised by “rock 
‘n’ roll” music were all popular with sections of the public but nonetheless 
attracted elite criticism. Chapter Five examines British perceptions of US 
culture in the long 1950s and investigates debates about the country’s 
seemingly growing influence in Britain. This was a period when comparisons 
with American culture were unavoidable. The affluence and consumerism 
provided a marked contrast with the living standards of Western Europe and the 
intensification of the cultural Cold War with the USSR meant that Washington 
was eager to promote its successes and innovations. This chapter examines 
these debates and constructions of US culture to identify some of the underlying 
perceptions of America that were commonly espoused in Britain’s political 
culture. As it will demonstrate, the process of cultural exchange was 
complicated, eliciting various reactions in Britain. Impressions of American 
culture and responses to its importation to the UK were conditioned as much by 
expectations of the US as any physical experience of the country. Although 
there was significant condescension and opposition about what was regarded as 
an ersatz, vulgar or ostentatious culture, this co-existed with enthusiasm for 
American culture. Concepts such as Americanisation and anti-Americanism 
risk simplifying the complicated processes of cultural transfer and exchange; 
America was a model widely used as Britons attempted to negotiate and 
understand modernity. As will be demonstrated, the US was invoked by both 
critics and sympathisers to justify their reactions to complicated changes to 
British culture and lifestyles.  
 
‘Americanisation’ 
 
The British interest in American culture was well established by the 1950s. 
Despite US ‘isolationism’ before the Second World War, the country elicited 
various and visceral reactions even before the Declaration of Independence. The 
promise of the “New World” which had inspired the initial Atlantic exploration 
persisted for centuries afterwards even whilst many in Europe regarded the 
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country as barren, uncivilised or savage.4 Unlike any other nation, America 
represented far more than its geographical boundaries as it was a collection of 
metaphors and symbols, serving as a blank canvas for European fantasies and 
anxieties. By the 1950s, only around 8 percent of Britons had visited America 
but by the middle of this point the prevalence of US cultural exports in Europe 
made the country seem tangible to British observers.5 Because American visits 
were rare, perceptions of the country’s culture were governed by longstanding 
tropes as well as the products from the US which were increasingly available in 
Britain. In the inter-war period, the UK became Hollywood’s largest export 
market, jazz music was enjoyed by some sections of the public, and American 
businesses traded in British towns and cities. The result — particularly as this 
process intensified after the Second World War — was that Britons had more 
images of America on which to draw when forming perceptions of the country 
and the surfeit of US products and representations encouraged feelings of 
familiarity with its life and culture. Writing about Hollywood’s influence in 
1951, writer J. E. Morpurgo described: 
 
The towering New York sky-line, the white clapboard houses of 
New England, the Golden Gate, the magnificence of the 
Rockies; these pictures have become, through cinematic 
repetition, part of the Englishman’s pictorial equipment, and 
with Hollywood’s aid he has developed an intimate 
acquaintance with such peculiarly American institutions as the 
drugstore, the tourist-cabin, the fraternity house and the railroad 
depot.6 
 
 Although these cultural exports played a large role in informing and framing 
British views about the US, their presence was controversial and their reception 
mixed. Whilst millions of Britons regularly watched US films or shopped in 
Woolworths, since the 1920s there had been warnings about the effect of these 
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American items and businesses on British culture. The Daily Express claimed 
in 1927 that cinema-goers ‘talk America, think America, dream America’ with 
the result being ‘several million people, mostly women, who, to all intents and 
purposes, are temporary American citizens.’7 Although these fears receded 
when US investment in Britain decreased as a result of the Depression, 
America’s post-war economic expansion led to renewed claims of cultural 
imperialism by the 1950s. Particularly on the British left, the growing cultural 
and economic influence of the US represented an ‘American invasion’ which 
threatened indigenous British ways of life and habits.8 In his seminal 1957 book 
The Uses of Literacy, Richard Hoggart lamented the erosion of traditional 
working-class cultures by American popular music, television programmes or 
fashion imported to Britain. Describing the milk bars and juke boxes which 
populated British towns and cities, the cultural theorist described their 
inhabitants as men with ‘drape-suits, picture ties and an American slouch’ who 
lived ‘in a myth-world compounded of a few simple elements which they take 
to be those of American life.’9 The anti-capitalism which remained prevalent on 
the left encouraged its suspicion of what was regarded as a mechanised, 
commercial lifestyle prevalent in the US. In left-wing journal Tribune, symbols 
of the international success of US capitalism such as Coca-Cola were frequent 
targets for criticism and in 1952 Labour MP Jennie Lee described the US as 
evidence that capitalism had ‘lost its sanctions.’ It was, she told readers, a 
country as a ‘world of permanent central heating and artificial light … [which] 
reeks of rye whiskey and dope, its music is the jukebox syncopated with 
gunshots.’10   
 Critics bemoaned what they regarded as the Americanisation of British 
culture. For left-wing spokesmen, it was a source of frustration because the 
increased living standards experienced by the American public had been 
achieved under the capitalist system they opposed. In 1952, ‘Bevanite’ MP 
Barbara Castle argued that ‘We are not anti-American. We are anti-capitalist — 
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or used to be.’11 Consequently, some left-wing officials and politicians were 
quick to note the deficiencies in this culture which challenged their conviction 
that the working class could achieve the best improvements under a socialist 
economic system. At the Labour Party conference in 1960, Harold Wilson 
asserted that ‘America perhaps is rich enough to be able to afford this 
Americanised society; we cannot’ and warned that Britain would ‘go on lagging 
behind others unless we have central planning and direction of our economic 
life.’12 The complaints motivated by suspicion at the influence of big business 
on American cultural production were augmented by the nationalistic belief in 
the superiority of British habits and tastes. In 1951, writer Harold Nicolson 
warned against the calls for Federal Union by suggesting that: 
 
The time may come when we have all been so gleichgeschaltes 
by American culture that we shall respond automatically to the 
same stimulus. But at the present moment, as is noticeable, we 
do not respond to the same stimulus. It is evident that in any 
Federal Union, whatever institutional devices might be adopted, 
the voice of America would be dominant. It will take many 
generations before the British citizen responds with complete 
automatism to the voice of America.13 
 
Evelyn Waugh’s 1948 novel The Loved One reflected these doubts about 
aspects of the US’s culture by satirising Hollywood social life as well as the 
American funeral industry.14 Waugh’s upper-class criticisms of American 
culture often found expression in right-wing publications as writers and 
correspondents protested about US customs replacing what they perceived as 
the British way of life. A letter published in conservative journal John Bull in 
1958 demonstrated that such concerns often concerned minor aspects of British 
life as it asked ‘What has happened to the old British habit of lovers walking 
arm-in-arm? It seems to have completely died out — and given place to that 
frightful American custom of pulling the girl along by the fingertips.’15 
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 Not only was American culture regarded as inferior by sections of the 
British elite; its increased prevalence provoked an extended debate about the 
‘Americanisation’ of the UK. It was particularly left-wing figures that adopted 
such a view and Francis Williams argued in 1962 that  
 
Sometimes it hits you as soon as you arrive in a country—you 
see it in the stores and office blocks, in the theatres and 
apartment houses, in the way people talk and dress and behave 
and the things they read. Sometimes you need to have known a 
country years before to be aware of the changes Americanisation 
has wrought. But if you travel about the world a good deal you 
cannot but be aware of it in some shape or form almost 
wherever you go.16 
 
Although this type of thesis was common given the extent of American cultural 
exports to Britain, it was controversial. Even a review in the left-wing New 
Statesman treated Williams’s thesis with some suspicion as writer John Gross 
questioned ‘How far are American methods modified by British institutions, 
and will an American practice necessarily have the same social consequences 
here as it does at home?’ Moreover, he asked ‘When is Americanization the 
result of direct influence, and when of parallel development?’17  
 As this question implied, anxieties about Americanisation were not about 
America per se but related to wider concerns about the US version of modernity 
based on technological innovation, consumerism, and mass culture. It became a 
cliché to suggest that the US was five years ahead of the UK but the two 
countries were experiencing similar challenges after 1945. Rather than being an 
example of deliberate US cultural imperialism, this was arguably an example of 
the fact that the two countries and Western democracies more generally were 
undergoing similar changes as they adjusted from industrial to service 
industries and from production to consumption. As Britons attempted to come 
to terms with these issues, best-selling American books such as The Lonely 
Crowd, The Organization Man, The Hidden Persuaders and The Affluent 
Society were all popular in the UK. They all informed the debate about US 
culture and offered ideas which augmented the critique of American culture and 
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shaped perceptions of life across the Atlantic. Others claimed that these worries 
about ‘Americanisation’ were more related to the British engagement with 
modernity. American writer Mary McCarthy posited that this was the cause of 
British objections to the US after encountering some prejudice on a visit to 
Britain in 1954. She reported on BBC radio that:  
 
The western world’s fear of America is simply a localisation of 
the universal fear of the future. If we Americans, tourists, in 
London are looked upon with misgiving, it is because we seem 
to have come, bag and baggage and camera, from the home of 
that unimaginable tomorrow.18 
 
According to H. G. Nicholas, Europeans ‘cannot fail to see in America more 
than America, to see there some at least of the portents of our own future.’ He 
pointed out that ‘whether it is Coca-cola, mass technology, the open society, a 
lost innocence, a more perfect union, a wave of the future rolls towards the 
shores of Europe as certainly as in earlier centuries it rolled from Europe to 
North America.’19 Furthermore, the critics did not regard American life as 
homogeneous and the use of the term Americanisation simplified their ideas, 
distracting from the fact that many simply viewed the US as the epitome of a 
commercialised culture. In advancing these arguments, the British sceptics 
about the American version of modernity were aided by the ideas of US writers 
and intellectuals. Amongst the left-wing critics, there was a consistent belief 
that Britain was not being exposed to the best of US life, culture and ideas but a 
portrait of the country dominated by big business. Raymond Williams, who like 
Hoggart was associated with the new left which emerged out of divisions on the 
far left in the 1950s, argued that in some ways ‘we are culturally an American 
colony’ but this was ‘pseudo-American’ as ‘it is not the best American culture 
that we are getting, and the import and imitation of the worst has been done, 
again and again, by some of our own people.’20 For Tribune journalist Geoffrey 
Wagner, the majority of Americans were ‘being imposed upon by those 
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responsible for the production of drivel’ as ‘small groups, certain individuals 
become able to exploit the good nature in the masses at large to their own 
financial advantage.’21  
 
Affluence 
 
Americanisation has been a popular way for conceiving Europe’s engagement 
with US culture. One recent account discussed the ‘Americanization of 
everywhere’ and argued that ‘America won the world by winning it over, 
sometimes with candy bars and jeans, mostly with images and sounds’ with 
Europeans being ‘captivated rather than conquered — consensually 
Americanised.’22 On various political, social and cultural questions during the 
1950s, the US’s influence in Britain was significant but the population and 
elites responded in various ways and reactions were conditioned by political 
views, age, gender and social class. One of the more obvious signs of the 
cultural differences between the two countries was the relatively high standard 
of living enjoyed by the American public. American social and economic 
conditions presented a marked contrast with those apparent in the British towns 
and cities which still bore the physical scars of the Blitz as reconstruction was 
slow. Despite the Conservative Government policy of building 300,000 council 
houses in 1953, half a million people continued to live in slum housing. They 
were, according to the then Housing Minister Harold Macmillan, ‘living in 
cramped, dark, rotten houses with no water, sometimes no lavatories, no proper 
ventilation and no hope of rescue.’23 Modern conveniences which were 
common amongst the American public such as refrigerators, washing machines 
and televisions were not readily available in Britain. 
Although these high living standards and conveniences attracted admiration 
amongst some Britons, there were commentators and members of the public 
who regarded the US’s rising living standards as being evidence of its vulgar or 
materialistic nature. Respondents to M-O Directives often included the latter 
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characterisation in their assessments of the US and its population, with the 
inference being that Britons were less guilty of these traits. When the 
organisation surveyed the public on their views about Americans in 1950, 
‘Materialist’ was amongst the most common responses as 15 per cent of 
participants held this view of the US.24 A 22 year-old typist reported ‘I find 
their way of living too materialistic and shallow’ whilst 21 year-old student 
noted that Americans ‘are a bit late in waking up to the fact that their 
supremacy in world affairs is only in material things.’25  
It was common for British observers to find faults with the US’s abundance 
or to find fault with its society and level of prosperity. Often this focused on the 
superficial nature of American life as commentators stressed that Britain 
possessed features which were superior to the high living standards across the 
Atlantic. Observing the high American wages after a visit in 1957, Labour MP 
George Brown reported that ‘we still know much more about living, I feel.’26 
This reasoning was frequently apparent when Britons discussed shopping in the 
US. The supermarket was a symbol of capitalist success as these stores 
provided a vast array of packaged goods with large parking facilities for 
customers’ cars. Safeway became the first American supermarket to open in the 
UK in 1963 but beforehand it was a prominent tool in the US efforts to prove 
the superiority of its way of life in the cultural Cold War with Russia. Queen 
Elizabeth II visited an American supermarket in Maryland in 1957 and Soviet 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev was similarly given a tour during a trip in 1959. 
Despite the attraction of US supermarkets, reports of their conditions often 
stressed that the more sedate British shopping habits were preferable. When 
BBC radio’s Woman’s Hour discussed the subject on several occasions in the 
early 1950s, its correspondents often pointed to the benefits of the British 
environment. A broadcast in 1951 which questioned the prevalent British idea 
that the American woman had an easy life described the range of goods on offer 
in a US supermarket but questioned ‘if most English housewives would trade it 
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for their local shop and its unhurried atmosphere.’ It concluded that though ‘the 
American housewife may, in some ways, lead an easier life, perhaps a less 
monotonous one’ many Englishmen would not want to trade ‘the sort of peace 
and security they have here for the more active bustle across the Atlantic.’27 For 
another contributor Suzanne Taylor, an American who married an Englishman, 
the ostensible differences between the situations for both countries’ housewives 
were much smaller in reality. She told listeners of her surprise that ‘almost 
every contraption, device and gadget that I transported so zealously from my 
first home to my second were all to be found here within easy reach of hand if 
not pocket-book.’28 Similarly, when Daily Express columnist Ronald Singleton 
reported on US supermarkets’ innovations in refrigeration he asked readers 
‘What about the joy of shopping; going from counter to counter; talking with 
the butcher as he cuts a piece of fresh steak?’29 
Amongst the British public, attitudes towards the US presence in the 
domestic economy were complicated but on the whole supportive of the inward 
investment. American companies such as Woolworths, Gillette and Hoover had 
become popular and well-known in Britain during the inter-war period and any 
scepticism about foreign investment in the abstract did not translate to antipathy 
towards particular firms. Indeed, when Research Services Limited surveyed 
public attitudes towards US firms and their role in the British economy in mid-
1960, it reported little evidence of unfavourable views about American oil 
company Esso and automobile manufacturer Ford.30 Amongst car drivers — the 
section of the population with most experience of these businesses — the 
favourable views comprised an even higher proportion. On the broader question 
of American investment in the British economy, the polling company reported 
greater suspicion, noting that despite the popularity of Fords or Esso ‘nearly 
three in ten disapprove of the idea of American companies operating in 
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Britain.’31 Men, younger people and Conservatives tended to be more 
enthusiastic but left-wing voters were more divided about the topic. 43 per cent 
of Labour supporters reported that the presence of US companies in Britain was 
a ‘good thing’ compared with 33 per cent who regarded it as a ‘bad thing.’32 
The reasons that people gave for holding such attitudes varied. Its supporters 
pointed to the prospect that it would provide new opportunities for employment 
or innovation with some even stressing that it could promote friendly relations 
between the two countries. Unfavourable responses were mainly informed by 
nationalistic concerns that American businesses were beginning to dominate 
British industry and that the indigenous companies should be allowed to 
develop first. However, 16 per cent were reported as invoking ‘a general anti-
American prejudice’ about the subject.33 Judging the change in attitudes since 
1953 it concluded that ‘there are hints that while the anti foreign element hasn’t 
decreased, there may be more goodwill towards the US among the previously 
uncommitted.’34 When the organisation repeated its survey for a panel of 
opinion-leaders, there was even greater sympathy for the process. Majorities of 
elites from all political backgrounds were favourable towards the process. 
Despite the disagreements amongst the Labour and Liberal voters, the left-wing 
opinion leaders were significantly more supportive, with 53 per cent labelling 
the process a ‘good thing.’35 Thus, attitudes towards American investment were 
conditioned by an individual’s political background and social position but only 
a significant minority were opposed to the process.   
Although opinion polling suggested that a majority of Britons supported the 
American involvement in its economy, several films released during the 1950s 
were more critical of the US presence in Britain. The Maggie (1954) portrayed 
the farcical efforts by the head of an American multinational company to 
recover its cargo from an old-fashioned and widely mocked Scottish puffer 
accidentally entrusted with its shipment. Calvin B. Marshall (Paul Douglas), an 
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American businessman named with a likely reference to Marshall Aid, 
ultimately fails to regain his goods despite his financial power and hasty pursuit 
of the eponymous boat. Moreover, the community spirit of the Scottish 
working-class community was alien to Marshall who, as the film’s only 
American appeared isolated and divorced from human contact, only 
maintaining contact with his wife throughout via telephone. The Battle of the 
Sexes (1959) also used comedy to explore the subject, depicting the 
unsuccessful efforts of productivity-driven American Angela Barrows 
(Constance Cummings) to reform a dilapidated and antiquated Scottish 
business. In the film, the sceptical manager of the Scottish tweed company Mr. 
Martin (Peter Sellers) manages to plot against Barrows’ plans and preserve the 
traditional techniques of the business. These allegories about the US reception 
in Europe were not lost on commentators; a Daily Worker journalist observed 
that the crew in The Maggie possessed ‘the sense of human dignity and 
enjoyment of life which the American has lost.’36 After its release in the US, a 
letter published in the New Yorker complained that Marshall’s fate was typical 
of the country’s reception in Europe – ‘taken for our money, cheated, fooled, 
our advice ignored, our skills wasted, our intentions sneered at.’37 
 Whether these films were as unequivocally hostile to the US as this critic 
claimed was questionable, as was the belief that it represented the majority 
British attitude on the subject.38 Rather than being a universal attitude, this 
contempt was likely representative of the left-wing suspicions of American 
investment in Britain. Both films were produced by figures associated with 
Ealing Studio and thus reflected some of the common Labour and Liberal 
doubts about American investment in Britain. Ealing’s Head of Production 
Michael Balcon later remembered that its ‘creative elite’ was a ‘group of 
liberal-minded, like-minded people … we were rather middle-class people 
brought up with middle-class backgrounds and rather conventional backgrounds 
… We voted Labour for the first time after the war: this was our mild 
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revolution.’39 Sellers also had private doubts which corresponded with those of 
his on-screen character as he concluded after a transatlantic trip in 1960 that 
Americans were vulgar and ‘immersed in the theology of making a fast buck.’40 
However, if the films represented wider left-wing anxieties about the subject, 
their critique was somewhat mild, equivocal and not merely directed at the 
American characters. Both films contained effete, middle-class English 
establishment figures supportive of the US attempts to introduce productivity 
lessons but similarly unable to understand the working-class communities in 
Scotland. They ultimately endorsed the popular construction of the ties between 
the two countries: British skill, experience and know-how could trump the US’s 
financial might.  
 Such comparisons between the two countries’ skills were frequently used by 
the British businesses and entrepreneurs who sought profits in American 
markets. When the Dollars Export Board or individual manufacturers provided 
guidance for Britons hoping to sell across the Atlantic, they often encouraged 
their compatriots not to compete with the mass produced US products but to 
emphasise the Britishness or the superior quality, tradition and craftsmanship of 
their goods. The Chairman of the Wool Textiles Export Corporation noted that 
there was ‘a tremendous cachet and prestige, and that cachet and prestige is a 
sales point. The very name “British” offers something different, which is a sales 
point, and offers something in the way of a “snob” appeal.’41 After a tour of the 
US in 1957, Alexander Haldane recommended in the FBI Review that Britons 
‘should avoid, as much as possible, direct competition with American mass-
produced items, where price is the factor of major importance in any 
transaction.’ He recommended that the authorities should emphasise the 
Britishness of its goods and establish a department store with ‘an entirely 
British atmosphere, its staff entirely British, even to the “Yeoman of the Guard” 
or “Beefeater” in uniform at the door.’42 Thus, the conception that Britons had 
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experience, skills and knowledge which contrasted with American abundance 
and materialism was not only applied to foreign affairs but was a reflection of a 
more pervasive construction of the two countries’ roles and skills. 
 
America on the Big Screen 
 
Film policy had been a source of intergovernmental conflict during the late 
1940s.  In an attempt to address its chronic balance of payments crisis, the 
Attlee Government introduced a tax on the receipts from American films 
exports, a policy which prompted Hollywood to embargo British cinemas. 
Ultimately, the Labour Government and film distributors proved unable to fill 
the gap left by the US productions and negotiated the Anglo-American Film 
Agreement of 1948. This specified that Hollywood companies were allowed to 
distribute a total of 180 feature films in Britain but any profits over £17 million 
had to be reinvested in the indigenous industry.43 As a result, nominally British 
films could include several American actors, producers or writers and cinema-
goers were often exposed to portrayals of US characters and their relationships 
with their on-screen British counterparts. By mid-1953, these Anglo-American 
films accounted for 13 per cent of Britain’s film production.44 For sceptics 
about this foreign presence with domestic cinema, this added to the reasons for 
their criticism. Floods of Fear (1958), a production about an escaped convict 
during a flood in South Carolina which was filmed at Pinewood studios and 
Ruislip Lido, was labelled by The Times as ‘a British film in an American 
disguise.’45 As well as appearing artificial and unrealistic portrayals of British 
life, films produced with influence from Hollywood were considered by some 
reviewers as detrimental to home-grown actors. Indeed, the initial influx of 
American stars led actor’s trade union equity to demand a ban on the use of 
foreigners unless suitable Britons were unavailable and labelled the recent 
Night and the City (1950) as not presenting a true picture of London.46 When 
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the cinema adaptation of Graham Greene’s The End of the Affair (1955) cast 
Rhode Island-born actor Van Johnson in the role of protagonist Maurice 
Bendrix, Daily Mirror reviewer complained that Johnson ‘doesn’t do the part 
justice.’47 In the Sunday Times, Dilys Powell’s objections were more focused 
on the actor’s nationality and compared him unfavourably with his British 
rivals as she remarked that Bendrix was a part ‘for an actor of, say, Michael 
Redgrave. Instead, we are given the friendly features and agreeably grating 
voice of Van Johnson.’48  
 Attitudes towards Hollywood films were in part shaped along class lines, 
with the working class audiences who eagerly consumed these imports being 
more receptive than the middle-class intellectuals who often commented on 
them. The Manchester Guardian’s film critic C. A. Lejeune was a frequent 
critic of the values she believed were introduced to Britain through Hollywood 
films. She questioned the effect of these products on American reputation 
abroad, noting its ‘frank outlay of brutality; its complete indifference to world 
affairs; its acceptance of drunkenness as an endearing part of American army 
life; its completely amoral outlook.’49 On the left, there were complaints that 
the industry was dominated by big business and failed to represent ordinary 
workers.50 The crime, violence and sex depicted in these imports were all 
causes for concern. From Here to Eternity (1953) was one film which attracted 
some British criticism despite its Box Office and critical success in the US. 
Starring well-known Hollywood actors Burt Lancaster, Montgomery Clift and 
Frank Sinatra alongside British born Deborah Kerr, it depicted the experiences 
of American troops before Pearl Harbour. For the Daily Express reviewer it was 
‘a pretty raw and depressing film’ whilst the Observer regarded its portrayals of 
the casualness of American military discipline, the corruption in the US army 
and the puerility of its soldiers as ‘displayed in such intense and indeed 
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horrifying degree that they defy credibility.’51 According to Tribune journalist 
and frequent critic of US culture Geoffrey Wagner, the violence evident in 
Hollywood films was ‘not merely a matter of a cosh on the jaw here and there’ 
but ‘an attitude of mind underlying the majority of pictures being produced in 
Hollywood today, a lassitude of the soul, a feeling of moral dissolution and first 
spiritual emptiness that attempts to hypnotise us into assent, hoaxed as we are 
by cheap sensation.’52  
Other reviewers and the British public were less hostile to these imports. 
The tabloid press diligently reported American celebrity life and when there 
were reports in the British press that Rita Hayworth was largely unknown in 
Egypt, the Daily Express editorialised that ‘quite excluded from their lives has 
been the picture of a radiant and lovely young woman who in her film – as 
opposed to her matrimonial – career has given pleasure and happiness to 
millions.’53 When Marilyn Monroe suffered a miscarriage in 1957, the Daily 
Mirror devoted its front-page to the story and reprinted a message sent to the 
actor which praised her for having ‘brought glamour and sparkle into our lives, 
and we hope you will go right on doing so.’54 Although the US actors were 
exotic and glamorous, their presence in Britain also provoked some negativity 
with one cinema-goer reporting ‘Take the toughness of Bogart and what is left? 
Take the virile goody-goody pose from Taylor and what is left? In both cases 
just an empty shell of the mass-produced robots that Hollywood dares to call 
stars.’55 Whilst the American actors attracted contrasting opinions amongst 
Britons, the financial arrangements of the British film industry and the attempts 
to distribute British films in the US ensured that the images of America and 
Americans were rarely hostile in UK produced films. For Robert B. Ray, this 
was an era during which Hollywood films frequently addressed sociological 
issues but they were ‘dealt with along the safe, official lines encouraged by a 
studied ideological optimism.’ Furthermore, ‘these films’ commercial success 
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obviously depended on their conservatism, thinly disguised by an outward 
display of social concern.’56 This only encouraged the belief discussed in 
Chapter One that the US was ameliorating social problems such as racism, 
corruption and gangsterism. Films addressing race relations such as Intruder in 
the Dust (1949), The Defiant Ones (1958) and A Raisin in the Sun (1961) were 
conservative and well-received in Britain, with the latter two nominated for 
British Academy of Film and Television Awards as the best overseas film. 
Released in cinemas when tensions in Little Rock and Notting Hill were recent 
memories, The Defiant Ones depicted the attempted escape from prison by an 
African-American inmate handcuffed to another white prisoner. Despite the 
prisoners’ initial animosity, the film was optimistic about the possibilities for 
racial progress as the pair are forced to co-operate in a bid to evade capture. The 
Daily Mirror devoted almost a full page to its review of the film and reviewer 
Donald Zec reported that ‘Hollywood has at last faced America’s touchiest 
social problem — colour prejudice’ and noted that it was ‘not only a brilliant 
picture’ but a ‘mighty courageous one.’57  
Americans were rarely depicted as villains and more likely to work in 
concert with the British stars in partnerships which were allegorical of the 
growing Anglo-American relationship.58 For example, in Beyond this Place 
(1959) Liverpool-born Paul Mathry (Van Johnson) returned from the US and 
uncovered a plot by the establishment to frame his father for murder. Despite 
the complicity of the police and politicians in this cover-up, the outsider Mathry 
provides the necessary dynamism and scrutiny to challenge the officials 
involved. As well as the fact that Americans were often presented favourably in 
British films, the productions were cautious about challenging the post-war 
Anglo-American relationship or Atlanticism which defined British policy. 
According to Tony Shaw, the period was one during which it is notable ‘how 
consistent a theme communist subversion was in the cinema during this period, 
mirroring that widely exhibited in contemporary political discourse and popular 
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literature.’59 As well as reflecting the prevailing anti-communism, cinema 
usually presented an Anglo-American partnership which co-operated in 
opposition to totalitarian or subversive threats. This was particularly the case 
during the height of Cold War tension. Released shortly after the outbreak of 
war in Korea, Highly Dangerous (1950) portrayed a Cold War Anglo-American 
alliance between British entomologist Frances Gray (Margaret Lockwood) and 
US journalist Bill Casey (Dane Clark). The pair aim to penetrate an 
authoritarian Balkan state in order to capture insects set to be used for 
bacteriological warfare and, successful in their mission, the film has a romantic 
ending. In this, it did little to challenge the notion of the importance of Anglo-
American affinity but it did present a caricature of totalitarianism behind the 
Iron Curtain. Moreover, allowing Gray to exercise leadership after being given 
drugs by communist officials even portrayed the relationship as one in which 
Britain could direct its ally. Such was the frequency of cinematic alliances 
between Britons and Americans that film critic Raymond Durgnat later noted 
that this was a period during which the two nationalities were ‘buddies locked 
in complete identity of interest.’60 Indeed, films such as Rough Shoot (1952), 
The Iron Petticoat (1955) and Dr. No (1962) re-enforced the anti-communism 
which was common amongst elites and the public throughout the period. Even 
films with plots not directly related to the Cold War or international relations 
would often cast Britons and Americans as allies.  
 Not all representations of the Cold War relationship were as simple and the 
onscreen Anglo-American co-operation was at times strained. The Quatermass 
Xperiment (1955), a science fiction thriller in which US scientist Bernard 
Quatermass (Bernard Donleavy) and a British policeman Inspector Lomax 
(Jack Warner) work to prevent the spread of an alien life form, was more 
ambiguous. It depicted astronaut Victor Carroon’s gradual transformation into a 
plant-like alien life-form which then expands across London before being 
tamed in a stand-off at Westminster Abbey. Although the Britons and 
Americans work together to resist the growth of this alien invasion, the 
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partnership is fraught by divergent temperaments and approaches to problems. 
Quatermass’s original experiment had taken place without official sanction (‘If 
the whole world waited for official sanction it’d be standing still!’) and his 
character frustrated the British officials. With American officials and elites 
routinely characterised as headstrong or bombastic and willing to bypass UN 
arbitration, some within the audience would have likely agreed with the view 
expressed by Carroon’s wife Judith that Quatermass was responsible for her 
husband’s condition. The Anglo-American relationship between Lomax and 
Quatermass also contained signs of this uneasiness about the British links with 
Washington as the former’s claim that ‘Nobody wins a Cold War’ reflected 
some concerns about the US’s tactics. Others were similarly unwilling to 
endorse the Cold War orthodoxies or question the international bipolarity. The 
Young Lovers (1955) and The Day the Earth Caught Fire (1961) critiqued both 
superpowers for their role in escalating world tensions. The former portrayed 
the development of a forbidden love affair between the daughter of a Russian 
ambassador in London and an American working in the US Embassy and the 
efforts of both countries to prevent their relationship. When they elope at the 
end of the film, they leave a note for their pursuers which read: 
 
You say the world is divided in two that we cannot escape that 
fact. We are going to try. You, who live in separate worlds, can 
no longer believe in innocence because you no longer believe in 
love. But without love, you will destroy not, as you think, each 
other, but yourselves. 
 
The film’s release at a time of relative cordiality in Cold War relations had an 
effect on its content. Its producer Anthony Havelock-Allen was reported as 
stating that the American Embassy approved the script in advance and that ‘We 
waited three years to make the picture, hoping for the right climate.’61  
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Importing America 
 
As well as the Hollywood films which had been popular in Britain since the 
1920s, the 1950s witnessed the import of new cultural products which began to 
feature in debates about youth culture, the rise of the teenager and the 
‘Americanisation’ of this section of the population. Rock ‘n’ roll music, horror 
comics and bowling allies were amongst the items imitated in Britain or 
exported across the Atlantic which in turn provoked interest and criticism. 
Reactions tended to be organised along class and generational lines with 
working class and younger Britons usually more receptive to these products 
than elites or their parents. Particularly amongst teenagers — a section of the 
population which received greater scrutiny during the 1950s — the promise of 
America could provide an antidote to the perceived limitations and restrictions 
of their own culture. The comments of a 53 year-old housewife illustrated the 
different views of the US and its products as she told M-O that ‘We are the 
victims of their films, their jazz, and their murdering of our tongue. Of course, 
were I twenty instead of fifty I should not “feel this way” about them.’62 The 
affluence of the 1950s afforded young people more disposable income and the 
increased birth rates during and after the Second World War meant that 
adolescents formed a larger and more prominent section of the population.  
 Fears about the growing evidence of juvenile delinquency were often linked 
with the imports from the US, particularly rock ‘n’ roll music. Former editor of 
Tribune Tosco Fyvel argued that youth violence, gang culture and hooliganism 
were international problems but were particularly acute in America. He noted 
that ‘the violence of the street-gangs in Manhattan suggests what the Teddy-boy 
problem might become in another twenty years if the problem gets worse.’63 
Various features of youth culture caused concern but the fondness of American 
inspired popular music in particular prompted occasional warnings. Music, it 
was believed by the British establishment, carried ideological messages and the 
BBC with its monopoly over radio broadcasting believed that it was its duty to 
prevent the spread of ‘unrespectable’ music. Then still wedded to Reithian ideas 
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about preserving the tastes and standards of its listeners, the Corporation was 
sceptical about popular music which was perceived as uneducated or lacking 
the skill of classical music. Commentators tended to point to popular American 
musicians as threatening to undermine traditional patterns of behaviour or 
suggested that their influence could Americanise the British public. With 
British acts such as Tommy Steele and Cliff Richard influenced by US style of 
music, Colin MacInnes labelled the UK’s youth culture as ‘half English’ 
because ‘new American musical idioms […] have swamped our own ditties 
with the help, above all, of the shared language of the lyrics.’64 
The fears that American rock ‘n’ roll encouraged juvenile delinquency, 
violence, criminality or immorality were particularly apparent when there were 
reports of riots in 1956 following screenings of the Hollywood films Rock 
Around the Clock and The Blackboard Jungle. Both contained scenes which 
featured rebellious youths and provided a focus for the growing youth culture. 
Local exhibitioners called for the film to be banned but there were questions 
even at the time as to whether this was another example of a ‘moral panic’ 
which met an American import. 65 Despite press reports about the violence 
which occurred at cinemas showing Rock Around the Clock, the Circuits 
Management Association which was responsible for managing British cinemas 
told the Home Office that the press had exaggerated the importance of these 
incidents. In response to the Daily Express claim about vandalism at a Glasgow 
cinema, the manager of the cinema concerned reported that the ‘only damage 
done at the theatre was to one glass display panel which is smashed on an 
average once a week by local hooligans – irrespective of the film.’ Another 
cinema manager from Saltaire described that it was a ‘falsehood’ that a brawl 
had broke out between Teddy Boys.66 By contrast with these reports, the visit to 
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Britain of Bill Haley and the Comets in 1957 witnessed no repeat displays of 
the signs of juvenile unrest which was reported in some British cinemas.67  
 Although the US exercised significant influence over British culture, it is 
questionable whether this represented domination or Americanisation. For 
David Snowman, Britain was more open to cultural imports than it had been 
before but its ‘receptivity to the products of American culture was not slavish or 
indiscriminate. Nor does it appear to have been as conscious or as wholehearted 
as was that of some other societies.’68 Indeed, not only did British rock ‘n’ roll 
stars adopt their own vernacular but there was also some opposition to the 
introduction of American styles and customs. Politicians and journalists often 
appeared slow to understand the appeal of American culture amongst people or 
were sceptical about its growing influence. A Daily Herald journalist was 
unlikely alone in his condescension for young people’s tastes when he noted 
that Sam Cooke’s Chain Gang had ‘all the obvious gimmicks … body shacking 
grunts and rattling effects. Yet even today’s happy-go-lucky youngsters should 
realise, as they jig around their jukeboxes, that there’s nothing amusing about 
chain gangs.’69 For politicians on the left who were sceptical about 
consumerism and affluence, these pursuits seemed less worthy of expenditure 
than provisions on welfare. Harold Wilson told the Labour Party conference in 
1960 that ‘If you build a hospital our economy is in danger. If you build a pub 
or a bowling alley it is sacrosanct, but build one school and it is inflationary.’70 
Wilson’s reference to bowling alleys came at a time when their spread had been 
somewhat controversial. As cinema attendance began to flag, the Rank 
Organisation and Associated British Cinemas converted some of their 
properties into alleys. Though there were reports of protests from communities 
anxious about the association between bowling alleys and juvenile delinquency 
with schemes blocked in Doncaster and Welwyn Garden City, many press 
accounts were enthusiastic about this new leisure activity. In 1962, when there 
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were already eighteen such venues in Britain, Rank’s Bowling Director Ivor 
Smith reassured Londoners that the new alley in Streatham had ‘no intention of 
permitting Teddy Boys and such types to congregate here and make themselves 
a nuisance.’71 Rather than being interpreted as a purely American invasion, 
many commentators regarded ten pin bowling as the re-export of an English 
product because of its similarities with the Puritan game of nine-pins.72 Given 
an exclusive tour of a new bowling alley, the Daily Mirror’s Agony Aunt 
Marjorie Proops confessed her ineptitude at the sport but, after hearing that a 
group of GIs would act as instructors, told readers ‘I just can’t wait to be 
instructed by twenty US servicemen.’73 
 It was not only popular music and youth culture which appeared to Britons 
to be glamorous or exotic. During 1954, the evangelist preacher Reverend Billy 
Graham visited the United Kingdom and his shows at Wembley and Haringey 
Stadiums were attended by thousands of Britons and Graham gained many 
converts. However, his brand of religion was controversial in Britain because of 
its commercialised nature. As one Briton recalled, ‘I saw a billboard … and I 
quite mistakenly thought that this might be some sort of show — Billy Graham 
was the comedian and Bev Shea is the soloist, or the band leader.’74 Despite 
being a commercialised performance that was heavily advertised, the ‘crusade’ 
was not unpopular with the British public. Graham’s presence and message 
received backing from the establishment as the preacher was invited to 
Downing Street by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury Geoffrey Fisher appeared onstage with Graham and Queen 
Elizabeth II was reported to have watched him on the BBC on Good Friday 
1954.75 Though the commercialism of the broadcasts might have been met with 
disapproval from some British observers, many were sympathetic towards this 
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style of religion. A correspondent in the Daily Mail editorialised that ‘If St. 
Paul were here today he would applaud Billy Graham’s 600 bus sides, his 1,500 
posters, his 150 billboards, his 20,000 car stickers, and the lavish newspaper 
advertising and the highly skilled public relations techniques.’76 Attempts to 
measure the proportion of favourable reactions were imprecise but generally 
showed that significant sections of the public were well-disposed to the 
preacher. BIPO surveys suggested that almost all of their respondents were 
aware of Graham’s presence in Britain.77 The Picture Post reported that 88 per 
cent of the letters it received were favourable but the Manchester Guardian 
recorded a more mixed response when Graham returned in 1955.78 In some of 
the samples re-printed in the former publication, the correspondents stressed 
that the preacher had ‘made Greater London deeply conscious of real 
Christianity’ whilst one committed atheist claimed that ‘[b]y the end of the 
meeting I was so completely convinced that my previous ideas were wrongly 
thought out, that I joined the crowd of new converts.’ Not all were favourable 
as one complained of ‘emotional blackmail’ yet one 15 year old even claimed 
to possess, since the visit, a ‘completely different outlook on life’ and a ‘reason 
for living.’79 
Communists tended to be most vocal in their opposition towards US culture 
and were usually the most eager to foster any resentment about the influx of 
American imports in Britain. Though their complaints were not always well-
received, the far left had one success in the campaign against horror comics 
from the US which arrived in the UK during the Second World War. Although 
the popularity of television, popular music and films was not affected by its 
attacks on these products, in the late 1940s a far left-led campaign against 
‘horror comics’ achieved much wider popularity. These products arrived in 
Britain towards the end of the Second World War with the GIs stationed in 
RAF bases and by the 1950s attracted the attention of politicians, officials and 
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schoolteachers who were eager to prevent their influence on the population. The 
CPGB’s 1951 Cultural Conference had denounced various forms of American 
culture and channelled protests against comics. However, an edition of far left 
journal Arena made a distinction between the ‘reactionary elements in USA 
society’ and the ‘culture of the American people, the America of Emerson and 
Whitman, Theodore Dreiser, Paul Robeson and Howard Fast.’80 In common 
with many of the warnings about Britain’s Americanisation, the party 
conceived that British culture and identity was under threat from a variety of 
US imports, one of which was American-style comics. Publications such as 
Haunt of Fear and Tales from the Crypt were often cited amongst campaigners 
and were compared unfavourably with what were said to be less violent and 
dangerous English equivalents, which tended to be based on fairy stories. 
Indeed, Conservative Party journal Onward reprinted a page of American 
comic “The School Children Killers” alongside an article on the subject by Enid 
Blyton, who was amongst the best-known British writers of fairy stories. She 
described American comics as too frequently emphasising the triumph of evil 
over good and did not develop children’s reading skills. By contrast, British 
comics were ‘quite different’ and ‘often a half-way house to better reading.’81  
Part of the reason for the far left’s success in lobbying for legislation to 
prohibit ‘horror comics’ was due to the campaigner’s concerted effort to avoid 
the use of language which could be conceived as ‘anti-American.’ This would 
have risked alienating those who were reluctant to offend Britain’s closest ally, 
particularly given the growing anxiety about the growth in the attitude. As 
Martin Barker has noted, after 1953 ‘the comics against which the campaign 
was directed underwent a change of nomenclature which is very significant’ as 
the ‘American-style’ publications were more frequently referred to as ‘horror 
comics’ or ‘crime and horror comics.’82 This contrast was apparent in debates 
about the subject in Parliament. Introducing an Adjournment debate in August 
1952, left-wing Labour MP Maurice Edelman described ‘the pernicious and 
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harmful effects of the circulation of American-style comics in this country.’ 
Though Edelman warned against the issue being used ‘as an excuse by those 
who seek some stick with which to beat the Americans,’ his Labour colleague 
Horace King echoed the communist line with the claim that ‘We want to keep 
our English ways. What we get from America is not the best of American life, 
the natural American culture that exists in a million homes in that country, but 
all that is worst from America both in scenes portrayed in the films and in this 
particularly nasty and cheap literature which is coming over.’83 In a much 
longer debate in Parliament in February 1955 there were fewer references to 
America or American-style comics with one MP noting the changes in language 
since the subject first received attention.84  
 
Commercial Television 
 
Perceptions of American culture and its perceived merits and defects were 
particularly apparent in discussions about the future of British broadcasting, 
which was the subject of political debate throughout the whole period. The 
introduction of second television channel ITV in 1955 was preceded by 
assessment of conditions across the Atlantic. The interest in American 
broadcasting techniques pre-dated the Second World War. In 1945, the BBC 
retained the monopoly over television and radio which it had had since being 
granted its licence in 1923. Doubts about the quality of the US system had been 
partly responsible for the reluctance in the inter-war period to introduce 
commercial or sponsored television in Britain and the 1925 Crawford 
Committee concluded that its ‘system of uncontrolled transmission and 
reception is unsuited to this country.’85 Ostensibly, the two countries had 
markedly different broadcasting traditions which led to contrasting 
programming styles on both sides of the Atlantic. Since its foundation, the 
nationalized BBC had embodied the paternalist aims of educating and 
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informing (as well as entertaining) the public whereas the US system was 
organised around private, profit-seeking organisations. By the late 1940s, 
however, the American model attracted various supporters in Britain. Although 
increased exposure to US tastes and culture in wartime provoked some 
snobbery, it also led to questions as to whether the BBC’s staid content could 
be improved with outside inspiration and innovation. In a series of articles in 
April 1951, the Daily Express journalist Leonard Mosley bemoaned the state of 
British television, concluding that the problem was ‘not that we lag behind the 
Americans, but that we do not need to lag behind.’ The ‘pioneering spirit that 
once made our TV service foremost in the world,’ he asserted, ‘has been 
smothered.’86 Mosley’s comments were representative of ideas that were 
popular amongst conservatives at the start of the 1950s. Attacks on the BBC’s 
bureaucracy intersected with right-wing criticisms of the nationalisations 
introduced by the Attlee Government and the Conservative Party’s promises to 
‘Set the People Free.’87  
Not all of the party or its associated groups and individuals were as fond of 
the prospect of commercial television being introduced to Britain. Its senior 
politicians Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Lord Salisbury and R. A. Butler 
were far from enthusiastic about the possible end to the BBC’s monopoly whilst 
Lord Hailsham and Lord Halifax were openly hostile. Indeed, there was 
initially ‘no significant Party leadership for commercial television’ and 
criticism of American television was often apparent in conservative journals.88 
In spite of the reservations about commercial television amongst conservatives, 
the Churchill Government ultimately introduced the legislation that led to the 
establishment of independent television. The outcome of the Beveridge 
Committee on broadcasting, which was convened in 1949 and reported in 1951, 
led to the growth of a group of Conservatives who urged the end to the BBC’s 
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monopoly. The Conservative ‘representative’ to the committee Selwyn Lloyd 
disagreed with the report’s recommendation that sponsored television not be 
introduced as he welcomed the prospect of commercialism alongside the BBC. 
Foreign Secretary during the Suez Crisis, Lloyd told The Times editor William 
Haley that he liked the ‘competition to produce good programmes’ in the US 
and that local radio stations ‘can be used to promote community spirit and local 
interest, to encourage local talent and enterprise.’89 However, he was not 
entirely positive about American examples, describing that ‘advertisements 
aimed at North American eyes and ears seem to me to be boring, repetitive and 
lacking in subtlety.’90  
 These conclusions were informed as much by Lloyd’s pre-existing political 
beliefs and attitudes as his experience of the US. According to left-wing British 
writer Mary Stocks, who served on the Beveridge Committee and travelled with 
Lloyd on his North American tour, his viewpoint was the consequence of his 
‘addiction to private enterprise.’91 If Lloyd’s interpretations of broadcasting 
across the Atlantic were conditioned by related ideological views, the same was 
true of the majority who supported the status quo. Unlike the conservatives who 
pointed to the potential of the medium in a free-market capitalist system, the 
detractors of commercial television were influenced by their paternalism and 
the aversion to advertising which were popular on the left. Labour MP Joseph 
Reeves’s comments in the Beveridge Report noted that programming across the 
Atlantic was ‘positively ruined by obtrusive and objectionable advertising 
matter’ with such arguments predictably resonating with the BBC.92 After a US 
study tour, the organisation’s Chairman Lord Simon described its radio content 
as ‘extravagant’ and warned that ‘if we do not want a disastrous lowering of 
standards of broadcasting in this country we should avoid sponsored 
broadcasting like the plague.’93 As the campaign to introduce commercial 
television gathered pace in the early 1950s, similar ideas were crucial to the 
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arguments utilised by the opposition. The left complained about the amount of 
violence on American screens, the domination of big business over the format 
and pointed to Senator Joseph McCarthy’s manipulation of the medium as a 
warning for Britain.94 Outlining the number of lynchings, murders and holdups 
on US television, a Labour pamphlet asked ‘Do we want this kind of 
debasement of standards in Britain?’95 These left-wing warnings were 
epitomised by NBC’s reporting of the coverage of Queen Elizabeth II’s 
coronation in 1953. When the Today Show juxtaposed its mascot, a chimpanzee 
named J. Fred Muggs, with pictures from London it seemed to vindicate the 
warnings about commercial television. Though Conservatives were keen to 
dismiss the importance of such examples, Labour politicians pointed to this 
incident as evidence of the debasement that could occur in Britain and the 
incident was widely reported and ridiculed, provoking questions in the House of 
Commons.96  
 Despite the contrasting views about commercial broadcasting and attitudes 
towards the prospect of its adoption by Britain, supporters and opponents were 
united in the assumption that their culture was superior to that apparent in the 
US. Whereas the left warned about the possible degeneration that could occur 
by importing American methods, conservatives suggested that the British 
people were too sensible to be attracted by vulgar programming. Because the 
advocates of ITV wanted the new channel to broadcast alongside the BBC and 
the Independent Television Association was created in principle to regulate 
content, Conservatives pointed to significant differences with the US. Home 
Secretary David Maxwell-Fyfe was amongst the most explicit, claiming that he 
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was ‘not impressed by analogies from the United States.’ He explained that this 
was because ‘We have our typical British way of resolving problems of taste, 
just like any other problem. We are a much more mature and sophisticated 
people.’97 Maxwell-Fyfe’s views provoked criticism from former Foreign 
Secretary Herbert Morrison, who claimed that his ideas resembled ‘anti-
Americanism.’98 However, an anti- and pro-American schema is a poor guide 
for categorising and understanding the reactions during the debates about the 
introduction of commercial television. Brogan’s comments the prevalence on 
US television of ‘horrid little children with ugly voices aping grown ups’ 
demonstrated that Atlanticism in other questions did not always translate to 
approval of US culture and even Churchill’s notion of an English-speaking 
world did not prevent him from being lukewarm about the subject.99 
Christopher Mayhew, anti-communist Under Secretary of State at the Foreign 
Office during the Attlee Government, opposed the proposals because it would 
‘bring British and American TV standards constantly closer together’ which 
was dangerous ‘to our whole national culture and way of life.’100 In the same 
way that Britons studied US politics for evidence which justified their 
ideological perspectives, their analysis of American culture was informed by an 
effort to identify trends which supported their convictions about the subject. 
Though several commentators and politicians pointed to Canada, New Zealand 
or Australia to support their perspectives, the US’s position as a model of 
modernity ensured that American ‘lessons’ resonated more widely. 
  American examples were crucial in the early debates about the possible 
introduction of commercial television but in the years after ITV began 
broadcasting conditions from across the Atlantic became less frequently cited 
portents. After all, critics no longer needed to travel abroad or study NBC or 
CBS for evidence of the ills of privatised programming. Nonetheless, when the 
new channel was introduced in 1955, some objections were voiced about its 
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content. A reporter in Punch wrote after its introduction that ‘We expected the 
I.T.A. to borrow ideas, programmes and films from American television. We 
knew that the advertising agencies would fashion their “spots” on the American 
plan. What we didn’t bargain for was an entire service geared to the American 
way of life.’101 Others were less perturbed by any similarities with broadcasting 
across the Atlantic and welcomed the programming and advertisements of the 
new channel. The Daily Mirror — which despite its left-wing background 
supported the introduction of commercial television — reported that the critics 
had been proven wrong because the channel was ‘enterprising and balanced’ 
with the advertisements being ‘expertly handled.’102 In the Daily Mail, 
entrepreneur Miles Thomas reported with what was a probable reference to the 
US that ‘I saw nothing of the sometimes brash and vulgar elements that appear 
on other screens. We seem to have combined wit with our selling approach in 
an attractive manner. And I saw no evidence of bad taste.’103  
As Lawrence Black has noted of the Labour Party, the party’s ‘opposition to 
TV diminished through the early 1960s’ partly because ‘fears of 
‘Americanization’ faded’ and the party accepted independent television’s 
popularity.104 However, during the late 1950s, the issue continued to cause 
questions about the cultural influence of the US over Britain even if debates 
about Americanisation were less frequent. Part of the problem for critics of the 
medium was its popularity amongst the general public. American imports such 
as I Love Lucy, a comedy based on the exploits of Lucille Ball which portrayed 
the opulent lifestyle of a New York apartment block, and Los Angeles police 
detective programme Dragnet were successful in Britain.105 In a News 
Chronicle poll in January 1956, I Love Lucy was the second most popular 
programme with viewers and the BBC struggled to compete with the new 
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channel.106 With US programmes having such an immediate appeal to the 
public, the charges of Americanisation lost some force but still persisted into 
the 1960s. In 1957, the Conservative Party received complaints about the ‘ever-
increasing Americanisation’ of ITV and BBC and their broadcasting of 
‘unintelligent and alien programmes’ but sought to allay fears by stressing that 
such trends were exaggerated.’107 Despite the success of many American 
imports, their presence continued to provoke criticism on the left. In 1959, 
reports of cheating in 21 — a quiz show imported from the US — led to 
renewed focus on the quality of the US imports. D. W. Brogan described that 
the American citizen was ‘disconcerted’ by ‘a series of shocks in the past year 
which are forcing a domestic “agonizing reappraisal,”’ one of which was the 
‘serio-comic tragedy of the rigged TV quizzes’ during which the public was 
‘bamboozled by the great mass media.’108 In the Daily Mirror, “Cassandra” 
described it as evidence that the ‘Fast Buck, or high-speed dollar obtained in 
circumstances that do not always bear close examination, is a revered 
institution.’109 However, the scandal surrounding 21 did not provoke the same 
degree of anxiety as the appearance of the chimp J. Fred Muggs’ during the 
coverage of the coronation. By 1959, Mayhew’s objections were more about 
the extent of American and “mid-Atlantic” features rather than their presence. 
He argued of the British public that ‘While welcoming a fair ration of American 
television programmes, they regard with horror the possibility of creating in 
Britain a hybrid mid-Atlantic culture.’110 
 Warnings about the Americanisation of British television received renewed 
attention in 1962 with the publication of the Pilkington Report which criticised 
ITV for having failed to uphold ‘standards’ in broadcasting. With renowned 
sceptic of American culture Richard Hoggart serving on the committee, it is 
unsurprising that these conclusions were emphasised. However, the 
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submissions by the communist and socialist parties did not attack commercial 
television for importing American tastes and mores or because it corroded the 
British national identity but because the left was underrepresented on the 
medium. The evidence submitted by the Socialist Party of Great Britain even 
lauded the US example as it reported that its ‘companion organizations in 
certain other countries have fared better than we have here, and our own 
members on visits to the USA fairly easily obtain the opportunity denied to us 
in this country.’111 Thus, this example illustrates that debates about American 
culture were not static but capable of shifting over time and, though television 
was at one point a key battleground in the debates about the US’s influence in 
Britain, its introduction lessened its potency as a symbol of life across the 
Atlantic. 
 
Encountering America 
 
Whilst Britons could often construct vivid impressions of American culture 
without having experienced the country, the number of people having visited 
the US increased during the 1950s. As the geopolitical rivalry between 
Washington and Moscow intensified, so did the cultural Cold War and the 
efforts by both governments to prove the superiority of their way of life to 
potential and existing allies. The United States Information Agency (USIA) was 
created in 1953 to disseminate sympathetic views of American society, politics 
and culture whilst bodies such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) 
promoted American art forms such as jazz and abstract expressionist art. One 
tactic used by successive US administrations during the Cold War to influence 
international attitudes towards its culture was the funding of visits for 
burgeoning politicians, journalists, officials and academics. In Britain, these 
“Smith-Mundt” programmes were particularly targeted at the soft left of the 
Labour Party and TUC, because they were regarded by the US as more likely to 
challenge NATO given the presence within their ranks of critics of 
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Atlanticism.112 The trips contributed to a growth in transatlantic travel; only 
24,000 Britons visited the US in 1937 compared with 54,000 by 1954 and 
69,000 in 1959.113 Dollar exchange restrictions at the beginning of the decade 
meant that most prospective visitors had to rely on funding from the State 
Department or other US organisations such as the Fulbright Foundation or 
Commonwealth Fund. The goal of such trips was to manage the American 
reputation abroad and its stated aim was ‘to build a receptive climate of public 
opinion overseas in which the actions and policies of the US can be correctly 
interpreted.’114  
 As well as aiming to influence the views of the participants, this cultural 
diplomacy sought to have a much wider impact as the visitors were encouraged 
to disseminate recollections and observations from their tours. Consequently, 
accounts of American visits were regular features in journals and newspapers, 
and several book-length studies of trips were published. Such was the interest 
that between August 1953 and February 1955 every edition of the General and 
Municipal Workers’ monthly journal featured an article about the visits of two 
of its members. The weight of these accounts and the earnestness of their 
authors attracted some ridicule. Punch satirised the genre in 1958, publishing a 
series of articles about an American trip by a journalist who had never visited 
the US and Welsh poet Dylan Thomas described that the tourists ‘write in their 
notebooks like demons, generalising away, on character and culture and 
American political scene.’115 For novelist Kingsley Amis, the problem with the 
British visitors was not their banality but their attitudes towards their hosts, a 
judgement which encouraged his belief that anti-American sentiment was 
increasing.116 His novel One Fat Englishman, which was based on his 
experiences on the East Coast in 1958, portrayed the Britons in the US as 
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ungrateful, rude and excessively critical. Its protagonist Roger Micheldene 
summarised what Amis believed to be the typical complaints about the country, 
its culture and society: 
 
Do you think I don’t know it’s a bloody sight worse than 
England in all these ways? Bloody gold-plated bathroom taps 
and the John Birch Society and muggings in Central Park and no 
Jews in the golf club and Little Rock and Las Vegas and Vassar 
and … well … If it was my own country I’d simply …117 
 
 Despite these suggestions that the accounts of American visits were cliché-
ridden and monotonous, the reports were quite diverse as participants recorded 
a range of emotions, beliefs and prejudices when confronted with US life. The 
allure of its cultural capital was not always seductive, though. For several 
visitors the country was a disappointment and they invoked well-rehearsed 
stereotypes about the nature of the American public or its cities. In the Listener, 
Geoffrey Grigson, a poet and critic who worked for the BBC, reported after a 
visit ‘Most Americans walk about the Loop in Chicago or up and down Canal 
Street in New Orleans and they don’t realise it is ugly.’ Despite his contempt 
for the British travellers, Dylan Thomas made his own private observations 
about life across the Atlantic. A visitor to the US on several occasions during 
1950s, he reported that America was ‘all an enormous façade of speed and 
efficiency and power behind which millions of little individuals are wrestling, 
in vain, with their own anxieties.’118 Informed by ongoing debates about the 
Americanisation of British culture and society, the most persistent critique was 
that the US was a homogenous and conformist society in which a mass culture 
was minimising regional or local variety.119  
Most provocative amongst this type of account was J. B. Priestley and 
Jacquetta Hawkes’s 1955 book Journey Down a Rainbow, which juxtaposed 
their separate trips to Texas and the pre-modern pueblo societies of New 
Mexico. According to Priestley, the US epitomised ‘Admass’, the mass, 
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commercialised society based on advertising, ever-increasing productivity, 
living standards and inflation.120 Compared with the consumerism and mass 
culture of the US, the descriptions of the traditional society were favourable and 
Hawkes noted that ‘the stand they are making against Americanization is really 
astonishing.’121 Given the British and American sensitivity about any criticism 
of American life, Priestley inevitably had to defend their book against charges 
of anti-Americanism as journalists labelled him ‘the man who hates 
America.’122 However, as Roger Fagge has noted, Priestley’s work ‘represented 
a genuine attempt by an idiosyncratic English radical to wrestle with the 
complicated meaning of America and the modern world.’123 Though the US 
represented the zenith of the consumer culture of which Priestley was 
suspicious, he praised his hosts and travelled widely throughout the country. 
Others who bemoaned the growing homogeneity, conformity of American 
culture in the 1950s later re-evaluated their assessments. Jan Morris’s reports of 
her transatlantic trips were punctuated by complaints about the ‘numbing spread 
of the uniformity’ and in Hawaii she lamented that the island had become the 
‘nadir or epitome of razzle-dazzle Americanism.’124 Nonetheless, she 
subsequently remembered that she had been ‘quite wrong’ and conceded that ‘I 
didn’t know everything after all, and except in superficials [sic] the style of the 
country seems to me as varied as ever.’125  
 Whilst negative stereotypes and prejudices of the US were popular amongst 
British visitors, this was not the sole reaction to encounters with life across the 
Atlantic. More frequently, transatlantic travellers were forced to undergo a 
more difficult process by which their expectations of American life and culture 
needed to be reconciled with their observations and experiences. As was 
outlined in Chapter One about the British impressions of race relations, in some 
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cases the tours prompted little change in the attitudes of Britons. However, 
others were open about the disconnection between reality and their mental 
constructions of the country. Jacqueline Hope-Wallace, a worker in welfare 
administration who embarked on a Commonwealth Fund Scholar in 1953 
reflected on this tension as she noted that it was ‘a voyage of discovery, to an 
Eldorado and New Found Land.’126 Another commentator described that it was 
a kind of Alice Through the Looking Glass day for me’ noting that at an 
American university he found ‘everything recognisable yet everything 
different.’127 The Britons who undertook transatlantic trips were usually more 
favourable to the US. Surveys conducted by Research Services Limited in 1962 
indicated that Britons with recent experience of America were more likely to 
praise various indexes of its social, cultural and political life as well as 
attributes concerning the country and its people. For example, 93 percent of 
recent visitors described Americans as ‘friendly’ whereas amongst those who 
had never experienced life across the Atlantic the number was only 77 
percent.128  
For many of the young politicians and trade unionists who travelled to the 
US, the trips were seminal in their political development and there were limited 
signs of negativity in the contemporary accounts of trade unionists or the 
subsequent recollections of Labour politicians. Given that Washington was 
most eager to ensure that burgeoning left-wing figures were not attracted to the 
propaganda of the USSR, it was in these circles that recollections were most 
often recorded and, though some complained about aspects of American life, 
most were quite positive about their trips. Indeed, Roy Jenkins, a Labour MP 
who was a recipient of a Smith-Mundt fellowship in 1953, remembered that 
‘August to October 1953 was a major formative influence in my life’ and that 
the State Department funding and organisation of his trip was ‘a brilliant piece 
of unforced propaganda.’129 For other commentators, the visits proved the 
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superiority of the American system which was deemed to be better than that of 
the USSR merely because it was willing to hold such tours. Anne Godwin, the 
General Secretary of the Clerical Workers’ Union, concluded that the act of 
inviting visitors from overseas disproved any ideas that the US was ‘Beelzebub 
Incarnate in the field of political liberty’ and was in fact ‘a long way from 
dictatorship.’130  
 More often than not, though, the recollections from these trips were neither 
positive nor negative but contained various contrasting stereotypes about 
America and its public. Although Washington funded these trips with the aim 
of shaping British perceptions of the US, many participants would have 
espoused positive views of the country without the financial involvement of the 
State Department. Though it was fashionable to decry the homogenisation of 
the US, others stressed the great variety of American life. Labour politician 
George Brown wrote in 1957 of his tour that: 
 
In those six weeks without leaving America we almost went 
halfway around the world. We saw every conceivable climactic 
condition. Met almost every kind of human being. And saw a 
dozen different political set-ups. To the world it’s a country. But 
in a very real sense, it’s a miniature world.131   
 
Negative stereotypes, prejudices and objections to the US co-existed with more 
sympathetic, positive and admiring views of the country. The accounts of 
American visits by Punch editor Malcolm Muggeridge were typical in that he 
voiced a range of ideas, stereotypes and prejudices about the country after 
experiencing it in the early 1960s. His private remarks included a collection of 
common yet contradictory stereotypes about Americans and the US. Noting the 
growth in the size of the New York Times, Muggeridge reflected that the 
‘American pursuit of happiness involves everything getting bigger and bigger – 
cars, steaks, newspapers, etc. Satiety [is] the enemy of this pursuit, the doom of 
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which haunts American life.’132 It was not only the size of American life which 
perturbed Muggeridge; he was also dismissive or contemptuous about Los 
Angeles (‘probably most horrible town in the world’) and airport self-service 
coffee bars (‘a freely constructed concentration camp’).133 Though outspoken in 
his criticism of various aspects of US life, to conclude on this basis that the 
journalist was anti-American would be to condemn most of Britain as holding 
such views. Negative perceptions existed alongside enthusiasm, as Muggeridge 
noted that student audiences in America ‘are probably the most receptive and 
appreciative in the world. They exude the spirit of youthfulness; laugh with gay 
abandon of children, and accept any old dog-eared epigram as though it had 
come straight from Jonathan Swift.’134 His conclusions revealed a country of 
paradoxes. It was ‘one where a stranger may enjoy the most open-handed and 
affectionate hospitality, and also the one where he can be most lonely.’135 Even 
though his views of the US were complicated, Muggeridge was conscious of 
‘the curious way in which news of America sent to England acquires anti-
American slant by the time it appears there.’ He admitted ‘to being myself 
affected and then always surprised, on coming to America, not to find all 
youths juvenile delinquents, everyone smoking marijuana, taking bribes, being 
hauled before Congressional Committees, and otherwise living up to [the] 
American way of life as projected abroad.’136 These conclusions illustrated the 
complexity and diversity in British attitudes towards America. Experiences of 
its culture were mediated to a large extent by expectations, which were shaped 
by an individual’s values and political attitudes.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In post-war Britain, the life and culture in the United States was closely 
monitored, debated and invoked in diverse debates about the social and cultural 
changes which occurred in the long 1950s. The decade witnessed the growth of 
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public affluence and consumerism and America was a useful model for 
navigating these changes and developments in leisure, entertainment and 
commerce all prompted assessment of the experience in the US. Britons reacted 
in various ways to US culture and its export across the Atlantic; political 
affiliation, age, and social class were amongst the factors which contributed to 
the differing interpretations of American culture. There were fewer concerns 
about its influence amongst the general public than from the elites who were 
often concerned about the influence of imported goods on British standards, 
tastes, habits and customs.  Despite the warnings about the Americanisation of 
British culture, these debates were complicated with attitudes towards various 
American exports and products evolving over time. The specific subjects which 
were associated with this growing American influence changed over time and 
the intensity of feeling about these imports often diminished when they became 
an established part of British life imbued with their own characteristics and 
features. Attitudes towards US commercial television, popular music or the 
American presence in British cinema operated independently of perceptions 
about the country’s foreign policy. Politicians, officials and commentators 
regarded as Atlanticist on international questions could simultaneously voice 
hostile or condescending opinions about US culture. One thing that 
underpinned these discussions, though, was the idea that British tastes, habits 
and customs were superior to those of Americans. Despite the high living 
standards and wages in America, there was nationalistic confidence that the UK 
was less vulgar and brash or that its way of life was preferable to anything 
which could imported from the US.  
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Conclusion  
 
This thesis has examined British political culture during the long 1950s in order 
to assess attitudes towards the United States of America with reference to 
sources not usually utilised in studies of the Anglo-American relationship. 
During this period, the US had an influence in British politics which was unique 
for a foreign country. Lessons from across the Atlantic informed a wide variety 
of debates and policy decisions, providing a guide as politicians, commentators, 
and the public tried to navigate a range of post-war political, cultural and socio-
economic changes. Shared Anglo-American heritage and history meant that this 
interest had been long apparent but the onset of the Cold War, growth of the 
‘special relationship’ and Washington’s increased importance in international 
affairs only heightened the attention paid to the US. As both countries faced 
similar challenges in their domestic affairs and international policies, it is 
unsurprising that America could provide warning or inspiration about future 
developments. Given the interest in the behaviour, trajectory and values of its 
main ally, it was inevitable that there would be a variety of British views about 
American life. Indeed, a range of positive and negative perceptions, stereotypes 
and prejudices were espoused about the US and the policies pursued by its 
government. Views were shaped in part by an individual’s political background 
and ideology yet people could hold a range of favourable and unfavourable 
opinions about the country and its population. 
 These complexities and nuances in perceptions of the US belie the popular 
idea that anti-Americanism was widespread in post-war Britain. Allegations 
about the extent of the phenomenon punctuated almost any discussion of 
American affairs from its domestic politics and culture to its overseas foreign 
and defence policy. With the Anglo-American relationship only recently having 
been established yet particularly important to British international policy, there 
was eagerness from the establishment to defend the alliance and their ally. 
Although there was undoubtedly criticism, opposition and in some instances 
hostility towards Washington’s aims, it is questionable whether this amounted 
to anti-Americanism. Rather than being the result of a surfeit of prejudiced 
hostility towards the US, the growing anxiety about this attitude was the result 
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of the Cold War context which defined the long 1950s. Though it was often 
cited as a prominent attitude, there were limited attempts to define the term and 
it was invoked in response to almost any criticism of Washington or aspects of 
American life. During a decade of global tension, any signs of dissent from the 
Atlanticist policies pursued by the governments of both parties were treated 
with suspicion and defensiveness. The allegations about anti-Americanism 
which were first voiced in earnest in the decade after the Second World War 
were a product of the bipolarity of the era; even the most cautious dissent from 
the Atlantic Alliance was met with smears in both the US and Britain. In fact, 
examples of ‘anti-Americanism’ were less frequent than warnings about the 
growth of the attitude, with the term becoming more an abusive label than a 
meaningful analytical category. That anti-Americanism received such scrutiny 
and provoked anxiety was not evidence of Anglo-American disharmony but a 
sign of the attention devoted to the country. The importance of the US in the 
British press, cinema, academia and its political life contributed to the 
frequency of critical or negative opinion about America which gave rise to the 
perception that Britons were unfair in their judgements of Americans. In other 
words, it was the expectation of similarities and extensive focus which caused 
contrasting outlooks, positions and ideas to be exaggerated or what has been 
described as the ‘narcissism of minor differences’ which seemed more 
important because of the attention they were accorded.1 However, any 
objections or criticism was not so much evidence of a disproportionate amount 
of hostility towards the US but more because of the extent to which British 
politics was geared towards analysis of America. 
Many of the subjects about which Britons repeatedly criticised the US were 
more complicated than being evidence of reflexive, irrational or reactionary 
views about its ally. Perceptions about the US were often more about modernity 
or longstanding policy commitments, beliefs or ideas than judgements of 
America per se. Judgements about America were formed with reference to a 
host of ideas and attitudes which pre-dated the onset of the Cold War, the 
development of the Anglo-American alliance or Washington’s rise to global 
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pre-eminence. The contemporary warnings about anti-Americanism and the 
subsequent studies which have identified its deep-seated nature in Britain often 
overlook this fact that the UK’s political culture was particularly attentive to 
developments across the Atlantic. As a result, criticism of Washington’s foreign 
policies, opposition to aspects of its politics, culture and society would always 
be more common than similar attitudes to any other nation – even some of 
Britain’s recent enemies. A range of positive and negative stereotypes were 
invoked about America and its population, which was variously regarded as 
naive, vulgar, materialistic and bombastic yet generous, friendly, hardworking 
and vigorous. Pro and anti-American dichotomies pose various problems for 
categorising or analysing British views about the US. Political affiliations and 
ideologies affected perceptions of Britain’s ally as did changing international 
circumstances. Staunch Atlanticists on questions of foreign policy could 
simultaneously hold snobbish views about American culture or serious 
reservations about aspects of Washington’s foreign and defence policy. 
Paradoxically, the fiercest critics of the country’s capitalist system were usually 
able to find elements of the country with which they identified. 
Whether this British interest in the US amounts to a ‘special relationship’ 
between the two countries is questionable. The westward gaze of Britain was 
not unique nor was it necessarily reciprocated by Americans; Washington’s 
global significance after 1945 meant that all Western European countries 
contained a variety of views about the US or were subjected to the ‘coca-
colonization’ of American public diplomacy and cultural export.2 Without an 
assessment of American political culture, it is difficult to conclude as to 
whether Britain attracted a similar amount of attention in the US. Notions of a 
liberal Anglosphere or Anglo-America also need to be treated with some 
caution given that a not dissimilar engagement with America was apparent 
outside of the transatlantic zone. Without a similar study of Britain’s place in 
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US political culture, therefore, such conclusions are impossible but there are 
grounds for wariness of these claims given the British experience of the long 
1950s. Ideas about the common values, language, culture and heritage were 
invoked during various British debates about the relationship with America. 
Because of the multiple identities in both countries, however, there were 
frequent disagreements about which values the US represented. Though many 
politicians, commentators and officials claimed to share values with America, 
the notion of an Anglosphere is problematic because the populations of the 
demographic changes to both countries in the second half of the twentieth 
century. What can be safely concluded, nonetheless, is that during the long 
1950s America loomed large in British political culture and the imagination of 
its population.  
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